These patches improve how /dev/random initializes its entropy pool during the kernel boot sequence. With these changes, using an x86 test kernel run under KVM, the urandom pool gets initialized before the init scripts start running, and of the kernel users of get_random_bytes(), a debugging printk found only two users of get_random_bytes() before the nonblocking pool could be fully initialized: rc80211_minstrel_ht_init+0x2b/0x6a called get_random_bytes with 22 bits of entropy available neigh_hash_alloc+0x82/0x94 called get_random_bytes with 31 bits of entropy available Both of these calls were in a subsys_initcall(); and the first one I'm fairly certain could be replaced by the use of prandom_u32(). Note: I've cc'ed these patches to linux-crypto so hopefully more people will review these patches. - Ted Theodore Ts'o (4): random: use device attach events for entropy random: make add_timer_randomness() fill the nonblocking pool first random: printk notifications for urandom pool initialization random: don't zap entropy count in rand_initialize() drivers/base/core.c | 3 +++ drivers/char/random.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- include/linux/random.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) -- 1.7.12.rc0.22.gcdd159b -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html