* Matthew Garrett: > On Sun, Sep 01, 2013 at 12:41:22PM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote: > >> But if you don't generate fresh keys on every boot, the persistent >> keys are mor exposed to other UEFI applications. Correct me if I'm >> wrong, but I don't think UEFI variables are segregated between >> different UEFI applications, so if anyone gets a generic UEFI variable >> dumper (or setter) signed by the trusted key, this cryptographic >> validation of hibernate snapshots is bypassable. > > If anyone can execute arbitrary code in your UEFI environment then > you've already lost. This is not about arbitrary code execution. The problematic applications which conflict with this proposed functionality are not necessarily malicious by themselves and even potentially useful. For example, if you want to provision a bunch of machines and you have to set certain UEFI variables, it might be helpful to do so in an unattended fashion, just by booting from a USB stick with a suitable UEFI application. Is this evil? I don't think so. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
