On Thu 2013-08-22 19:01:54, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> In current solution, the snapshot signature check used the RSA key-pair
> that are generated by bootloader(e.g. shim) and pass the key-pair to
> kernel through EFI variables. I choice to binding the snapshot
> signature check mechanism with UEFI secure boot for provide stronger
> protection of hibernate. Current behavior is following:
>
> + UEFI Secure Boot ON, Kernel found key-pair from shim:
> Will do the S4 signature check.
>
> + UEFI Secure Boot ON, Kernel didn't find key-pair from shim:
> Will lock down S4 function.
>
> + UEFI Secure Boot OFF
> Will NOT do the S4 signature check.
> Ignore any keys from bootloader.
>
> v2:
> Replace sign_key_data_loaded() by skey_data_available() to check sign key data
> is available for hibernate.
>
> Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@xxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
> ---
> kernel/power/hibernate.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++-
> kernel/power/main.c | 11 +++++-
> kernel/power/snapshot.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
> kernel/power/swap.c | 4 +-
> kernel/power/user.c | 11 +++++
> 5 files changed, 112 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/power/hibernate.c b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
> index c545b15..0f19f3d 100644
> --- a/kernel/power/hibernate.c
> +++ b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
> @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
> #include <linux/ctype.h>
> #include <linux/genhd.h>
> #include <linux/key.h>
> +#include <linux/efi.h>
>
> #include "power.h"
>
> @@ -632,7 +633,14 @@ static void power_down(void)
> int hibernate(void)
> {
> int error;
> - int skey_error;
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION
> + if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL) && !skey_data_available()) {
> +#else
> + if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) {
> +#endif
> + return -EPERM;
> + }
>
> lock_system_sleep();
> /* The snapshot device should not be opened while we're running */
> @@ -799,6 +807,15 @@ static int software_resume(void)
> if (error)
> goto Unlock;
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION
> + if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL) && !wkey_data_available()) {
> +#else
> + if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) {
> +#endif
> + mutex_unlock(&pm_mutex);
> + return -EPERM;
> + }
> +
> /* The snapshot device should not be opened while we're running */
> if (!atomic_add_unless(&snapshot_device_available, -1, 0)) {
> error = -EBUSY;
> @@ -892,6 +909,15 @@ static ssize_t disk_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
> int i;
> char *start = buf;
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION
> + if (efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT) && !skey_data_available()) {
> +#else
> + if (efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) {
> +#endif
> + buf += sprintf(buf, "[%s]\n", "disabled");
> + return buf-start;
> + }
> +
> for (i = HIBERNATION_FIRST; i <= HIBERNATION_MAX; i++) {
> if (!hibernation_modes[i])
> continue;
> @@ -926,6 +952,14 @@ static ssize_t disk_store(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
> char *p;
> int mode = HIBERNATION_INVALID;
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION
> + if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL) && !skey_data_available()) {
> +#else
> + if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) {
> +#endif
> + return -EPERM;
> + }
> +
> p = memchr(buf, '\n', n);
> len = p ? p - buf : n;
>
You clearly need some helper function.
Pavel
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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