On Tue, Nov 06, 2012 at 10:42:42AM -0500, Jarod Wilson wrote: > The value stored in last_data must be primed for FIPS 140-2 purposes. Upon > first use, either on system startup or after an RNDCLEARPOOL ioctl, we > need to take an initial random sample, store it internally in last_data, > then pass along the value after that to the requester, so that consistency > checks aren't being run against stale and possibly known data. > > v2: streamline code flow a bit, eliminating extra loop and spinlock in the > case where we need to prime, and account for the extra primer bits. > > v3: extract_buf() can't be called with spinlock already held, so bring > back some extra lock/unlock calls. > > CC: Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > CC: Neil Horman <nhorman@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > CC: Matt Mackall <mpm@xxxxxxxxxxx> > CC: linux-crypto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@xxxxxxxxxx> > --- > drivers/char/random.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ > 1 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c > index b86eae9..d0139df 100644 > --- a/drivers/char/random.c > +++ b/drivers/char/random.c > @@ -437,6 +437,7 @@ struct entropy_store { > int entropy_count; > int entropy_total; > unsigned int initialized:1; > + bool last_data_init; > __u8 last_data[EXTRACT_SIZE]; > }; > > @@ -957,6 +958,10 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, > ssize_t ret = 0, i; > __u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE]; > > + /* if last_data isn't primed, we need EXTRACT_SIZE extra bytes */ > + if (fips_enabled && !r->last_data_init) > + nbytes += EXTRACT_SIZE; > + > trace_extract_entropy(r->name, nbytes, r->entropy_count, _RET_IP_); > xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes); > nbytes = account(r, nbytes, min, reserved); > @@ -967,6 +972,17 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, > if (fips_enabled) { > unsigned long flags; > > + > + /* prime last_data value if need be, per fips 140-2 */ > + if (!r->last_data_init) { > + spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags); > + memcpy(r->last_data, tmp, EXTRACT_SIZE); > + r->last_data_init = true; > + nbytes -= EXTRACT_SIZE; > + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags); > + extract_buf(r, tmp); > + } > + > spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags); > if (!memcmp(tmp, r->last_data, EXTRACT_SIZE)) > panic("Hardware RNG duplicated output!\n"); > @@ -1086,6 +1102,7 @@ static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r) > > r->entropy_count = 0; > r->entropy_total = 0; > + r->last_data_init = false; > mix_pool_bytes(r, &now, sizeof(now), NULL); > for (i = r->poolinfo->POOLBYTES; i > 0; i -= sizeof(rv)) { > if (!arch_get_random_long(&rv)) > -- > 1.7.1 > > Thanks Jarod. Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html