>>> why do you need to clear the entire key table if it will be >>> overwritten anyway? >> If you set a > 128-bit key and then set a 128-bit key, the remaining >> bits still remain in the key table. Similarly, if we use updated IV in >> one operation and want to use the initial IV for the next, the updated >> IV will still remain in the key table. The entire key table is copied to >> the AES engine. Even though, we program the engine with the exact number >> of bits to use for the key and whether to use the updated/initial IV, I >> feel its better if the unused bits are zero instead of having garbage. > you're losing free performance. I am really not comfortable having garbage in the keytable. Can you suggest another way to ensure this? -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
