Peter Zijlstra wrote:
On Mon, 2011-09-12 at 09:56 -0400, Jarod Wilson wrote:
Thomas Gleixner wrote:
Well, there is enough prove out there that the hardware you're using
is a perfect random number generator by itself.
So stop complaining about not having access to TPM chips if you can
create an entropy source just by (ab)using the inherent randomness of
modern CPU architectures to refill your entropy pool on the fly when
the need arises w/o imposing completely unintuitive thresholds and
user visible API changes.
We started out going down that path:
http://www.mail-archive.com/linux-crypto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/msg05778.html
We hit a bit of a roadblock with it though.
Have you guys seen this work:
http://lwn.net/images/conf/rtlws11/random-hardware.pdf
Yeah, that was part of the initial inspiration for the prior approach.
There were still concerns that clock entropy didn't meet the random
entropy pool's "perfect" security design goal. Without a rewrite of the
entropy accounting system, clock entropy isn't going in, so I think
looking into said rewrite is up next on my list.
--
Jarod Wilson
jarod@xxxxxxxxxx
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