Valdis.Kletnieks@xxxxxx wrote:
On Fri, 09 Sep 2011 10:21:13 +0800, Sandy Harris said:
Barring a complete failure of SHA-1, an enemy who wants to
infer the state from outputs needs astronomically large amounts
of both data and effort.
So let me get this straight - the movie-plot attack we're defending against is
somebody readin literally gigabytes to terabytes (though I suspect realistic
attacks will require peta/exabytes) of data from /dev/urandom, then performing
all the data reduction needed to infer the state of enough of the entropy pool
to infer all 160 bits of SHA-1 when only 80 bits are output...
*and* doing it all without taking *any* action that adds any entropy to the
pool, and *also* ensuring that no other programs add any entropy via their
actions before the reading and data reduction completes. (Hint - if the
attacker can do this, you're already pwned and have bigger problems)
/me thinks RedHat needs to start insisting on random drug testing for
their security experts at BSI. EIther that, or force BSI to share the
really good stuff they've been smoking, or they need to learn how huge
a number 2^160 *really* is....
Well, previously, we were looking at simply improving random entropy
contributions, but quoting Matt Mackall from here:
http://www.mail-archive.com/linux-crypto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/msg05799.html
'I recommend you do some Google searches for "ssl timing attack" and
"aes timing attack" to get a feel for the kind of seemingly impossible
things that can be done and thereby recalibrate your scale of the
impossible.'
:)
Note: I'm not a crypto person. At all. I'm just the "lucky" guy who got
tagged to work on trying to implement various suggestions to satisfy
various government agencies.
--
Jarod Wilson
jarod@xxxxxxxxxx
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