On Wed, 2011-09-07 at 17:28 -0400, Steve Grubb wrote: > On Wednesday, September 07, 2011 05:10:27 PM Sasha Levin wrote: > > > > > > Something similar probably happens for getting junk on disks before > > > > > > creating an encrypted filesystem on top of them. > > > > > > > > > > During system install, this sysctl is not likely to be applied. > > > > > > > > It may happen at any time you need to create a new filesystem, which > > > > won't necessarily happen during system install. > > > > > > > > See for example the instructions on how to set up a LUKS filesystem: > > > > https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/System_Encryption_with_LUKS#Prepar > > > > atio n_and_mapping > > > > > > Those instructions might need to be changed. That is one way of many to > > > get random numbers on the disk. Anyone really needing the security to > > > have the sysctl on will also probably accept that its doing its job and > > > keeping the numbers random. Again, no effect unless you turn it on. > > > > There are bunch of other places that would need to be changed in that > > case :) > > > > Why not implement it as a user mode CUSE driver that would > > wrap /dev/urandom and make it behave any way you want to? why push it > > into the kernel? > > For one, auditing does not work for FUSE or things like that. We have to be able to > audit who is using what. Then there are the FIPS-140 requirements and this will spread > it. There are problems sending crypto audit events from user space, too. auditd doesn't work with FUSE? afaik it should, FUSE is a filesystem like any other. -- Sasha. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
