----- "Neil Horman" <nhorman@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> +static int rng_recvmsg(struct kiocb *unused, struct socket *sock,
> + struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags)
> +{
> + struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
> + struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
> + struct rng_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
> + int rc, i;
> + u8 *data = kzalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
There probably should be an upper limit on the allocation - perhaps just always allocate a single page.
> +static void rng_release(void *private)
> +{
> + struct rng_ctx *ctx = private;
> + crypto_free_rng(ctx->ctx);
> + kfree(ctx->seed);
Is a seed secret enough that it should be zeroed before freeing? (Same in setkey, accept_parent).
Mirek
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