Thanks for your response.
> >
> Just use get_random_bytes, or initalize an instance of cprng with
> get_random_bytes.
>
Will do.
>
> Depends on your goal, if you just wnat to hide the pointers, why not just print
> NULL instead of the value? If you want to maintain some level of uniqueness,
> just pull sizeof (void *) random bytes from whatever method above and add it to
> the pointer in question, and hope for the best.
>
Unfortunately, neither of these sound like an option. It's been
requested from the networking folks that any replacement value for the
socket addresses be a consistent unique identifier for object tracking
purposes. The current plan is to expose the real address to privileged
readers, and expose a consistent obfuscated address that's only useful
for tracking to unprivileged readers.
> Honestly, though, I'm having trouble seeing the value of this. What interface in proc
> are you seeing that exposes pointers from kernel space in any meaningful way?
> and if those cases exist, isn't selinux the solution to preventing exposure of
> these values to processes without sufficient privlidges?
> Neil
>
Lots of packet families expose them...see, for
example, /proc/net/{tcp,udp,raw,unix}. Since socket structures have
function pointers, they are an appealing target in the event of a kernel
memory write vulnerability. The goal here is to make exploitation of
such issues more difficult, including for distros that don't use
SELinux.
Thanks,
Dan
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