On Sun, Sep 12, 2010 at 7:52 AM, Jeff Layton <jlayton@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Thu, 9 Sep 2010 13:12:40 -0500
> shirishpargaonkar@xxxxxxxxx wrote:
>
>> From: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@xxxxxxxxx>
>>
>> To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob.
>>
>> For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from
>> the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved,
>> if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String
>> as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations.
>>
>> For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob.
>>
>> The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error,
>> this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response)
>> and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed.
>>
>> The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer,
>> 5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large
>> enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible
>> 10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user,
>> workstation names etc.
>>
>> Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it,
>> over the other security mechanisms.
>>
>> The reason mac_key was changed to session key is, this structure does not hold
>> message authentication code, it holds the session key (for ntlmv2, ntlmv1 etc.).
>> mac is generated as a signature in cifs_calc* functions.
>>
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@xxxxxxxxx>
>> ---
>> fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------
>> fs/cifs/cifsglob.h | 4 +-
>> fs/cifs/cifsproto.h | 6 ++--
>> fs/cifs/cifssmb.c | 16 +++++----
>> fs/cifs/sess.c | 93 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
>> fs/cifs/transport.c | 6 ++--
>> 6 files changed, 128 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c b/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c
>> index 346fb64..7e15cd0 100644
>> --- a/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c
>> +++ b/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c
>> @@ -43,7 +43,8 @@ extern void SMBencrypt(unsigned char *passwd, const unsigned char *c8,
>> unsigned char *p24);
>>
>> static int cifs_calculate_signature(const struct smb_hdr *cifs_pdu,
>> - const struct mac_key *key, char *signature)
>> + const struct session_key *key,
>> + char *signature)
>> {
>> struct MD5Context context;
>>
>> @@ -79,7 +80,7 @@ int cifs_sign_smb(struct smb_hdr *cifs_pdu, struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
>> server->sequence_number++;
>> spin_unlock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
>>
>> - rc = cifs_calculate_signature(cifs_pdu, &server->mac_signing_key,
>> + rc = cifs_calculate_signature(cifs_pdu, &server->session_key,
>> smb_signature);
>> if (rc)
>> memset(cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, 0, 8);
>> @@ -90,7 +91,7 @@ int cifs_sign_smb(struct smb_hdr *cifs_pdu, struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
>> }
>>
>> static int cifs_calc_signature2(const struct kvec *iov, int n_vec,
>> - const struct mac_key *key, char *signature)
>> + const struct session_key *key, char *signature)
>> {
>> struct MD5Context context;
>> int i;
>> @@ -146,7 +147,7 @@ int cifs_sign_smb2(struct kvec *iov, int n_vec, struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
>> server->sequence_number++;
>> spin_unlock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
>>
>> - rc = cifs_calc_signature2(iov, n_vec, &server->mac_signing_key,
>> + rc = cifs_calc_signature2(iov, n_vec, &server->session_key,
>> smb_signature);
>> if (rc)
>> memset(cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, 0, 8);
>> @@ -157,14 +158,14 @@ int cifs_sign_smb2(struct kvec *iov, int n_vec, struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
>> }
>>
>> int cifs_verify_signature(struct smb_hdr *cifs_pdu,
>> - const struct mac_key *mac_key,
>> + const struct session_key *session_key,
>> __u32 expected_sequence_number)
>> {
>> unsigned int rc;
>> char server_response_sig[8];
>> char what_we_think_sig_should_be[20];
>>
>> - if ((cifs_pdu == NULL) || (mac_key == NULL))
>> + if (cifs_pdu == NULL || session_key == NULL)
>> return -EINVAL;
>>
>> if (cifs_pdu->Command == SMB_COM_NEGOTIATE)
>> @@ -193,7 +194,7 @@ int cifs_verify_signature(struct smb_hdr *cifs_pdu,
>> cpu_to_le32(expected_sequence_number);
>> cifs_pdu->Signature.Sequence.Reserved = 0;
>>
>> - rc = cifs_calculate_signature(cifs_pdu, mac_key,
>> + rc = cifs_calculate_signature(cifs_pdu, session_key,
>> what_we_think_sig_should_be);
>>
>> if (rc)
>> @@ -210,7 +211,7 @@ int cifs_verify_signature(struct smb_hdr *cifs_pdu,
>> }
>>
>> /* We fill in key by putting in 40 byte array which was allocated by caller */
>> -int cifs_calculate_mac_key(struct mac_key *key, const char *rn,
>> +int cifs_calculate_session_key(struct session_key *key, const char *rn,
>> const char *password)
>> {
>> char temp_key[16];
>> @@ -395,7 +396,8 @@ calc_exit_2:
>> return rc;
>> }
>>
>> -void setup_ntlmv2_rsp(struct cifsSesInfo *ses, char *resp_buf,
>> +int
>> +setup_ntlmv2_rsp(struct cifsSesInfo *ses, char *resp_buf,
>> const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
>> {
>> int rc;
>> @@ -408,20 +410,46 @@ void setup_ntlmv2_rsp(struct cifsSesInfo *ses, char *resp_buf,
>> get_random_bytes(&buf->client_chal, sizeof(buf->client_chal));
>> buf->reserved2 = 0;
>>
>> + if (ses->server->secType == RawNTLMSSP) {
>> + if (!ses->domainName) {
>> + rc = find_domain_name(ses);
>> + if (rc) {
>> + cERROR(1, "error %d finding domain name", rc);
>> + goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret;
>> + }
>> + }
>> + } else {
>> + rc = build_avpair_blob(ses);
>> + if (rc) {
>> + cERROR(1, "error %d building av pair blob", rc);
>> + return rc;
>> + }
>> + }
>> +
>> /* calculate buf->ntlmv2_hash */
>> rc = calc_ntlmv2_hash(ses, nls_cp);
>> - if (rc)
>> + if (rc) {
>> cERROR(1, "could not get v2 hash rc %d", rc);
>> + goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret;
>> + }
>> CalcNTLMv2_response(ses, resp_buf);
>>
>> /* now calculate the MAC key for NTLMv2 */
>> hmac_md5_init_limK_to_64(ses->server->ntlmv2_hash, 16, &context);
>> hmac_md5_update(resp_buf, 16, &context);
>> - hmac_md5_final(ses->server->mac_signing_key.data.ntlmv2.key, &context);
>> + hmac_md5_final(ses->server->session_key.data.ntlmv2.key, &context);
>>
>> - memcpy(&ses->server->mac_signing_key.data.ntlmv2.resp, resp_buf,
>> + memcpy(&ses->server->session_key.data.ntlmv2.resp, resp_buf,
>> sizeof(struct ntlmv2_resp));
>> - ses->server->mac_signing_key.len = 16 + sizeof(struct ntlmv2_resp);
>> + ses->server->session_key.len = 16 + sizeof(struct ntlmv2_resp);
>> +
>> + return 0;
>> +
>> +setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret:
>> + kfree(ses->tiblob);
>> + ses->tilen = 0;
>> +
>> + return rc;
>> }
>>
>> void CalcNTLMv2_response(const struct cifsSesInfo *ses,
>> @@ -435,6 +463,10 @@ void CalcNTLMv2_response(const struct cifsSesInfo *ses,
>> hmac_md5_update(v2_session_response+8,
>> sizeof(struct ntlmv2_resp) - 8, &context);
>>
>> + if (ses->tilen)
>> + hmac_md5_update(ses->tiblob,
>> + ses->tilen, &context);
>> +
>> hmac_md5_final(v2_session_response, &context);
>> /* cifs_dump_mem("v2_sess_rsp: ", v2_session_response, 32); */
>> }
>> diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsglob.h b/fs/cifs/cifsglob.h
>> index 2bfe682..c68f31c 100644
>> --- a/fs/cifs/cifsglob.h
>> +++ b/fs/cifs/cifsglob.h
>> @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ enum protocolEnum {
>> /* Netbios frames protocol not supported at this time */
>> };
>>
>> -struct mac_key {
>> +struct session_key {
>> unsigned int len;
>> union {
>> char ntlm[CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE + 16];
>> @@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ struct TCP_Server_Info {
>> /* 16th byte of RFC1001 workstation name is always null */
>> char workstation_RFC1001_name[RFC1001_NAME_LEN_WITH_NULL];
>> __u32 sequence_number; /* needed for CIFS PDU signature */
>> - struct mac_key mac_signing_key;
>> + struct session_key session_key;
>> char ntlmv2_hash[16];
>> unsigned long lstrp; /* when we got last response from this server */
>> u16 dialect; /* dialect index that server chose */
>> diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsproto.h b/fs/cifs/cifsproto.h
>> index 1d60c65..c155479 100644
>> --- a/fs/cifs/cifsproto.h
>> +++ b/fs/cifs/cifsproto.h
>> @@ -362,12 +362,12 @@ extern int cifs_sign_smb(struct smb_hdr *, struct TCP_Server_Info *, __u32 *);
>> extern int cifs_sign_smb2(struct kvec *iov, int n_vec, struct TCP_Server_Info *,
>> __u32 *);
>> extern int cifs_verify_signature(struct smb_hdr *,
>> - const struct mac_key *mac_key,
>> + const struct session_key *session_key,
>> __u32 expected_sequence_number);
>> -extern int cifs_calculate_mac_key(struct mac_key *key, const char *rn,
>> +extern int cifs_calculate_session_key(struct session_key *key, const char *rn,
>> const char *pass);
>> extern void CalcNTLMv2_response(const struct cifsSesInfo *, char *);
>> -extern void setup_ntlmv2_rsp(struct cifsSesInfo *, char *,
>> +extern int setup_ntlmv2_rsp(struct cifsSesInfo *, char *,
>> const struct nls_table *);
>> #ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH
>> extern void calc_lanman_hash(const char *password, const char *cryptkey,
>> diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifssmb.c b/fs/cifs/cifssmb.c
>> index c65c341..13c854e 100644
>> --- a/fs/cifs/cifssmb.c
>> +++ b/fs/cifs/cifssmb.c
>> @@ -603,13 +603,15 @@ CIFSSMBNegotiate(unsigned int xid, struct cifsSesInfo *ses)
>> rc = 0;
>> else
>> rc = -EINVAL;
>> -
>> - if (server->sec_kerberos || server->sec_mskerberos)
>> - server->secType = Kerberos;
>> - else if (server->sec_ntlmssp)
>> - server->secType = RawNTLMSSP;
>> - else
>> - rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
>> + if (server->secType == Kerberos) {
>> + if (!server->sec_kerberos &&
>> + !server->sec_mskerberos)
>> + rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
>> + } else if (server->secType == RawNTLMSSP) {
>> + if (!server->sec_ntlmssp)
>> + rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
>> + } else
>> + rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> This was a separate patch before. It probably ought to remain
> one.
This was added here because without this patch, sec=ntlmsspi option would fail
against a server like Windows 2003, so it seemed logical to make this
change here,
along with other authentication specific changes.
>
>> }
>> } else
>> server->capabilities &= ~CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY;
>> diff --git a/fs/cifs/sess.c b/fs/cifs/sess.c
>> index 2de5f08..8f44fde 100644
>> --- a/fs/cifs/sess.c
>> +++ b/fs/cifs/sess.c
>> @@ -440,7 +440,7 @@ static void build_ntlmssp_negotiate_blob(unsigned char *pbuffer,
>> /* BB is NTLMV2 session security format easier to use here? */
>> flags = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56 | NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET |
>> NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE |
>> - NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NT_ONLY | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM;
>> + NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM;
>> if (ses->server->secMode &
>> (SECMODE_SIGN_REQUIRED | SECMODE_SIGN_ENABLED))
>> flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
>> @@ -466,10 +466,12 @@ static int build_ntlmssp_auth_blob(unsigned char *pbuffer,
>> struct cifsSesInfo *ses,
>> const struct nls_table *nls_cp, bool first)
>> {
>> + int rc;
>> + unsigned int size;
>> AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE *sec_blob = (AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE *)pbuffer;
>> __u32 flags;
>> unsigned char *tmp;
>> - char ntlm_session_key[CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE];
>> + struct ntlmv2_resp ntlmv2_response = {};
>>
>> memcpy(sec_blob->Signature, NTLMSSP_SIGNATURE, 8);
>> sec_blob->MessageType = NtLmAuthenticate;
>> @@ -477,7 +479,7 @@ static int build_ntlmssp_auth_blob(unsigned char *pbuffer,
>> flags = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56 |
>> NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_TARGET_INFO |
>> NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE |
>> - NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NT_ONLY | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM;
>> + NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM;
>> if (ses->server->secMode &
>> (SECMODE_SIGN_REQUIRED | SECMODE_SIGN_ENABLED))
>> flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
>> @@ -492,19 +494,26 @@ static int build_ntlmssp_auth_blob(unsigned char *pbuffer,
>> sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.Length = 0;
>> sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.MaximumLength = 0;
>>
>> - /* calculate session key, BB what about adding similar ntlmv2 path? */
>> - SMBNTencrypt(ses->password, ses->server->cryptKey, ntlm_session_key);
>> - if (first)
>> - cifs_calculate_mac_key(&ses->server->mac_signing_key,
>> - ntlm_session_key, ses->password);
>> -
>> - memcpy(tmp, ntlm_session_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
>> sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - pbuffer);
>> - sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.Length = cpu_to_le16(CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
>> - sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.MaximumLength =
>> - cpu_to_le16(CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
>> + rc = setup_ntlmv2_rsp(ses, (char *)&ntlmv2_response, nls_cp);
>> + if (rc) {
>> + cERROR(1, "Error %d during NTLMSSP authentication", rc);
>> + goto setup_ntlmv2_ret;
>> + }
>> + size = sizeof(struct ntlmv2_resp);
>> + memcpy(tmp, (char *)&ntlmv2_response, size);
>> + tmp += size;
>> + if (ses->tilen > 0) {
>> + memcpy(tmp, ses->tiblob, ses->tilen);
>> + tmp += ses->tilen;
>> + }
>>
>> - tmp += CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE;
>> + sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.Length = cpu_to_le16(size +
>> + ses->tilen);
>> + sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.MaximumLength =
>> + cpu_to_le16(size + ses->tilen);
>> + kfree(ses->tiblob);
>> + ses->tilen = 0;
>>
>> if (ses->domainName == NULL) {
>> sec_blob->DomainName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - pbuffer);
>> @@ -516,7 +525,6 @@ static int build_ntlmssp_auth_blob(unsigned char *pbuffer,
>> len = cifs_strtoUCS((__le16 *)tmp, ses->domainName,
>> MAX_USERNAME_SIZE, nls_cp);
>> len *= 2; /* unicode is 2 bytes each */
>> - len += 2; /* trailing null */
>> sec_blob->DomainName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - pbuffer);
>> sec_blob->DomainName.Length = cpu_to_le16(len);
>> sec_blob->DomainName.MaximumLength = cpu_to_le16(len);
>> @@ -533,7 +541,6 @@ static int build_ntlmssp_auth_blob(unsigned char *pbuffer,
>> len = cifs_strtoUCS((__le16 *)tmp, ses->userName,
>> MAX_USERNAME_SIZE, nls_cp);
>> len *= 2; /* unicode is 2 bytes each */
>> - len += 2; /* trailing null */
>> sec_blob->UserName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - pbuffer);
>> sec_blob->UserName.Length = cpu_to_le16(len);
>> sec_blob->UserName.MaximumLength = cpu_to_le16(len);
>> @@ -548,6 +555,8 @@ static int build_ntlmssp_auth_blob(unsigned char *pbuffer,
>> sec_blob->SessionKey.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - pbuffer);
>> sec_blob->SessionKey.Length = 0;
>> sec_blob->SessionKey.MaximumLength = 0;
>> +
>> +setup_ntlmv2_ret:
>> return tmp - pbuffer;
>> }
>>
>> @@ -561,15 +570,14 @@ static void setup_ntlmssp_neg_req(SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *pSMB,
>> return;
>> }
>>
>> -static int setup_ntlmssp_auth_req(SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *pSMB,
>> +static int setup_ntlmssp_auth_req(char *ntlmsspblob,
>> struct cifsSesInfo *ses,
>> const struct nls_table *nls, bool first_time)
>> {
>> int bloblen;
>>
>> - bloblen = build_ntlmssp_auth_blob(&pSMB->req.SecurityBlob[0], ses, nls,
>> + bloblen = build_ntlmssp_auth_blob(ntlmsspblob, ses, nls,
>> first_time);
>> - pSMB->req.SecurityBlobLength = cpu_to_le16(bloblen);
>>
>> return bloblen;
>> }
>> @@ -705,7 +713,7 @@ ssetup_ntlmssp_authenticate:
>>
>> if (first_time) /* should this be moved into common code
>> with similar ntlmv2 path? */
>> - cifs_calculate_mac_key(&ses->server->mac_signing_key,
>> + cifs_calculate_session_key(&ses->server->session_key,
>> ntlm_session_key, ses->password);
>> /* copy session key */
>>
>> @@ -744,12 +752,23 @@ ssetup_ntlmssp_authenticate:
>> cpu_to_le16(sizeof(struct ntlmv2_resp));
>>
>> /* calculate session key */
>> - setup_ntlmv2_rsp(ses, v2_sess_key, nls_cp);
>> - /* FIXME: calculate MAC key */
>> + rc = setup_ntlmv2_rsp(ses, v2_sess_key, nls_cp);
>> + if (rc) {
>> + cERROR(1, "Error %d during NTLMv2 authentication", rc);
>> + kfree(v2_sess_key);
>> + goto ssetup_exit;
>> + }
>> memcpy(bcc_ptr, (char *)v2_sess_key,
>> sizeof(struct ntlmv2_resp));
>> bcc_ptr += sizeof(struct ntlmv2_resp);
>> kfree(v2_sess_key);
>> + if (ses->tilen > 0) {
>> + memcpy(bcc_ptr, ses->tiblob,
>> + ses->tilen);
>> + bcc_ptr += ses->tilen;
>> + kfree(ses->tiblob);
>> + ses->tilen = 0;
>> + }
>> if (ses->capabilities & CAP_UNICODE) {
>> if (iov[0].iov_len % 2) {
>> *bcc_ptr = 0;
>> @@ -780,15 +799,15 @@ ssetup_ntlmssp_authenticate:
>> }
>> /* bail out if key is too long */
>> if (msg->sesskey_len >
>> - sizeof(ses->server->mac_signing_key.data.krb5)) {
>> + sizeof(ses->server->session_key.data.krb5)) {
>> cERROR(1, "Kerberos signing key too long (%u bytes)",
>> msg->sesskey_len);
>> rc = -EOVERFLOW;
>> goto ssetup_exit;
>> }
>> if (first_time) {
>> - ses->server->mac_signing_key.len = msg->sesskey_len;
>> - memcpy(ses->server->mac_signing_key.data.krb5,
>> + ses->server->session_key.len = msg->sesskey_len;
>> + memcpy(ses->server->session_key.data.krb5,
>> msg->data, msg->sesskey_len);
>> }
>> pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_EXT_SEC;
>> @@ -830,12 +849,33 @@ ssetup_ntlmssp_authenticate:
>> if (phase == NtLmNegotiate) {
>> setup_ntlmssp_neg_req(pSMB, ses);
>> iov[1].iov_len = sizeof(NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE);
>> + iov[1].iov_base = &pSMB->req.SecurityBlob[0];
>> } else if (phase == NtLmAuthenticate) {
>> int blob_len;
>> - blob_len = setup_ntlmssp_auth_req(pSMB, ses,
>> + char *ntlmsspblob;
>> +
>> + /* 5 is an empirical value, large enought to
>> + * hold authenticate message, max 10 of
>> + * av paris, doamin,user,workstation mames,
>> + * flags etc..
>> + */
>> + ntlmsspblob = kmalloc(5 *
>> + sizeof(struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE),
>> + GFP_KERNEL);
>> + if (!ntlmsspblob) {
>> + cERROR(1, "Can't allocate NTLMSSP");
>> + rc = -ENOMEM;
>> + goto ssetup_exit;
>> + }
>> +
>> + blob_len = setup_ntlmssp_auth_req(ntlmsspblob,
>> + ses,
>> nls_cp,
>> first_time);
>> iov[1].iov_len = blob_len;
>> + iov[1].iov_base = ntlmsspblob;
>> + pSMB->req.SecurityBlobLength =
>> + cpu_to_le16(blob_len);
>> /* Make sure that we tell the server that we
>> are using the uid that it just gave us back
>> on the response (challenge) */
>> @@ -845,7 +885,6 @@ ssetup_ntlmssp_authenticate:
>> rc = -ENOSYS;
>> goto ssetup_exit;
>> }
>> - iov[1].iov_base = &pSMB->req.SecurityBlob[0];
>> /* unicode strings must be word aligned */
>> if ((iov[0].iov_len + iov[1].iov_len) % 2) {
>> *bcc_ptr = 0;
>> diff --git a/fs/cifs/transport.c b/fs/cifs/transport.c
>> index 82f78c4..a66c91e 100644
>> --- a/fs/cifs/transport.c
>> +++ b/fs/cifs/transport.c
>> @@ -543,7 +543,7 @@ SendReceive2(const unsigned int xid, struct cifsSesInfo *ses,
>> (ses->server->secMode & (SECMODE_SIGN_REQUIRED |
>> SECMODE_SIGN_ENABLED))) {
>> rc = cifs_verify_signature(midQ->resp_buf,
>> - &ses->server->mac_signing_key,
>> + &ses->server->session_key,
>> midQ->sequence_number+1);
>> if (rc) {
>> cERROR(1, "Unexpected SMB signature");
>> @@ -731,7 +731,7 @@ SendReceive(const unsigned int xid, struct cifsSesInfo *ses,
>> (ses->server->secMode & (SECMODE_SIGN_REQUIRED |
>> SECMODE_SIGN_ENABLED))) {
>> rc = cifs_verify_signature(out_buf,
>> - &ses->server->mac_signing_key,
>> + &ses->server->session_key,
>> midQ->sequence_number+1);
>> if (rc) {
>> cERROR(1, "Unexpected SMB signature");
>> @@ -981,7 +981,7 @@ SendReceiveBlockingLock(const unsigned int xid, struct cifsTconInfo *tcon,
>> (ses->server->secMode & (SECMODE_SIGN_REQUIRED |
>> SECMODE_SIGN_ENABLED))) {
>> rc = cifs_verify_signature(out_buf,
>> - &ses->server->mac_signing_key,
>> + &ses->server->session_key,
>> midQ->sequence_number+1);
>> if (rc) {
>> cERROR(1, "Unexpected SMB signature");
>
>
> Would it be reasonable to split the simple mac_key to session_key
> rename part into a separate patch from the ones that actually change
> behavior?
OK. But I am not sure what we are trying to achieve here churning
these patches so
many times for a simple change. Not sure who the audience is.
>
> --
> Jeff Layton <jlayton@xxxxxxxxx>
>
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