On Tuesday, August 10, 2010 08:46:28 am Neil Horman wrote: > Specifically, my concerns are twofold: > > 1) struct format. By passing down a structure as your doing through an > ioctl call, theres no way to extend/modify that structure easily for > future use. For instance the integration of aead might I think requires a > blocking factor to be sepcified, and entry for which you have no available > field in your crypt_ops structure. If you extend the structure in a later > release of this code, you create a potential incompatibility with user > space because you are no longer guaranteed that the size of the crypt_op > structure is the same, and you need to be prepared for a range of sizes to > get passed down, at which point it becomes difficult to differentiate > between older code thats properly formatted, and newer code thats > legitimately broken. You might could add a version field to mitigate > that, but it gets ugly pretty quickly. Yeah, this does call out for versioning. But the ioctls are just for crypto parameter setup. Hopefully, that doesn't change too much since its just to select an algorithm, possibly ask for a key to be wrapped and loaded, or ask for a key to be created and exported. After setup, you just start using the device. > Thats why I had suggested the use of a netlink protocol to manage this kind > of interface. There are other issue to manage there, but they're really > not that big a deal, comparatively speaking, and that interface allows for > the easy specification of arbitrary length data in a fashion that doesn't > cause user space breakage when additional algorithms/apis are added. The problem with the netlink approach is that auditing is not as good because netlink is an async protocol. The kernel can only use the credentials that ride in the skb with the command since there is no guarantee the process has not changed credentials by the time you get the packet. Adding more credentials to the netlink headers is also not good. As it is now, the auditing is synchronous with the syscall and we can get at more information and reliably create the audit records called out by the protection profiles or FIPS-140 level 2. -Steve -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
