On Thursday 07 May 2009 14:41:26 Jarod Wilson wrote: > At present, nothing is preventing the use of non-approved algorithms > in fips mode. I was initially working on a patch to make it easier > for all fips-approved algs to be tested using tcrypt, and realized > the changes I was making could also be used to prevent non-approved > algs in fips mode. Any approved alg *must* have self-tests, and thus > have an entry in testmgr.c's alg_test_descs[]. By adding a fips flag > to these entries, we can simply reject all algs that don't have this > flag when in fips mode by skipping their self-tests and returning > an -EINVAL to prevent them from being loaded. So with this change, I > can > > 1) 'modprobe tcrypt' and have all fips approved algs self-tested, and > *only* fips approved algs tested > > 2) 'modprobe md4' for example, and in fips mode, have the module load > rejected as invalid Hrm. Minor correction... Only seeing module loads rejected as invalid when patching this into a Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5.x kernel. With the cryptodev tree, we do skip non-allowed algs as intended, but loading modules for non-allowed algs still works... -- Jarod Wilson jarod@xxxxxxxxxx -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
