This patch adds checks to tcrypt to catch destination buffer
corruption for cipher tests across pages, which was useful
while fixing corruption caused by the HIFN driver.
It works by always clearing xbuf before the cipher operation
and counts how many bytes beyond the end of each buffer pointed
to by a scatterlist entry are non-zero.
The byte count is unreliable, if enough bytes are corrupted
it might reach the beginning of a new destination area and
include it in the count. I don't think this is important to
handle 100% correct since it usually shouldn't happen anyway,
but if this is considered a problem I would simply remove
the byte count entirely and only check the first byte.
commit b50b099a28f8e970cfe54b38bfc317e213a1faa7
Author: Patrick McHardy <kaber@xxxxxxxxx>
Date: Wed May 7 08:32:05 2008 +0200
[TCRYPT]: Catch cipher destination memory corruption
Check whether the destination buffer is written to beyond the last
byte contained in the scatterlist.
Also change IDX1 of the cross-page access offsets to a multiple of 4.
This triggers a corruption in the HIFN driver and doesn't seem to
negatively impact other testcases.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@xxxxxxxxx>
diff --git a/crypto/tcrypt.c b/crypto/tcrypt.c
index 6beabc5..1aa443d 100644
--- a/crypto/tcrypt.c
+++ b/crypto/tcrypt.c
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@
/*
* Indexes into the xbuf to simulate cross-page access.
*/
-#define IDX1 37
+#define IDX1 32
#define IDX2 32400
#define IDX3 1
#define IDX4 8193
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ out:
static void test_aead(char *algo, int enc, struct aead_testvec *template,
unsigned int tcount)
{
- unsigned int ret, i, j, k, temp;
+ unsigned int ret, i, j, k, n, temp;
char *q;
struct crypto_aead *tfm;
char *key;
@@ -360,7 +360,6 @@ next_one:
}
printk(KERN_INFO "\ntesting %s %s across pages (chunking)\n", algo, e);
- memset(xbuf, 0, XBUFSIZE);
memset(axbuf, 0, XBUFSIZE);
for (i = 0, j = 0; i < tcount; i++) {
@@ -388,6 +387,7 @@ next_one:
goto out;
}
+ memset(xbuf, 0, XBUFSIZE);
sg_init_table(sg, template[i].np);
for (k = 0, temp = 0; k < template[i].np; k++) {
memcpy(&xbuf[IDX[k]],
@@ -459,6 +459,14 @@ next_one:
0 : authsize)) ?
"fail" : "pass");
+ for (n = 0; q[template[i].tap[k] + n]; n++)
+ ;
+ if (n) {
+ printk("Result buffer corruption %u "
+ "bytes:\n", n);
+ hexdump(&q[template[i].tap[k]], n);
+ }
+
temp += template[i].tap[k];
kunmap(sg_page(&sg[k]));
}
@@ -473,7 +481,7 @@ out:
static void test_cipher(char *algo, int enc,
struct cipher_testvec *template, unsigned int tcount)
{
- unsigned int ret, i, j, k, temp;
+ unsigned int ret, i, j, k, n, temp;
char *q;
struct crypto_ablkcipher *tfm;
struct ablkcipher_request *req;
@@ -581,7 +589,6 @@ static void test_cipher(char *algo, int enc,
}
printk("\ntesting %s %s across pages (chunking)\n", algo, e);
- memset(xbuf, 0, XBUFSIZE);
j = 0;
for (i = 0; i < tcount; i++) {
@@ -602,6 +609,7 @@ static void test_cipher(char *algo, int enc,
printk("test %u (%d bit key):\n",
j, template[i].klen * 8);
+ memset(xbuf, 0, XBUFSIZE);
crypto_ablkcipher_clear_flags(tfm, ~0);
if (template[i].wk)
crypto_ablkcipher_set_flags(
@@ -663,6 +671,14 @@ static void test_cipher(char *algo, int enc,
memcmp(q, template[i].result + temp,
template[i].tap[k]) ? "fail" :
"pass");
+
+ for (n = 0; q[template[i].tap[k] + n]; n++)
+ ;
+ if (n) {
+ printk("Result buffer corruption %u "
+ "bytes:\n", n);
+ hexdump(&q[template[i].tap[k]], n);
+ }
temp += template[i].tap[k];
kunmap(sg_page(&sg[k]));
}
