On Tue, Jan 04, 2022 at 12:04:10PM -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
> From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>
> Implement create_ima_ns() to create and initialize an ima_namespace
> and implement free_ima_ns() to free it.
>
> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> include/linux/ima.h | 13 +++++
> security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 1 +
> security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 16 +++++++
> security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c | 2 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 5 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
> index e1d65162d1fb..06c88cb17b21 100644
> --- a/include/linux/ima.h
> +++ b/include/linux/ima.h
> @@ -226,4 +226,17 @@ static inline bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id func)
> return false;
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE && CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING */
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
> +
> +void free_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *ns);
> +
> +#else
> +
> +static inline void free_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns)
> +{
> +}
> +
> +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_NS */
> +
> #endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
> index f8a5e5f3975d..b86a35fbed60 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
> @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ ima-$(CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC) += ima_kexec.o
> ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += ima_mok.o
> ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += ima_asymmetric_keys.o
> ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS) += ima_queue_keys.o
> +ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_NS) += ima_ns.o
>
> ifeq ($(CONFIG_EFI),y)
> ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT) += ima_efi.o
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> index f63c6f22b853..4255301e5b96 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> @@ -163,6 +163,7 @@ extern bool ima_canonical_fmt;
> int ima_init(void);
> int ima_fs_init(void);
> int ima_ns_init(void);
> +int ima_init_namespace(struct ima_namespace *ns);
> int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_namespace *ns,
> struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
> const char *op, struct inode *inode,
> @@ -503,4 +504,19 @@ static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void)
> return &init_ima_ns;
> }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
> +
> +struct ima_namespace *create_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns);
> +
> +#else
> +
> +static inline struct ima_namespace *
> +create_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns)
Why are you introducing these functions in 13/19 when you're first using
it in the last patch of this series?
> +{
> + WARN(1, "Cannot create an IMA namespace\n");
> + return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
> +}
I think I pointed this out earlier or made illustrated it in my draft
patch earlier. This function should not return a ptr to an ima
namespace. That's just not necessary: the ima namespace _is stashed in
struct user namespace_:
static int create_ima_ns(struct uesr_namespace *user_ns)
{
[...]
/* Pairs with [...] */
smp_store_release(&user_ns->ima_ns, ns);
return 0;
}
and in the other case:
static inline create_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
