Hi Serge,
Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@xxxxxxxxxx> writes:
> Hi Serge,
>
> "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx> writes:
>
>> On Wed, Dec 02, 2020 at 05:12:27PM +0100, Giuseppe Scrivano wrote:
>>> Hi Eric,
>>>
>>> ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx (Eric W. Biederman) writes:
>>>
>>> > Nit: The tag should have been "userns:" rather than kernel.
>>> >
>>> > Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@xxxxxxxxxx> writes:
>>> >
>>> >> writing to the id map fails when an extent overlaps multiple mappings
>>> >> in the parent user namespace, e.g.:
>>> >>
>>> >> $ cat /proc/self/uid_map
>>> >> 0 1000 1
>>> >> 1 100000 65536
>>> >> $ unshare -U sleep 100 &
>>> >> [1] 1029703
>>> >> $ printf "0 0 100\n" | tee /proc/$!/uid_map
>>> >> 0 0 100
>>> >> tee: /proc/1029703/uid_map: Operation not permitted
>>> >>
>>> >> To prevent it from happening, automatically split an extent so that
>>> >> each portion fits in one extent in the parent user namespace.
>>> >
>>> > I don't see anything fundamentally wrong with relaxing this
>>> > restriction, but more code does have more room for bugs to hide.
>>> >
>>> > What is the advantage of relaxing this restriction?
>>>
>>> we are running rootless containers in a namespace created with
>>> newuidmap/newgidmap where the mappings look like:
>>>
>>> $ cat /proc/self/uid_map
>>> 0 1000 1
>>> 1 110000 65536
>>>
>>> users are allowed to create child user namespaces and specify the
>>> mappings to use. Doing so, they often hit the issue that the mappings
>>> cannot overlap multiple extents in the parent user namespace.
>>>
>>> The issue could be completely addressed in user space, but to me it
>>> looks like an implementation detail that user space should not know
>>> about.
>>> In addition, it would also be slower (additional read of the current
>>> uid_map and gid_map files) and must be implemented separately in each
>>> container runtime.
>>>
>>> >> $ cat /proc/self/uid_map
>>> >> 0 1000 1
>>> >> 1 110000 65536
>>> >> $ unshare -U sleep 100 &
>>> >> [1] 1552
>>> >> $ printf "0 0 100\n" | tee /proc/$!/uid_map
>>> >> 0 0 100
>>> >> $ cat /proc/$!/uid_map
>>> >> 0 0 1
>>> >> 1 1 99
>>> >>
>>> >> Signed-off-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>> >> ---
>>> >> kernel/user_namespace.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
>>> >> 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>>> >>
>>> >> diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
>>> >> index 87804e0371fe..b5542be2bd0a 100644
>>> >> --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
>>> >> +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
>>> >> @@ -706,6 +706,41 @@ const struct seq_operations proc_projid_seq_operations = {
>>> >> .show = projid_m_show,
>>> >> };
>>> >>
>>> >> +static void split_overlapping_mappings(struct uid_gid_map *parent_map,
>>> >> + struct uid_gid_extent *extent,
>>> >> + struct uid_gid_extent *overflow_extent)
>>> >> +{
>>> >> + unsigned int idx;
>>> >> +
>>> >> + overflow_extent->first = (u32) -1;
>>> >> +
>>> >> + /* Split extent if it not fully contained in an extent from parent_map. */
>>> >> + for (idx = 0; idx < parent_map->nr_extents; idx++) {
>>> >
>>> > Ouch!
>>> >
>>> > For the larger tree we perform binary searches typically and
>>> > here you are walking every entry unconditionally.
>>> >
>>> > It looks like this makes the write O(N^2) from O(NlogN)
>>> > which for a user facing function is not desirable.
>>> >
>>> > I think something like insert_and_split_extent may be ok.
>>> > Incorporating your loop and the part that inserts an element.
>>> >
>>> > As written this almost doubles the complexity of the code,
>>> > as well as making it perform much worse. Which is a problem.
>>>
>>> I've attempted to implement the new functionality at input validation
>>> time to not touch the existing security checks.
>>>
>>> I've thought the pattern for iterating the extents was fine as I've
>>> taken it from mappings_overlap (even if it is used differently on an
>>> unsorted array).
>>>
>>> Thanks for the hint, I'll move the new logic when map_id_range_down() is
>>> used and I'll send a v2.
>>
>> Hi,
>>
>> sorry if I miseed it. Did you ever send a v2?
>
> no worries, the v2 is here:
>
> https://lkml.kernel.org/lkml/20201203150252.1229077-1-gscrivan@xxxxxxxxxx/
have you had a chance to look at the patch?
Thanks,
Giuseppe
