On Fri, May 29, 2020 at 12:31:37AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > On Thu, May 28, 2020 at 04:08:57AM -0700, Sargun Dhillon wrote: > > This adds a seccomp notifier ioctl which allows for the listener to "add" > > file descriptors to a process which originated a seccomp user > > notification. This allows calls like mount, and mknod to be "implemented", > > as the return value, and the arguments are data in memory. On the other > > hand, calls like connect can be "implemented" using pidfd_getfd. > > > > Unfortunately, there are calls which return file descriptors, like > > open, which are vulnerable to TOC-TOU attacks, and require that the > > more privileged supervisor can inspect the argument, and perform the > > syscall on behalf of the process generating the notifiation. This > > allows the file descriptor generated from that open call to be > > returned to the calling process. > > > > In addition, there is funcitonality to allow for replacement of > > specific file descriptors, following dup2-like semantics. > > > > Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@xxxxxxxxx> > > Suggested-by: Matt Denton <mpdenton@xxxxxxxxxx> > > This looks mostly really clean. When I've got more brain tomorrow I want to > double-check the locking, but I think the use of notify_lock and being > in the ioctl fully protects everything from any use-after-free-like > issues. > > Notes below... > > > +/* valid flags for seccomp_notif_addfd */ > > +#define SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SETFD (1UL << 0) /* Specify remote fd */ > > Nit: please use BIT() Fwiw, I don't think we can use BIT() in uapi headers, see: commit 23b2c96fad21886c53f5e1a4ffedd45ddd2e85ba Author: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Oct 24 23:25:39 2019 +0200 seccomp: rework define for SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE Switch from BIT(0) to (1UL << 0). > > > @@ -735,6 +770,41 @@ static u64 seccomp_next_notify_id(struct seccomp_filter *filter) > > return filter->notif->next_id++; > > } > > > > +static void seccomp_handle_addfd(struct seccomp_kaddfd *addfd) > > +{ > > + struct socket *sock; > > + int ret, err; > > + > > + /* > > + * Remove the notification, and reset the list pointers, indicating > > + * that it has been handled. > > + */ > > + list_del_init(&addfd->list); > > + > > + ret = security_file_receive(addfd->file); > > + if (ret) > > + goto out; > > + > > + if (addfd->fd == -1) { > > + ret = get_unused_fd_flags(addfd->flags); > > + if (ret >= 0) > > + fd_install(ret, get_file(addfd->file)); > > + } else { > > + ret = replace_fd(addfd->fd, addfd->file, addfd->flags); > > + } > > + > > + /* These are the semantics from copying FDs via SCM_RIGHTS */ > > + sock = sock_from_file(addfd->file, &err); > > + if (sock) { > > + sock_update_netprioidx(&sock->sk->sk_cgrp_data); > > + sock_update_classid(&sock->sk->sk_cgrp_data); > > + } > > This made my eye twitch. ;) I see this is borrowed from > scm_detach_fds()... this really feels like the kind of thing that will > quickly go out of sync. I think this "receive an fd" logic needs to be > lifted out of scm_detach_fds() so it and seccomp can share it. I'm not > sure how to parameterize it quite right, though. Perhaps: > > int file_receive(int fd, unsigned long flags, struct file *file) > { > struct socket *sock; > int ret; > > ret = security_file_receive(file); > if (ret) > return ret; > > /* Install the file. */ > if (fd == -1) { > ret = get_unused_fd_flags(flags); > if (ret >= 0) > fd_install(ret, get_file(file)); > } else { > ret = replace_fd(fd, file, flags); > } > > /* Bump the usage count. */ > sock = sock_from_file(addfd->file, &err); > if (sock) { > sock_update_netprioidx(&sock->sk->sk_cgrp_data); > sock_update_classid(&sock->sk->sk_cgrp_data); > } > > return ret; > } > > > static void seccomp_handle_addfd(struct seccomp_kaddfd *addfd) > { > /* > * Remove the notification, and reset the list pointers, indicating > * that it has been handled. > */ > list_del_init(&addfd->list); > addfd->ret = file_receive(addfd->fd, addfd->flags, addfd->file); > complete(&addfd->completion); > } > > scm_detach_fds() > ... > for (i=0, cmfptr=(__force int __user *)CMSG_DATA(cm); i<fdmax; > i++, cmfptr++) > { > > err = file_receive(-1, MSG_CMSG_CLOEXEC & msg->msg_flags > ? O_CLOEXEC : 0, fp[i]); > if (err < 0) > break; > err = put_user(err, cmfptr); > if (err) > /* wat */ > } > ... > > I'm not sure on the put_user() failure, though. We could check early > for faults with a put_user(0, cmfptr) before the file_receive() call, or > we could just ignore it? I'm not sure what SCM does here. I guess > worst-case: > > int file_receive(int fd, unsigned long flags, struct file *file, > int __user *fdptr) > { > ... > ret = get_unused_fd_flags(flags); > if (ret >= 0) { > if (cmfptr) { > int err; > > err = put_user(ret, cmfptr); > if (err) { > put_unused_fd(ret); > return err; > } > } > fd_install(ret, get_file(file)); > } > ... > } > > > @@ -763,14 +835,31 @@ static int seccomp_do_user_notification(int this_syscall, > > /* > > * This is where we wait for a reply from userspace. > > */ > > +wait: > > err = wait_for_completion_interruptible(&n.ready); > > mutex_lock(&match->notify_lock); > > if (err == 0) { > > + /* Check if we were woken up by a addfd message */ > > + addfd = list_first_entry_or_null(&n.addfd, > > + struct seccomp_kaddfd, list); > > + if (addfd && n.state != SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED) { > > + seccomp_handle_addfd(addfd); > > + mutex_unlock(&match->notify_lock); > > + goto wait; > > + } > > ret = n.val; > > err = n.error; > > flags = n.flags; > > } > > This feels like it needs to be done differently, but when I tried to > make it "proper" loop, I think it got more ugly: > > for (;;) { > err = wait_for_completion_interruptible(&n.ready); > mutex_lock(&match->notify_lock); > if (err == 0) { > /* Check if we were woken up by a addfd message */ > addfd = list_first_entry_or_null(&n.addfd, > struct seccomp_kaddfd, list); > if (addfd && n.state != SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED) { > seccomp_handle_addfd(addfd); > mutex_unlock(&match->notify_lock); > continue; > } > ret = n.val; > err = n.error; > flags = n.flags; > } > break; > } > > So, I guess it's fine how you have it. :) > > > > > + /* If there were any pending addfd calls, clear them out */ > > + list_for_each_entry_safe(addfd, tmp, &n.addfd, list) { > > + /* The process went away before we got a chance to handle it */ > > + addfd->ret = -ESRCH; > > + list_del_init(&addfd->list); > > + complete(&addfd->completion); > > + } > > + > > /* > > * Note that it's possible the listener died in between the time when > > * we were notified of a respons (or a signal) and when we were able to > > @@ -1174,6 +1263,95 @@ static long seccomp_notify_id_valid(struct seccomp_filter *filter, > > return ret; > > } > > > > +static long seccomp_notify_addfd(struct seccomp_filter *filter, > > + struct seccomp_notif_addfd __user *uaddfd) > > +{ > > + struct seccomp_notif_addfd addfd; > > + struct seccomp_knotif *knotif; > > + struct seccomp_kaddfd kaddfd; > > + u64 size; > > + int ret; > > + > > + ret = get_user(size, &uaddfd->size); > > + if (ret) > > + return ret; > > + > > + ret = copy_struct_from_user(&addfd, sizeof(addfd), uaddfd, size); > > + if (ret) > > + return ret; > > + > > + if (addfd.newfd_flags & ~O_CLOEXEC) > > + return -EINVAL; > > + > > + if (addfd.flags & ~SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SETFD) > > + return -EINVAL; > > + > > + if (addfd.newfd && !(addfd.flags & SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SETFD)) > > + return -EINVAL; > > + > > + kaddfd.file = fget(addfd.srcfd); > > + if (!kaddfd.file) > > + return -EBADF; > > + > > + kaddfd.flags = addfd.newfd_flags; > > + kaddfd.fd = (addfd.flags & SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SETFD) ? > > + addfd.newfd : -1; > > Given that -1 is already illegal, do we need SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SETFD? > Could a -1 for newfd just be used instead? > > > + init_completion(&kaddfd.completion); > > + > > + ret = mutex_lock_interruptible(&filter->notify_lock); > > + if (ret < 0) > > + goto out; > > + > > + knotif = find_notification(filter, addfd.id); > > + /* > > + * We do not want to allow for FD injection to occur before the > > + * notification has been picked up by a userspace handler, or after > > + * the notification has been replied to. > > + */ > > + if (!knotif) { > > + ret = -ENOENT; > > + goto out_unlock; > > + } > > + > > + if (knotif->state != SECCOMP_NOTIFY_SENT) { > > + ret = -EINPROGRESS; > > + goto out_unlock; > > + } > > + > > + list_add(&kaddfd.list, &knotif->addfd); > > + complete(&knotif->ready); > > + mutex_unlock(&filter->notify_lock); > > + > > + /* Now we wait for it to be processed */ > > + ret = wait_for_completion_interruptible(&kaddfd.completion); > > + if (ret == 0) { > > + /* > > + * We had a successful completion. The other side has already > > + * removed us from the addfd queue, and > > + * wait_for_completion_interruptible has a memory barrier. > > + */ > > + ret = kaddfd.ret; > > + goto out; > > + } > > + > > + mutex_lock(&filter->notify_lock); > > + /* > > + * Even though we were woken up by a signal, and not a successful > > + * completion, a completion may have happened in the mean time. > > + */ > > + if (list_empty(&kaddfd.list)) > > + ret = kaddfd.ret; > > + else > > + list_del(&kaddfd.list); > > + > > +out_unlock: > > + mutex_unlock(&filter->notify_lock); > > +out: > > + fput(kaddfd.file); > > + > > + return ret; > > +} > > + > > static long seccomp_notify_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, > > unsigned long arg) > > { > > @@ -1187,6 +1365,8 @@ static long seccomp_notify_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, > > return seccomp_notify_send(filter, buf); > > case SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID: > > return seccomp_notify_id_valid(filter, buf); > > + case SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ADDFD: > > + return seccomp_notify_addfd(filter, buf); > > default: > > return -EINVAL; > > } > > -- > > 2.25.1 > > > > Whee! :) > > -- > Kees Cook _______________________________________________ Containers mailing list Containers@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers