On Thu, May 30, 2019 at 12:16 AM Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On Mon, Apr 8, 2019 at 11:40 PM Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > Create a new audit record AUDIT_CONTAINER_ID to document the audit > > container identifier of a process if it is present. > > > > Called from audit_log_exit(), syscalls are covered. > > > > A sample raw event: > > type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): arch=c000003e syscall=257 success=yes exit=3 a0=ffffff9c a1=56374e1cef30 a2=241 a3=1b6 items=2 ppid=606 pid=635 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=3 comm="bash" exe="/usr/bin/bash" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key="tmpcontainerid" > > type=CWD msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): cwd="/root" > > type=PATH msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): item=0 name="/tmp/" inode=13863 dev=00:27 mode=041777 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 nametype= PARENT cap_fp=0 cap_fi=0 cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 > > type=PATH msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): item=1 name="/tmp/tmpcontainerid" inode=17729 dev=00:27 mode=0100644 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 nametype=CREATE cap_fp=0 cap_fi=0 cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 > > type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): proctitle=62617368002D6300736C65657020313B206563686F2074657374203E202F746D702F746D70636F6E7461696E65726964 > > type=CONTAINER_ID msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): contid=123458 > > > > Please see the github audit kernel issue for the main feature: > > https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/90 > > Please see the github audit userspace issue for supporting additions: > > https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/issues/51 > > Please see the github audit testsuiite issue for the test case: > > https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/64 > > Please see the github audit wiki for the feature overview: > > https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Audit-Container-ID > > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@xxxxxxxxxx> > > Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@xxxxxxxxxx> > > Acked-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@xxxxxxxxxx> > > Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > > Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@xxxxxxxxxx> > > --- > > include/linux/audit.h | 5 +++++ > > include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 + > > kernel/audit.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ > > kernel/auditsc.c | 20 ++++++++++++++------ > > 4 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) > > ... > > > diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c > > index 182b0f2c183d..3e0af53f3c4d 100644 > > --- a/kernel/audit.c > > +++ b/kernel/audit.c > > @@ -2127,6 +2127,26 @@ void audit_log_session_info(struct audit_buffer *ab) > > audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u ses=%u", auid, sessionid); > > } > > > > +/* > > + * audit_log_contid - report container info > > + * @context: task or local context for record > > + * @contid: container ID to report > > + */ > > +void audit_log_contid(struct audit_context *context, u64 contid) > > +{ > > + struct audit_buffer *ab; > > + > > + if (!audit_contid_valid(contid)) > > + return; > > + /* Generate AUDIT_CONTAINER_ID record with container ID */ > > + ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONTAINER_ID); > > + if (!ab) > > + return; > > + audit_log_format(ab, "contid=%llu", (unsigned long long)contid); > > We have a consistency problem regarding how to output the u64 contid > values; this function uses an explicit cast, others do not. According > to Documentation/core-api/printk-formats.rst the recommendation for > u64 is %llu (or %llx, if you want hex). Looking quickly through the > printk code this appears to still be correct. I suggest we get rid of > the cast (like it was in v5). IIRC it was me who suggested to add the casts. I didn't realize that the kernel actually guarantees that "%llu" will always work with u64. Taking that into account I rescind my request to add the cast. Sorry for the false alarm. > > > + audit_log_end(ab); > > +} > > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_contid); > > -- > paul moore > www.paul-moore.com -- Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace at redhat dot com> Software Engineer, Security Technologies Red Hat, Inc. _______________________________________________ Containers mailing list Containers@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers
