Maciej Żenczykowski <zenczykowski@xxxxxxxxx> writes: > From: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@xxxxxxxxxx> > > This allows locking down user namespaces tighter, > and it could even be considered a security fix. No. This makes no logical sense. A task that enters a user namespace loses all capabilities to everything outside of the user namespace. Capabilities inside a user namespace are only valid for objects created inside that user namespace. So limiting capabilities inside a user namespace when the capability bounding set is already fully honored by not giving the processes any of those capabilities makes no logical sense. If the concern is kernel attack surface versus logical permissions we can look at ways to reduce the attack surface but that needs to be fully discussed in the change log. > Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@xxxxxxxxxx> > --- > kernel/user_namespace.c | 7 ++++--- > 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c > index 246d4d4ce5c7..2354f7ade78a 100644 > --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c > +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c > @@ -50,11 +50,12 @@ static void set_cred_user_ns(struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *user_ns) > * anything as the capabilities are bound to the new user namespace. > */ > cred->securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT; > + cred->cap_bset = task_no_new_privs(current) ? current_cred()->cap_bset > + : CAP_FULL_SET; > cred->cap_inheritable = CAP_EMPTY_SET; > - cred->cap_permitted = CAP_FULL_SET; > - cred->cap_effective = CAP_FULL_SET; > + cred->cap_permitted = cred->cap_bset; > + cred->cap_effective = cred->cap_bset; > cred->cap_ambient = CAP_EMPTY_SET; > - cred->cap_bset = CAP_FULL_SET; > #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS > key_put(cred->request_key_auth); > cred->request_key_auth = NULL; _______________________________________________ Containers mailing list Containers@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers
