On Sat, Mar 4, 2017 at 1:15 PM, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Sat, Mar 4, 2017 at 1:10 PM, Nikolay Borisov
> <n.borisov.lkml@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 4.03.2017 14:01, Dmitry Vyukov wrote:
>>> On Sat, Mar 4, 2017 at 12:50 PM, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>>> <n.borisov.lkml@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>>>> [Addressing Dmitry Vyukov to ask for syzkaller clarification]
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 3.03.2017 18:30, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>>>>>>> Nikolay Borisov <n.borisov.lkml@xxxxxxxxx> writes:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> [Added containers ml, Eric Biederman and Jan Kara]. Please,
>>>>>>>> next time don't add random people but take the time to see who touched
>>>>>>>> the code.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Comments below.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 3.03.2017 14:16, JongHwan Kim wrote:
>>>>>>>>> I've got the following report with syzkaller fuzzer
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Syzkaller hit 'KASAN: use-after-free Read in dec_ucount' bug on commit .
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> ==================================================================
>>>>>>>>> BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __read_once_size
>>>>>>>>> include/linux/compiler.h:254 [inline] at addr ffff88006d399bc4
>>>>>>>>> BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in atomic_read
>>>>>>>>> arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:26 [inline] at addr ffff88006d399bc4
>>>>>>>>> BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in atomic_dec_if_positive
>>>>>>>>> include/linux/atomic.h:616 [inline] at addr ffff88006d399bc4
>>>>>>>>> BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in dec_ucount+0x1e5/0x210 kernel/ucount.c:217
>>>>>>>>> at addr ffff88006d399bc4
>>>>>>>>> Read of size 4 by task syz-executor3/19713
>>>>>>>>> CPU: 1 PID: 19713 Comm: syz-executor3 Not tainted 4.10.0+ #4
>>>>>>>>> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
>>>>>>>>> Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
>>>>>>>>> Call Trace:
>>>>>>>>> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [inline]
>>>>>>>>> dump_stack+0x115/0x1cf lib/dump_stack.c:51
>>>>>>>>> kasan_object_err+0x1c/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:162
>>>>>>>>> print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:200 [inline]
>>>>>>>>> kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:289 [inline]
>>>>>>>>> kasan_report.part.1+0x20e/0x4e0 mm/kasan/report.c:311
>>>>>>>>> kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:331 [inline]
>>>>>>>>> __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x29/0x30 mm/kasan/report.c:331
>>>>>>>>> __read_once_size include/linux/compiler.h:254 [inline]
>>>>>>>>> atomic_read arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:26 [inline]
>>>>>>>>> atomic_dec_if_positive include/linux/atomic.h:616 [inline]
>>>>>>>>> dec_ucount+0x1e5/0x210 kernel/ucount.c:217
>>>>>>>>> dec_inotify_instances fs/notify/inotify/inotify.h:37 [inline]
>>>>>>>>> inotify_free_group_priv+0x6c/0x80 fs/notify/inotify/inotify_fsnotify.c:169
>>>>>>>>> fsnotify_final_destroy_group fs/notify/group.c:37 [inline]
>>>>>>>>> fsnotify_put_group+0x73/0xa0 fs/notify/group.c:110
>>>>>>>>> fsnotify_destroy_group+0xec/0x120 fs/notify/group.c:93
>>>>>>>>> inotify_release+0x37/0x50 fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c:280
>>>>>>>>> __fput+0x327/0x7e0 fs/file_table.c:208
>>>>>>>>> ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
>>>>>>>>> task_work_run+0x18a/0x260 kernel/task_work.c:116
>>>>>>>>> exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:21 [inline]
>>>>>>>>> do_exit+0xa45/0x1b20 kernel/exit.c:873
>>>>>>>>> do_group_exit+0x149/0x400 kernel/exit.c:977
>>>>>>>>> get_signal+0x7d5/0x1810 kernel/signal.c:2313
>>>>>>>>> do_signal+0x94/0x1f30 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:807
>>>>>>>>> exit_to_usermode_loop+0x162/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:156
>>>>>>>>> prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:190 [inline]
>>>>>>>>> syscall_return_slowpath+0x2b6/0x310 arch/x86/entry/common.c:259
>>>>>>>>> entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xc0/0xc2
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> So PID 19713 is exitting and as part of it it's freeing its file
>>>>>>>> descriptors, one of which is apparently an inotify fd. And this has
>>>>>>>> already been freed.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> RIP: 0033:0x44fb79
>>>>>>>>> RSP: 002b:00007ffd0f00f6d8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000ca
>>>>>>>>> RAX: fffffffffffffdfc RBX: 0000000000708024 RCX: 000000000044fb79
>>>>>>>>> RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000708024
>>>>>>>>> RBP: 00000000000ae8e6 R08: 0000000000708000 R09: 000000160000000d
>>>>>>>>> R10: 00007ffd0f00f710 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000708000
>>>>>>>>> R13: 0000000000708024 R14: 00000000000ae8a1 R15: 0000000000000016
>>>>>>>>> Object at ffff88006d399b88, in cache kmalloc-96 size: 96
>>>>>>>>> Allocated:
>>>>>>>>> PID = 19691
>>>>>>>>> save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:57
>>>>>>>>> save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:502
>>>>>>>>> set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:514 [inline]
>>>>>>>>> kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:605
>>>>>>>>> kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xfb/0x280 mm/slub.c:2745
>>>>>>>>> kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:490 [inline]
>>>>>>>>> kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:663 [inline]
>>>>>>>>> get_ucounts kernel/ucount.c:140 [inline]
>>>>>>>>> inc_ucount+0x538/0xa70 kernel/ucount.c:195
>>>>>>>>> inotify_new_group+0x309/0x410 fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c:655
>>>>>>>>> SYSC_inotify_init1 fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c:682 [inline]
>>>>>>>>> SyS_inotify_init1 fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c:669 [inline]
>>>>>>>>> sys_inotify_init+0x17/0x80 fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c:696
>>>>>>>>> entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> However, it has been actually allocated by a different process with pid
>>>>>>>> 19691.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Freed:
>>>>>>>>> PID = 19708
>>>>>>>>> save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:57
>>>>>>>>> save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:502
>>>>>>>>> set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:514 [inline]
>>>>>>>>> kasan_slab_free+0x73/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:578
>>>>>>>>> slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1357 [inline]
>>>>>>>>> slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1379 [inline]
>>>>>>>>> slab_free mm/slub.c:2961 [inline]
>>>>>>>>> kfree+0xe8/0x2c0 mm/slub.c:3882
>>>>>>>>> put_ucounts+0x1dd/0x270 kernel/ucount.c:172
>>>>>>>>> dec_ucount+0x172/0x210 kernel/ucount.c:220
>>>>>>>>> dec_inotify_instances fs/notify/inotify/inotify.h:37 [inline]
>>>>>>>>> inotify_free_group_priv+0x6c/0x80 fs/notify/inotify/inotify_fsnotify.c:169
>>>>>>>>> fsnotify_final_destroy_group fs/notify/group.c:37 [inline]
>>>>>>>>> fsnotify_put_group+0x73/0xa0 fs/notify/group.c:110
>>>>>>>>> fsnotify_destroy_group+0xec/0x120 fs/notify/group.c:93
>>>>>>>>> inotify_release+0x37/0x50 fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c:280
>>>>>>>>> __fput+0x327/0x7e0 fs/file_table.c:208
>>>>>>>>> ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
>>>>>>>>> task_work_run+0x18a/0x260 kernel/task_work.c:116
>>>>>>>>> exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:21 [inline]
>>>>>>>>> do_exit+0xa45/0x1b20 kernel/exit.c:873
>>>>>>>>> do_group_exit+0x149/0x400 kernel/exit.c:977
>>>>>>>>> get_signal+0x7d5/0x1810 kernel/signal.c:2313
>>>>>>>>> do_signal+0x94/0x1f30 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:807
>>>>>>>>> exit_to_usermode_loop+0x162/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:156
>>>>>>>>> prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:190 [inline]
>>>>>>>>> syscall_return_slowpath+0x2b6/0x310 arch/x86/entry/common.c:259
>>>>>>>>> entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xc0/0xc2
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> And yet we have a third process which freed it, PID 19708. So there is
>>>>>>>> some dance happening with this fd, being allocated by one process,
>>>>>>>> handed over to 2 more, which are freeing it. Is this a valid usage
>>>>>>>> scenario of inotify descriptors?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> They are file descriptors so passing them around is valid. That is
>>>>>>> something unix domain sockets have allowed since the dawn of linux.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The dance would need to be the fd being passed to the addtional
>>>>>>> processes and then closed in the original before being closed
>>>>>>> in the processes the fd was passed to.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If those additional processes last longer than the original process this
>>>>>>> is easy to achieve.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> My guess is that someone just taught syskallzer to pass file descriptors
>>>>>>> around. So this may be an old bug. Either that or syskallzer hasn't
>>>>>>> been looking at linux-next with KASAN enabled in the kernel.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Dmitry, can you tell if syzkaller tests sending file descriptors across
>>>>>> sockets? Since the calltraces here show multiple processes being
>>>>>> involved in different operations on the exact same file descriptor.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Also JongHwan, can you provide the full, compilable reproducer to try
>>>>>> and track this issue down?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> syzkaller can pass descriptors across sockets, but currently only
>>>>> within a single multi-threaded process.
>>>>>
>>>>> Are you sure it's the same descriptor? It seems to me that it's struct
>>>>> ucounts, which is shared via the global ucounts_hashtable, so no
>>>>> sharing is required in user processes.
>>>>>
>>>>> Unless I am missing something, we want:
>>>>>
>>>>> @@ -154,7 +155,7 @@ static struct ucounts *get_ucounts(struct
>>>>> user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid)
>>>>> ucounts = new;
>>>>> }
>>>>> }
>>>>> - if (!atomic_add_unless(&ucounts->count, 1, INT_MAX))
>>>>> + if (!atomic_add_unless(&ucounts->count, 1, 0))
>>>>> ucounts = NULL;
>>>>> spin_unlock_irq(&ucounts_lock);
>>>>> return ucounts;
>>>>>
>>>>> no?
>>>>>
>>>>> put_ucounts drops the last reference, then get_ucounts finds the
>>>>> ucounts and successfully increments refcount as it's not INT_MAX (it's
>>>>> 0) and starts using it, meanwhile put_ucounts proceeds to
>>>>> unconditionally deleting the ucounts.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> It also seems that a concurrent put_ucounts can make get_ucounts fail
>>>> _spuriously_, which does not look good.
>>>> Don't we want something along the following lines?
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/kernel/ucount.c b/kernel/ucount.c
>>>> index 8a11fc0cb459..233c8e46acd5 100644
>>>> --- a/kernel/ucount.c
>>>> +++ b/kernel/ucount.c
>>>> @@ -143,19 +143,18 @@ static struct ucounts *get_ucounts(struct
>>>> user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid)
>>>>
>>>> new->ns = ns;
>>>> new->uid = uid;
>>>> - atomic_set(&new->count, 0);
>>>> + atomic_set(&new->count, 1);
>>>>
>>>> spin_lock_irq(&ucounts_lock);
>>>> ucounts = find_ucounts(ns, uid, hashent);
>>>> if (ucounts) {
>>>> + atomic_inc(&ucounts->count);
>>>> kfree(new);
>>>> } else {
>>>> hlist_add_head(&new->node, hashent);
>>>> ucounts = new;
>>>> }
>>>> }
>>>> - if (!atomic_add_unless(&ucounts->count, 1, INT_MAX))
>>>> - ucounts = NULL;
>>>> spin_unlock_irq(&ucounts_lock);
>>>> return ucounts;
>>>> }
>>>> @@ -166,7 +165,10 @@ static void put_ucounts(struct ucounts *ucounts)
>>>>
>>>> if (atomic_dec_and_test(&ucounts->count)) {
>>>> spin_lock_irqsave(&ucounts_lock, flags);
>>>> - hlist_del_init(&ucounts->node);
>>>> + if (atomic_read(&ucounts->count) == 0)
>>>> + hlist_del_init(&ucounts->node);
>>>> + else
>>>> + ucounts = NULL;
>>>> spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ucounts_lock, flags);
>>>>
>>>> kfree(ucounts);
>>>
>>>
>>> /\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\
>>>
>>> This is broken per se. Need something more elaborate.
>>>
>>
>>
>> How about this :
>>
>> diff --git a/kernel/ucount.c b/kernel/ucount.c
>> index 8a11fc0cb459..b817ac0e587c 100644
>> --- a/kernel/ucount.c
>> +++ b/kernel/ucount.c
>> @@ -166,11 +166,15 @@ static void put_ucounts(struct ucounts *ucounts)
>>
>> if (atomic_dec_and_test(&ucounts->count)) {
>> spin_lock_irqsave(&ucounts_lock, flags);
>> - hlist_del_init(&ucounts->node);
>> - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ucounts_lock, flags);
>> -
>> - kfree(ucounts);
>> + if (!atomic_read(&ucounts->count)) {
>> + hlist_del_init(&ucounts->node);
>> + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ucounts_lock, flags);
>> + kfree(ucounts);
>> + return;
>> + }
>> }
>> +
>> + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ucounts_lock, flags);
>> }
>>
>>
>>
>> This makes the atomic_dec_and_test and hashtable removal atomic in essence.
>
>
> This won't work.
> Consider the following scenario:
> Thread 0 decrements count to 0 here:
> if (atomic_dec_and_test(&ucounts->count)) {
> Then thread 1 calls get_ucounts, increments count to 1, then calls
> put_ucounts, decrements count to 0 and unhashes and frees ucounts.
> Not thread 0 does:
> if (!atomic_read(&ucounts->count)) {
> but ucounts is already freed!
What may work is if put_ucounts re-lookups the ucounts. If it can
still find it and count==0, then it is the right time to delete it. If
it can't find the ucounts, then somebody else has beaten it.
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