In order to protect against ptrace(2) and similar attacks on container runtimes when they join namespaces, many runtimes set mm->dumpable to SUID_DUMP_DISABLE. However, doing this means that attempting to set up an unprivileged user namespace will fail because an unprivileged process can no longer access /proc/self/{setgroups,{uid,gid}_map} for the container process (which is the same uid as the runtime process). Fix this by changing pid_getattr to *also* change the owner of regular files that have a mode of 0644 (when the process is not dumpable). This ensures that the important /proc/[pid]/... files mentioned above are properly accessible by a container runtime in a rootless container context. The most blantant issue is that a non-dumpable process in a rootless container context is unable to open /proc/self/setgroups, because it doesn't own the file. int main(void) { prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0); unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER); /* This will fail. */ int fd = open("/proc/self/setgroups", O_WRONLY); if (fd < 0) abort(); return 0; } Cc: dev@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Cc: containers@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@xxxxxxx> --- fs/proc/base.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index ca651ac00660..ebabb12f4536 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -1729,6 +1729,7 @@ int pid_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry, struct kstat *stat) return -ENOENT; } if ((inode->i_mode == (S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO)) || + (inode->i_mode == (S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR)) || task_dumpable(task)) { cred = __task_cred(task); stat->uid = cred->euid; @@ -1770,6 +1771,7 @@ int pid_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) if (task) { if ((inode->i_mode == (S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO)) || + (inode->i_mode == (S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR)) || task_dumpable(task)) { rcu_read_lock(); cred = __task_cred(task); @@ -2394,7 +2396,7 @@ static int proc_pident_instantiate(struct inode *dir, return -ENOENT; } -static struct dentry *proc_pident_lookup(struct inode *dir, +static struct dentry *proc_pident_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const struct pid_entry *ents, unsigned int nents) @@ -2536,7 +2538,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = { static int proc_attr_dir_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) { - return proc_pident_readdir(file, ctx, + return proc_pident_readdir(file, ctx, attr_dir_stuff, ARRAY_SIZE(attr_dir_stuff)); } -- 2.11.0 _______________________________________________ Containers mailing list Containers@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers