On 05/02/2016 05:54 AM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > On Tue, Apr 26, 2016 at 03:39:54PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: >> On Tue, Apr 26, 2016 at 3:26 PM, Serge E. Hallyn <serge@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>> Quoting Kees Cook (keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx): >>>> On Fri, Apr 22, 2016 at 10:26 AM, <serge.hallyn@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>> From: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@xxxxxxxxxx> > ... >>>> This looks like userspace must knowingly be aware that it is in a >>>> namespace and to DTRT instead of it being translated by the kernel >>>> when setxattr is called under !init_user_ns? >>> >>> Yes - my libcap2 patch checks /proc/self/uid_map to decide that. If that >>> shows you are in init_user_ns then it uses security.capability, otherwise >>> it uses security.nscapability. >>> >>> I've occasionally considered having the xattr code do the quiet >>> substitution if need be. >>> >>> In fact, much of this structure comes from when I was still trying to >>> do multiple values per xattr. Given what we're doing here, we could >>> keep the xattr contents exactly the same, just changing the name. >>> So userspace could just get and set security.capability; if you are >>> in a non-init user_ns, if security.capability is set then you cannot >>> set it; if security.capability is not set, then the kernel writes >>> security.nscapability instead and returns success. >>> >>> I don't like magic, but this might be just straightforward enough >>> to not be offensive. Thoughts? >> >> Yeah, I think it might be better to have the magic in this case, since >> it seems weird to just reject setxattr if a tool didn't realize it was >> in a namespace. I'm not sure -- it is also nice to have an explicit >> API here. >> >> I would defer to Eric or Michael on that. I keep going back and forth, >> though I suspect it's probably best to do what you already have >> (explicit API). > > Michael, Eric, what do you think? The choice we're making here is > whether we should > > 1. Keep a nice simple separate pair of xattrs, the pre-existing > security.capability which can only be written from init_user_ns, > and the new (in this patch) security.nscapability which you can > write to any file where you are privileged wrt the file. > > 2. Make security.capability somewhat 'magic' - if someone in a > non-initial user ns tries to write it and has privilege wrt the > file, then the kernel silently writes security.nscapability instead. > > The biggest drawback of (1) would be any tar-like program trying > to restore a file which had security.capability, needing to know > to detect its userns and write the security.nscapability instead. > The drawback of (2) is ~\o/~ magic. I have only (minor) thoughts from the interface perspective. (1) Sounds the source of possibly unpleasant surprises. (2) Is a little surprising, but less so if it's well documented, and it saves us the surprises of (1). So, (2) sounds better. Cheers, Michael -- Michael Kerrisk Linux man-pages maintainer; http://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/ Linux/UNIX System Programming Training: http://man7.org/training/ _______________________________________________ Containers mailing list Containers@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers
