On 23/09/13 22:41, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > > In kobj_ns_current_may_mount the default should be to allow the > mount. The test is only for a single kobj_ns_type at a time, and unless > there is a reason to prevent it the mounting sysfs should be allowed. > Subsystems that are not registered can't have are not involved so can't > have a reason to prevent mounting sysfs. > > This is a bug-fix to: > commit 7dc5dbc879bd0779924b5132a48b731a0bc04a1e > Author: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx> > Date: Mon Mar 25 20:07:01 2013 -0700 > > sysfs: Restrict mounting sysfs > > Don't allow mounting sysfs unless the caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN rights > over the net namespace. The principle here is if you create or have > capabilities over it you can mount it, otherwise you get to live with > what other people have mounted. > > Instead of testing this with a straight forward ns_capable call, > perform this check the long and torturous way with kobject helpers, > this keeps direct knowledge of namespaces out of sysfs, and preserves > the existing sysfs abstractions. > > Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx> > > That came in via the userns tree during the 3.12 merge window. > > Reported-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@xxxxxxxxxx> > Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx> Tested-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@xxxxxxxxxx> Thanks James _______________________________________________ Containers mailing list Containers@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers
