Re: [PATCH net-next 3/4] netns: bridge: allow unprivileged users add/delete mdb entry

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



On 2013/02/01 11:46, Matt Helsley wrote:
> On Fri, Feb 01, 2013 at 10:30:59AM +0800, Gao feng wrote:
>> since the mdb table is belong to bridge device,and the
>> bridge device can only be seen in one netns.
>> So it's safe to allow unprivileged user which is the
>> creator of userns and netns to modify the mdb table.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Gao feng <gaofeng@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> ---
>>  net/bridge/br_mdb.c | 3 ---
>>  1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/net/bridge/br_mdb.c b/net/bridge/br_mdb.c
>> index acc9f4c..38991e0 100644
>> --- a/net/bridge/br_mdb.c
>> +++ b/net/bridge/br_mdb.c
>> @@ -272,9 +272,6 @@ static int br_mdb_parse(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
>>  	struct net_device *dev;
>>  	int err;
>>
>> -	if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
>> -		return -EPERM;
>> -
> 
> I'm wondering why this doesn't follow the:
> 
> ...
> - if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
> + if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
> 
> pattern like the rest of the changes you provided. Perhaps I'm
> neglecting something but it looks wrong to remove the CAP_NET_ADMIN
> check entirely.
> 

rtnetlink_rcv_msg has done this job,in commit dfc47ef8639facd77210e74be831943c2fdd9c74
Eric change capable to ns_capable in rtnetlink_rcv_msg and Push capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)
into the rtnl methods.So we only need to do is remove this capable in br_mdb_parse.

Thanks!
_______________________________________________
Containers mailing list
Containers@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers


[Index of Archives]     [Cgroups]     [Netdev]     [Linux Wireless]     [Kernel Newbies]     [Security]     [Linux for Hams]     [Netfilter]     [Bugtraq]     [Yosemite Forum]     [MIPS Linux]     [ARM Linux]     [Linux RAID]     [Linux Admin]     [Samba]

  Powered by Linux