Glauber Costa <glommer@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes: > On 01/17/2013 10:04 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote: >> Glauber Costa <glommer@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes: >> >>> On 01/17/2013 09:29 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote: >>>> Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes: >>>> >>>>> Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx): >>>>>> Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes: >>>>>> >>>>>>> I actually was waiting for Eric to do it, but I'll happily send it >>>>>>> to linux-fsdevel and lkml (in a bit). >>>>>> >>>>>> I might just. >>>>>> >>>>>> I will take a look at this in a week or so. I want to get through the >>>>>> core userspace bits first so I can just cross those off my list of >>>>>> things that need to be done. >>>>>> >>>>>> Eric >>>>> >>>>> Ok, I'll wait on sending it then - thanks. >>>> >>>> Next up is my patch to shadow-utils and then taking a good hard stare at >>>> what is left kernel side. >>>> >>>> One of the questions I need to answer is: Do cgroups actually work >>>> for what needs to be limited? Or does the the focus of cgroups on >>>> processes without other ownership in objects fundamentally limit what >>>> can be expressed with cgroups in a problematic way. In which case would >>>> some hierarchical limits based on user namespaces and rlimits be easier >>>> to implement and make more sense. >>>> >>>> I think the answer will be that cgroups are good enough but that >>>> question certainly needs looking at. >>>> >>>> Anyway. shadow-utils, minimal tmpfs, minimal devpts, and then the rest. >>>> >>> First easy question: >>> >>> cgroups are not necessarily configured. >>> >>> IIUC, the aim of this patch is to allow unprivileged mounts of tmpfs >>> relying on the fact that cgroups will stop memory abuse (correct me if I >>> am wrong). >>> >>> But what if the user is not using cgroups? >> >> The requirement for tmpfs to be safe is that there should be a control >> that root can use to prevent DOS attacks. If you don't choose to use >> what is available then shrug. >> > > Yes, but if you are an unprivileged user, the whole box would go down, > not just your namespace/container/group, etc. > > So at first it seems to me very risky to allow an unprivileged mount of > something that may or may not be constrained. IOW: not depending on > cgroups and relying solely on namespaces to achieve seems better at > first. Cgroups are the entity that is supposed to constrain these things. That is what they are there for. If cgroups don't work for containers what is the point? That said this seems we may be approaching the question I was asking earlier. Is there a semantic reason why we can express things better in terms of user namespaces and rlimits than we can in terms of control groups? There may actually be in this case. Memory accounting has long been a tricky problem because it is hard to know who to charge the memory to. I think it would be very reasonable to make the rule that you charge the memory to the user namespace that created the object. For a filesystem like tmpfs that would be the user namespace where the tmpfs is first mounted. At which point with a touch of care you can build hierarchal limits for memory use of tmpfs and other consumers of memory based on user namespaces. (I still think memory control groups being able to limit tmpfs is enough to allow tmpfs mounts in user namespaces because that is only 2 lines of code and some verification that memory control groups can do the work. But if there is a better way we can add that.) What are the practical problems with control groups that makes them undesirable/hard to use with namespaces? What would it take to fix the problems with control groups? Eric _______________________________________________ Containers mailing list Containers@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers
