From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Allow privileged users in any user namespace to bind to
privileged sockets in network namespaces they control.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
net/ipv4/af_inet.c | 6 ++++--
net/ipv6/af_inet6.c | 2 +-
net/sctp/socket.c | 8 +++++---
3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
index 7449bcf..6a76956 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
@@ -474,6 +474,7 @@ int inet_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
struct sockaddr_in *addr = (struct sockaddr_in *)uaddr;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
+ struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
unsigned short snum;
int chk_addr_ret;
int err;
@@ -497,7 +498,7 @@ int inet_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
goto out;
}
- chk_addr_ret = inet_addr_type(sock_net(sk), addr->sin_addr.s_addr);
+ chk_addr_ret = inet_addr_type(net, addr->sin_addr.s_addr);
/* Not specified by any standard per-se, however it breaks too
* many applications when removed. It is unfortunate since
@@ -517,7 +518,8 @@ int inet_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
snum = ntohs(addr->sin_port);
err = -EACCES;
- if (snum && snum < PROT_SOCK && !capable(CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE))
+ if (snum && snum < PROT_SOCK &&
+ !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE))
goto out;
/* We keep a pair of addresses. rcv_saddr is the one
diff --git a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
index 19f68b2..5d4e45e 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ int inet6_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
return -EINVAL;
snum = ntohs(addr->sin6_port);
- if (snum && snum < PROT_SOCK && !capable(CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE))
+ if (snum && snum < PROT_SOCK && !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE))
return -EACCES;
lock_sock(sk);
diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c
index 59d16ea..e4a362d 100644
--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
@@ -336,6 +336,7 @@ static struct sctp_af *sctp_sockaddr_af(struct sctp_sock *opt,
/* Bind a local address either to an endpoint or to an association. */
SCTP_STATIC int sctp_do_bind(struct sock *sk, union sctp_addr *addr, int len)
{
+ struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk);
struct sctp_endpoint *ep = sp->ep;
struct sctp_bind_addr *bp = &ep->base.bind_addr;
@@ -379,7 +380,8 @@ SCTP_STATIC int sctp_do_bind(struct sock *sk, union sctp_addr *addr, int len)
}
}
- if (snum && snum < PROT_SOCK && !capable(CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE))
+ if (snum && snum < PROT_SOCK &&
+ !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE))
return -EACCES;
/* See if the address matches any of the addresses we may have
@@ -1162,7 +1164,7 @@ static int __sctp_connect(struct sock* sk,
* be permitted to open new associations.
*/
if (ep->base.bind_addr.port < PROT_SOCK &&
- !capable(CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE)) {
+ !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE)) {
err = -EACCES;
goto out_free;
}
@@ -1791,7 +1793,7 @@ SCTP_STATIC int sctp_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk,
* associations.
*/
if (ep->base.bind_addr.port < PROT_SOCK &&
- !capable(CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE)) {
+ !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE)) {
err = -EACCES;
goto out_unlock;
}
--
1.7.5.4
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