Hi, On Wed, Aug 31, 2011 at 11:58 +0400, Cyrill Gorcunov wrote: > From: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > > This one behaves similarly to the /proc/<pid>/fd/ one - it contains symlinks > one for each mapping with file, the name of a symlink is "vma->vm_start-vma->vm_end", > the target is the file. Opening a symlink results in a file that point exactly > to the same inode as them vma's one. I'm late noting it before the RFCv6 :) Besides checking ptrace_may_access() on ->lookup and ->readdir you also should define ->stat, otherwise you can bypass ptrace checks if there is a corresponding dentry in the cache. The same issue existed in fd* handlers: http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2011/08/29/1 Thanks, -- Vasiliy Kulikov http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments _______________________________________________ Containers mailing list Containers@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.linux-foundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers
