On 08/11/2011 11:09 PM, Serge Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Daniel Lezcano (daniel.lezcano@xxxxxxx):
>> When the reboot syscall is called and the pid namespace where the calling
>> process belongs to is not from the init pidns, we send a SIGCHLD with CLD_REBOOTED
>> to the parent of this pid namespace.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@xxxxxxx>
> ...
>
>> +void do_notify_parent_cldreboot(struct task_struct *tsk, int why, char *buffer)
>> +{
>> + struct siginfo info = { };
>> + struct task_struct *parent;
>> + struct sighand_struct *sighand;
>> + unsigned long flags;
>> +
>> + if (tsk->ptrace)
>> + parent = tsk->parent;
>> + else {
>> + tsk = tsk->group_leader;
>> + parent = tsk->real_parent;
>> + }
>> +
>> + info.si_signo = SIGCHLD;
>> + info.si_errno = 0;
>> + info.si_status = why;
>> +
>> + rcu_read_lock();
>> + info.si_pid = task_pid_nr_ns(tsk, parent->nsproxy->pid_ns);
>> + info.si_uid = __task_cred(tsk)->uid;
>
> This eventually should become:
>
> info.si_uid = user_ns_map_uid(task_cred_xxx(t, user_ns),
> current_cred(), current_uid());
>
> I've got a first-stab patch at converting the rest of
> kernel/signal.c in http://kernel.ubuntu.com/git?p=serge/userns-2.6.git
Ok, thanks.
>> + rcu_read_unlock();
>> +
>> + info.si_utime = cputime_to_clock_t(tsk->utime);
>> + info.si_stime = cputime_to_clock_t(tsk->stime);
>> +
>> + info.si_code = CLD_REBOOTED;
>> +
>> + sighand = parent->sighand;
>> + spin_lock_irqsave(&sighand->siglock, flags);
>> + if (sighand->action[SIGCHLD-1].sa.sa_handler != SIG_IGN &&
>> + sighand->action[SIGCHLD-1].sa.sa_flags & SA_CLDREBOOT)
>> + __group_send_sig_info(SIGCHLD, &info, parent);
>> + /*
>> + * Even if SIGCHLD is not generated, we must wake up wait4 calls.
>> + */
>> + __wake_up_parent(tsk, parent);
>> + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sighand->siglock, flags);
>> +}
> ...
>
>> @@ -426,10 +434,18 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(reboot, int, magic1, int, magic2, unsigned int, cmd,
>> {
>> char buffer[256];
>> int ret = 0;
>> + struct pid_namespace *pid_ns = current->nsproxy->pid_ns;
>> +
>> + /* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */
>> + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT)) {
> Doesn't this mean that an unprivileged task in a container can shut
> down the container?
Ha ha ! Right, good catch :)
Yes, rethinking about it, we can do what initially proposed Bruno by
just preventing to reboot when we are not in the init_pid_ns. Actually,
the sys_reboot occurs after the services shutdown and "kill -1 SIGTERM"
and "kill -1 SIGKILL", and would not make sense to do that in a child
pid namespace, except if we are in a container where we don't want to
reboot :)
So IMO, it is safe to do:
if (!ns_capable(current_pid_ns()->user_ns, CAP_SYS_BOOT))
return -EPERM;
if (pid_ns != &init_pid_ns)
return pid_namespace_reboot(pid_ns, cmd, buffer);
> The pidns->user_ns patch I sent earlier today gives you what you need
> so that you can add
>
> if (!ns_capable(current_pid_ns()->user_ns, CAP_SYS_BOOT)
> return -EPERM;
>
> right here to prevent that.
>
>> + /* If we are not in the initial pid namespace, we send a signal
>> + * to the parent of this init pid namespace, notifying a shutdown
>> + * occured */
>> + if (pid_ns != &init_pid_ns)
>> + pid_namespace_reboot(pid_ns, cmd, buffer);
>>
>> - /* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */
>> - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT))
>> return -EPERM;
>> + }
>>
>> /* For safety, we require "magic" arguments. */
>> if (magic1 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC1 ||
>> --
>> 1.7.4.1
>>
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