On Mon, May 23, 2011 at 4:05 PM, Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > This tree adds the files /proc/<pid>/ns/net, /proc/<pid>/ns/ipc, > /proc/<pid>/ns/uts that can be opened to refer to the namespaces of a > process at the time those files are opened, and can be bind mounted to > keep the specified namespace alive without a process. > > This tree adds the setns system call that can be used to change the > specified namespace of a process to the namespace specified by a system > call. i just have a quick question regarding these, apologies if wrong place to respond -- i trimmed to lists only. if i understand correctly, mount namespaces (for example), allow one to build such constructs as "private /tmp" and similar that even `root` cannot access ... and there are many reasons `root` does not deserve to completely know/interact with user processes (FUSE makes a good example ... just because i [user] have SSH access to a machine, why should `root`?) would these /proc additions break such guarantees? IOW, would it now become possible for `root` to inject stuff into my private namespaces, and/or has these guarantees never existed and i am mistaken? is there any kind of ACL mechanism that endows the origin process (or similar) with the ability to dictate who can hold and/or interact with these references? Thanks for your time, -- C Anthony _______________________________________________ Containers mailing list Containers@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.linux-foundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers
