On Sun, 2011-04-03 at 14:03 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > Quoting ntl@xxxxxxxxx (ntl@xxxxxxxxx): > > Only a pid namespace init task - the child process produced by a call > > to clone(2) with CLONE_NEWPID - is allowed to call these. The state > > So you make this useful for your cases by only using this with > application containers - created using lxc-execute, or, more precisely, > using lxc-init as the container's init. So a container running a stock > distro can't be checkpointed. Correct, a conventional distro init won't work, and application containers are my focus for now, at least. > Is this just to keep the patch simple for now, or is there some reason > to keep this limitation in place? I guess you're asking whether non-pid-init processes could be allowed to use the syscalls? I don't think so... almost certainly not restart(2). I think that restriction keeps the implementation simple and the semantics clear. And init is uniquely positioned to carry out any setup required (mounts, networking) before calling restart. _______________________________________________ Containers mailing list Containers@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.linux-foundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers
