On 01/10/2011 05:51 PM, Serge Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Bastian Blank (bastian@xxxxxxxxxxxx):
>> On Mon, Jan 10, 2011 at 09:13:34PM +0000, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>>> + const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
>>> + const struct cred *tcred = __task_cred(t);
>>> +
>>> + if (cred->user->user_ns != tcred->user->user_ns) {
>>> + /* userids are not equivalent - either you have the
>>> + capability to the target user ns or you don't */
>>> + if (ns_capable(tcred->user->user_ns, CAP_KILL))
>>> + return 1;
>>> + return 0;
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> + /* same user namespace - usual credentials checks apply */
>>> + if ((cred->euid ^ tcred->suid) &&
>>> + (cred->euid ^ tcred->uid) &&
>>> + (cred->uid ^ tcred->suid) &&
>>> + (cred->uid ^ tcred->uid) &&
>>> + !ns_capable(tcred->user->user_ns, CAP_KILL))
>>> + return 0;
>>> +
>>> + return 1;
>>
>> Isn't that equal to this?
>>
>> if (ns_capable(tcred->user->user_ns, CAP_KILL))
>> return 1;
>>
>> if (cred->user->user_ns == tcred->user->user_ns &&
>> (cred->euid == tcred->suid ||
>> cred->euid == tcred->uid ||
>> cred->uid == tcred->suid ||
>> cred->uid == tcred->uid))
>> return 1;
>>
>> return 0;
>>
>> I would consider this much easier to read.
>
> Unfortunately, it's actually not equivalent. when capable()
> returns success, then it sets the current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV.
> If permission is granted based on userids and the capability
> isn't needed, then we don't want to needlessly set PF_SUPERPRIV.
A bit off-topic: does this means that c/r needs to save and
restore this process flag ?
>
> That's why I'm going to such lengths to call capable() as a last
> resort.
IMHO, worth a one line comment in the code ...
Oren.
_______________________________________________
Containers mailing list
Containers@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.linux-foundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers
