On 04/09/09 10:26 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > Quoting Oren Laadan (orenl@xxxxxxxxxxx): > > During restart, we need to allocate pty slaves with the same > > identifiers as recorded during checkpoint. Modify the allocation code > > to allow an in-kernel caller to request a specific slave identifier. > > > > For this, add a new field to task_struct - 'required_id'. It will > > hold the desired identifier when restoring a (master) pty. > > > > The code in ptmx_open() will use this value only for tasks that try to > > open /dev/ptmx that are restarting (PF_RESTARTING), and if the value > > isn't CKPT_REQUIRED_NONE (-1). > > So noone has indicated any preference for this versus the ptmx_create() > approach... > > I'm satisfied knowing we have a working fallback in case task->required_id > is deemed unacceptable. > > However I'd like to not have linux-kernel folks think us morons for not > having considered that. Can you add a message to the changelog saying > why we're going with this approach (namely, that it lets us re-use > filp_open() instead of having to do a custom alloc_file in a new code-path, > which introduces maintenance duplication for file permission checking > paths)? As far as I am concerned, I do have a preference for the ptmx_create() approach. This task->required_id field reminds me the former approach taken for restarting pids and (and SYSV IPC ids IIRC) from userspace, that was proposed last year and actually deemed unacceptable [ IIRC, this was an argument in favor of a restart() syscall ]. I know that it's not the same since ->required_id is not set from userspace and used in a later syscall, but still ... Moreover I see no reason whey there would be no way to refactorize ptmx code and have less duplicated code with the ptmx_create() approach. Thanks, Louis -- Dr Louis Rilling Kerlabs Skype: louis.rilling Batiment Germanium Phone: (+33|0) 6 80 89 08 23 80 avenue des Buttes de Coesmes http://www.kerlabs.com/ 35700 Rennes
Attachment:
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
_______________________________________________ Containers mailing list Containers@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.linux-foundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers
