Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > Quoting Oren Laadan (orenl@xxxxxxxxxxx): >>> OL> Does the following bypass security checks for sys_connect() ? > > [ on sock_unix_restore()->sock_unix_restore_connected()->sock_unix_join() ] > >>> I don't think so. We're basically replicating sys_socketpair() here, >>> which does not do a security check, presumably because all you're >>> doing is hooking two sockets together that both belong to you. That's >>> not to say that we're as safe as that limited operation, but I don't >>> think it's totally clear. Perhaps someone more confident will >>> comment. >> Yes, please ... Serge ? >> >> To me it sounds plausible. If we adopt it, then a comment in the >> code is worthwhile. > > I'm not sure what Oren means "sounds plausible" or should be adopted. > Using a common helper with sys_connect()? I meant that Dan's argument sounds plausible, and if we go that way, it deserves a comment in the code explaining why the security call is omitted. Of course, that was before reading your concern about LSM-labeling of sockets... Oren. > > At the moment you miss out on the security_socket_connect() call. That > may be not as important for unix sockets, but it does look like selinux + > netlabel can label unix sockets as well. So I'm not convinced we can > just ignore it, as once we start properly LSM-labeling tasks and > sockets we may need to do that to ensure proper restart under selinux. > > The other thing is that some new fancy doohicky might require another > hook in sys_connect, which may or may not be needed for this path. > If coded this way, we may not find out until someone reports some > subtle failure long after the fact. > > Still your code is so customized that perhaps an explicit > security_socket_connect() call in your sock_unix_join() may be the > way to go... > > -serge _______________________________________________ Containers mailing list Containers@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.linux-foundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers
