On Fri, 2008-12-05 at 16:46 -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Dave Hansen (dave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx):
> > On Thu, 2008-12-04 at 22:41 -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > >
> > > @@ -158,6 +173,12 @@ cr_write_fd_ent(struct cr_ctx *ctx, struct
> > > files_struct *files, int fd)
> > > goto out;
> > > }
> > >
> > > + /* Make sure this isn't under some detached tree */
> > > + if (file_in_detached_tree(file)) {
> > > + ret = -EBADF;
> > > + goto out;
> > > + }
> >
> > Looks fine to me. This is racy, though. Right?
> >
> > There's no locking to keep the thing mounted for the duration of the
> > checkpoint.
>
> Oh, hahah, yeah. We have the file pinned so we're not going to
> lose any vfsmnt/dentries, but you're right, someone else could
> come along and umount -l in the middle.
>
> I suppose we could hold the namespace sem but it doesn't seem worth
> it and could deadlock.
>
> Patch withdrawn for now :)
Well, it is better than nothing. We don't have to worry about people
messing with it if we have complete control over the entire
mnt_namespace.
-- Dave
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