-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > Andrew, I've cc:d you here bc in doing this patch I noticed that your > 64-bit capabilities patch switched this code from an explicit check > of cap_t(p->cap_effective) to using __capable(). That means that > now being glossed over by the oom killer means PF_SUPERPRIV will > be set. Is that intentional? Yes, I switched the check because the old one didn't work with the new capability representation. However, I had not thought this aspect of this replacement through. At the time, it seemed obvious but in this case it actually depends on whether you think using privilege (PF_SUPERPRIV) means "benefited from privilege", or "successfully completed a privileged operation". I suspect, in this case, the correct thing to do is add the equivalent of: #define CAPABLE_PROBE_ONLY(a,b) (!security_capable(a,b)) and use that in the code in question. That is, return to the old behavior in a way that will not break if we ever need to add more bits. Thanks for finding this. Cheers Andrew > > Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@xxxxxxxxxx> > --- > mm/oom_kill.c | 2 +- > 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/mm/oom_kill.c b/mm/oom_kill.c > index 016127e..9fd8d5d 100644 > --- a/mm/oom_kill.c > +++ b/mm/oom_kill.c > @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ unsigned long badness(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long uptime, > * Superuser processes are usually more important, so we make it > * less likely that we kill those. > */ > - if (__capable(p, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || p->uid == 0 || p->euid == 0) > + if (__capable(p, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || __capable(p, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) > points /= 4; > > /* -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.7 (Darwin) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFHYGln+bHCR3gb8jsRAgNwAKDQED4YNy479LKfDL1fhVGWMK22eACgjPMh JcFgzPsvIQkoatjvJ1vtHQ8= =50l1 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Containers mailing list Containers@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.linux-foundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers