Quoting Crispin Cowan (crispin@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx): > Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > > Quoting Stephen Smalley (sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx): > > > >> I agree with this part - we don't want people to have to choose between > >> using containers and using selinux, so if hijack is going to be a > >> requirement for effective use of containers, then we need to make them > >> work together. > >> > > Absolutely, we just need to decide how to properly make it work with > > selinux. Maybe we check for > > > > allow (current_domain):(hijacked_process_domain) hijack > > type_transition hijacked_process_domain \ > > vserver_enter_binary_t:process vserver1_hijack_admin_t; > > > Is there to be an LSM hook, so that modules can decide on an arbitrary > decision of whether to allow a hijack? So that this "do the right > SELinux" thing can be generalized for all LSMs to do the right thing. Currently: 1. the permission is granted through ptrace 2. the lsm knows a hijack is going in security_task_alloc() when task != current so the lsm has all the information it needs. But I have no objection to a separate security_task_hijack() hook if you find the ptrace hook insufficient. -serge _______________________________________________ Containers mailing list Containers@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.linux-foundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers
