Eric W. Biederman wrote: [ ... ] > Close. Our ultimate goal is to make it so that when you talk within > the kernel you use a struct pid not a pid_t value. Attacking the > cached pid_t values is merely a way finding those places. > > So fixing thing like the pid_t value passed as credentials in unix domain > sockets is a lot more important than fixing any use of process_session > that just goes to user space. > > The reason it is important is because different processes may be in different > pid namespaces and raw pid_t values just won't make sense while struct pid > references are pid namespace independent. BTW, in rc4-mm1, we've nearly closed down the list from (needs an update) : http://wiki.openvz.org/Containers/Pidspace NFS is still pending. kthread is doing fine also. But, there are some pid_t values left over like in struct ucred you just mentioned. Any idea on how to track them down and prioritize them ? because we are real close to have all the prerequisites for the pid namespace. thanks, C.
