Linux CIFS client module: login rate limiting

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Hello Linux Kernel CIFS-List,

please forgive me to ninja-register to the list and start my firstpost right with the questions. This is done in the hope to save your time. The long background story is below in case you are interested:

Q1) Is it possible on the CIFS client to implement caching for failed CIFS/SMB authentication replies? My wish is to cache those negative replies just a second (HZ), as 3600 retries per hour to re-establish a lost connection to a CIFS server seems enough. Enough to succeed and enough on semi-permanent failures. I'd like to see this 1000ms cache as a mount default, as it's not for the initial request, just for the subsequent retries, but setting it to 0 (no cache) is ok for me, too, as it then can be changed at mount-time.

Q2) As an extension I also would like to see something like a maximum retry counter, which declares a CIFS mount dead if we do not succeed after N negative replies. In my case N=40000 (around at least 11 hrs for 1s cache time) sounds good. However the rate-limiting is much more important than deactivating a rogue CIFS mount. Hence mount's default should be N=0, which means, infinite retries (as it is today).

Q3) According to https://www.kernel.org/doc/readme/Documentation-filesystems-cifs-README these features do not exist (yet). Are such features planned for the kernel CIFS client module? If not, is there a chance for me to get patches upstream in case that I provide them? Is there more to think of than to just follow the style guide (and provide kernel-grade code)? Of course I will extend the sysctl/proc interface to those new mount options in a compatible way (or discuss this with the list before I break heritage). However my patches will be for "our" kernels used here (3.13 and 4.4), so perhaps this needs some porting/upgrading for the latest (I am not sure that I get permission to take the time to provide patches to the current kernel as well).

Sorry if some of those are FAQ, but as gmane.org is down/blank currently, I do not have access to the archive of kernel.cifs.

If you some better ideas, please feel free to criticize me ;)

Thanks,
-Tino
PS: FYI full long (sorry!) details follow in case you are interested:

(Sorry for missing logs and plain prose, I have no access to the test installation ATM, because it belongs to another group.)

Here at LiMux (Linux for Munich) in certain situations (for example the user has changed the password in LDAP) we observe, that CIFS clients might send 30 or more failing CIFS-setup-requests per second(!) to the CIFS server for an existing (old) CIFS-mount. Each of this requests tries to (re-)authenticate against AD/LDAP but fails, because the credentials are no more valid. After a short while the brute force protection of the AD kicks in and then blocks the AD-client (in this case the CIFS server) from accessing AD (for a while). Which means, other clients are affected by the faulty CIFS-mounts and prohibited to authenticate against the CIFS server.

The CIFS-Server-people cannot help, as the CIFS' vendor (no, not Microsoft) tells us to switch off brute-force-protection on AD-side, which is something we do not want to do for obvious reasons. The AD shall continue to block IPs with too many wrong requests. So the only option we have is, to do something against the high rate of AD-requests with a wrong password coming from CIFS clients.

To observe the effect following must happen:

- There is an old CIFS mount (for example a User's $HOME), which is already successfully mounted and working.

- The TCP session to the CIFS server breaks (like inactivity or some short outage on the network. I used "tcpkill" to simulate that), such that the Kernel's CIFS module needs to re-establish a connection to the CIFS server for the next access, which then triggers re-authenticating with the stored credentials.

- This re-authentication fails, due to a password change or locked account on the AD side. (If it succeeds there will be no problem, as then the CIFS mount is back to fully functional. The problem starts, when this re-authentication does not work.)

- And there also must be some culprit, in my case some user process (we haven't identified it yet but think it's something like Thunderbird), which tries to access the CIFS share in some looping fashion. (I used "while sleep 0.1; do touch /path/to/share/FILE; done" to test it.)

Please note that there are too many possible user space applications out there which could rapidly hammer a defunct CIFS mount, such that you won't be able to fix them all. Hence we need a fix on some other level.

(BTW we use version=1 of the protocol, and we require it, upgrading 18k of Linux workstations plus infrastructure against politics ain't easy.)

The CIFS module just forwards the request(s) to the CIFS server, and, as the TCP-connection is broken, tries to establish a new one. This triggers authentication, but the authentication fails. So the CIFS-client sees a negative reply like NT ACCOUNT LOCKED OUT, and answers something like "permission denied" to the userspace. So far, so correct, everything works perfectly as it should!

The problem starts when some userspace application starts to loop over the fault, thereby accessing the CIFS share over and over again, several times a second. Then the CIFS module continues to do it's job, but it does it much too perfect. Each single userspace access will try to re-open the session to the CIFS server, again and again, which means we see a massive amount of authentication requests to the server which all are doomed. Even worse, the faster the server and the better the network, the more such failing requests you will see, of course. This triggers the AD brute force protection even faster.

However, if those few CIFS-clients, which "freak out", would be limited to only send 1 request per second, then AD does not see too many failed requests per timespan, so everything stays operable.

But even if this is implemented, this is only half of the story (the important half, but there is more to it):

If we had rate-limiting in place the AD and CIFS server are out of the loop. But we still have the user account locked by the failing AD requests. Let's start over the case from the beginning under the assumption, that we have failed authentication reply caching with a 1s retry:

- The user changes his password (perhaps using Windows, not Linux) but does not log out afterwards (on Linux).

- The TCP-session of the CIFS mount breaks for some reason.

- Some userspace process tries to access this CIFS mount in the looping fashion.

- The Kernel's CIFS-module tries to re-establish the connection.

- The requests fails due to old credential. (As above. Windows has the new password, but Linux not.)

- After 5 such false retries (seen from the CIFS-Server) the AD locks the account. Now the Linux-Client sees NT ACCOUNT LOCKED (sp?). This takes 5 seconds.

- If the user comes back to work the next day and tries to login, his account is locked, of course.

- He calls Help Desk to get his account unlocked.  They do it.

- But 5s later his account is locked, again. Thanks to 5 retries seen from the old login on the Linux client.

- Wash, rinse, repeat.

Eventually the user finds out where he is still logged in and logs out, such that (in our case) the (automated, yet no more working) user's CIFS-mounts vanish, too. This delays how long it takes until the user can work normally, also it usually involves a lot of effort of other people to solve the riddle where the login hides.

This is why I asked Q2 which would allow us to configure, that after 11 hours (or so) the CIFS mount ceases to exist, such that the CIFS client stops trying to re-establish the connection. Which means, the next business day, the CIFS mount very likely has invalidated (it still is mounted, but quiet on the Linux side), such that the user can have his password unlocked without trouble.

This is a tripple-win situation, as it not only helps the Users and takes the burden from Help Desk to diagnose a hard do diagnose situation, it also conserves some wasted network bandwidth and processing power due to all those fruitless authentication requests seen today. Sigh.

I agree that all this is not the fault of the CIFS module. However it is better to start to be nice and polite to the infrastructure in case something stupid happens, than to continue as usual and thereby wasting resources and possibly impact others, even when you are rightfully doing this.

(This is a technical list, so I do not introduce myself, because I am not important. All you need to know is that I know Linux from 0.99 and I am able to hack the kernel, but until now only for my very own needs. BTW, my private GitHub is https://github.com/hilbix/)

Thanks for any help or comments,

-Tino

--
Mit freundlichen Grüßen
Valentin Hilbig
Externer Dienstleister

IT@M - Dienstleister für Informations- und Telekommunikationstechnik der Landeshauptstadt München
Geschäftsbereich Werkzeuge und Infrastruktur
Servicebereich Städtische Arbeitsplätze
Serviceteam LiMux-Arbeitsplatz I23
LiMux-Basisclient

Raum A2.030, Agnes-Pockels-Bogen 21, 80992 München

Tel.: +49 89 233-782273
E-Mail: externer.dl.hilbig@xxxxxxxxxxx
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