On Sat, Mar 21, 2015 at 10:23 PM, Taesoo Kim <taesoo@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On 03/21/15 at 09:10pm, Scott Lovenberg wrote: >> On Sat, Mar 21, 2015 at 6:08 PM, Taesoo Kim <tsgatesv@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> >> > Althouhg mkfs.cifs in userspace performs a bit of sanitization >> > (e.g., forcing one user option), current implementation is not >> > robust. Other options such as iocharset and domainanme are similary >> > vulnerable. >> > >> >> I assume you mean mount.cifs? :-) Anyways, good catch. > > Right. FYI, I've tried mangling password field (e.g., pass=a,user=A > &c); Skimming through the code (just a few minutes), there are a few > potential places that don't sanitize its string, unlike passwd. But > don't have much time to play with for now :) > > Thanks, > Taesoo > >> -- >> Peace and Blessings, >> -Scott. Without even looking at the code, I can tell you that's probably my fault if you're talking about the code in mount.cifs. I was pretty paranoid about the password field but not so paranoid about the other parameters. I'll take a look late tonight or some time tomorrow and try to patch over my shame. :) -- Peace and Blessings, -Scott. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-cifs" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
