On Sun, 30 Jun 2013 14:10:39 -0500
Steve French <smfrench@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Updated patch to try to prevent allocation of smb2 or smb3 crypto
> secmech structures unless needed. There is probably more updates that
> could be done to cleanup cifs - but the more important part is to get
> the smb2/smb3 part cleaned up.
>
> diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c b/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c
> index 3d8bf94..e0d94e1 100644
> --- a/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c
> +++ b/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c
> @@ -745,20 +745,6 @@ cifs_crypto_shash_allocate(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
> goto crypto_allocate_md5_fail;
> }
>
> - server->secmech.hmacsha256 = crypto_alloc_shash("hmac(sha256)", 0, 0);
> - if (IS_ERR(server->secmech.hmacsha256)) {
> - cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not allocate crypto hmacsha256\n");
> - rc = PTR_ERR(server->secmech.hmacsha256);
> - goto crypto_allocate_hmacsha256_fail;
> - }
> -
> - server->secmech.cmacaes = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0);
> - if (IS_ERR(server->secmech.cmacaes)) {
> - cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not allocate crypto cmac-aes");
> - rc = PTR_ERR(server->secmech.cmacaes);
> - goto crypto_allocate_cmacaes_fail;
> - }
> -
> size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) +
> crypto_shash_descsize(server->secmech.hmacmd5);
> server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5 = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
> @@ -779,45 +765,12 @@ cifs_crypto_shash_allocate(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
> server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash.tfm = server->secmech.md5;
> server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash.flags = 0x0;
>
> - size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) +
> - crypto_shash_descsize(server->secmech.hmacsha256);
> - server->secmech.sdeschmacsha256 = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
> - if (!server->secmech.sdeschmacsha256) {
> - rc = -ENOMEM;
> - goto crypto_allocate_hmacsha256_sdesc_fail;
> - }
> - server->secmech.sdeschmacsha256->shash.tfm = server->secmech.hmacsha256;
> - server->secmech.sdeschmacsha256->shash.flags = 0x0;
> -
> - size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) +
> - crypto_shash_descsize(server->secmech.cmacaes);
> - server->secmech.sdesccmacaes = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
> - if (!server->secmech.sdesccmacaes) {
> - cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Can't alloc cmacaes\n", __func__);
> - rc = -ENOMEM;
> - goto crypto_allocate_cmacaes_sdesc_fail;
> - }
> - server->secmech.sdesccmacaes->shash.tfm = server->secmech.cmacaes;
> - server->secmech.sdesccmacaes->shash.flags = 0x0;
> -
> return 0;
>
> -crypto_allocate_cmacaes_sdesc_fail:
> - kfree(server->secmech.sdeschmacsha256);
> -
> -crypto_allocate_hmacsha256_sdesc_fail:
> - kfree(server->secmech.sdescmd5);
> -
> crypto_allocate_md5_sdesc_fail:
> kfree(server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5);
>
> crypto_allocate_hmacmd5_sdesc_fail:
> - crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.cmacaes);
> -
> -crypto_allocate_cmacaes_fail:
> - crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.hmacsha256);
> -
> -crypto_allocate_hmacsha256_fail:
> crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.md5);
>
> crypto_allocate_md5_fail:
> diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c
> index afcb8a1..aa5bf23 100644
> --- a/fs/cifs/connect.c
> +++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c
> @@ -2108,14 +2108,15 @@ cifs_get_tcp_session(struct smb_vol *volume_info)
> goto out_err;
> }
>
> + tcp_ses->ops = volume_info->ops;
> + tcp_ses->vals = volume_info->vals;
> +
> rc = cifs_crypto_shash_allocate(tcp_ses);
> if (rc) {
> cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not setup hash structures rc %d\n", rc);
> goto out_err;
> }
>
> - tcp_ses->ops = volume_info->ops;
> - tcp_ses->vals = volume_info->vals;
> cifs_set_net_ns(tcp_ses, get_net(current->nsproxy->net_ns));
> tcp_ses->hostname = extract_hostname(volume_info->UNC);
> if (IS_ERR(tcp_ses->hostname)) {
> diff --git a/fs/cifs/smb2transport.c b/fs/cifs/smb2transport.c
> index 09b4fba..ca9d66e 100644
> --- a/fs/cifs/smb2transport.c
> +++ b/fs/cifs/smb2transport.c
> @@ -39,6 +39,65 @@
> #include "smb2status.h"
> #include "smb2glob.h"
>
> +static int
> +smb2_crypto_shash_allocate(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
> +{
> + unsigned int size;
> +
> + server->secmech.hmacsha256 = crypto_alloc_shash("hmac(sha256)", 0, 0);
> + if (IS_ERR(server->secmech.hmacsha256)) {
> + cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not allocate crypto hmacsha256\n");
> + return PTR_ERR(server->secmech.hmacsha256);
> + }
> +
> + size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) +
> + crypto_shash_descsize(server->secmech.hmacsha256);
> + server->secmech.sdeschmacsha256 = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!server->secmech.sdeschmacsha256) {
> + crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.hmacsha256);
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + }
> + server->secmech.sdeschmacsha256->shash.tfm = server->secmech.hmacsha256;
> + server->secmech.sdeschmacsha256->shash.flags = 0x0;
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int
> +smb3_crypto_shash_allocate(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
> +{
> + unsigned int size;
> + int rc;
> +
> + rc = smb2_crypto_shash_allocate(server);
> + if (rc)
> + return rc;
> +
> + server->secmech.cmacaes = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0);
> + if (IS_ERR(server->secmech.cmacaes)) {
> + cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not allocate crypto cmac-aes");
> + kfree(server->secmech.sdeschmacsha256);
> + crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.hmacsha256);
> + return PTR_ERR(server->secmech.cmacaes);
> + }
> +
> + size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) +
> + crypto_shash_descsize(server->secmech.cmacaes);
> + server->secmech.sdesccmacaes = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!server->secmech.sdesccmacaes) {
> + cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Can't alloc cmacaes\n", __func__);
> + kfree(server->secmech.sdeschmacsha256);
> + crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.hmacsha256);
> + crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.cmacaes);
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + }
> + server->secmech.sdesccmacaes->shash.tfm = server->secmech.cmacaes;
> + server->secmech.sdesccmacaes->shash.flags = 0x0;
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +
> int
> smb2_calc_signature(struct smb_rqst *rqst, struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
> {
> @@ -52,6 +111,9 @@ smb2_calc_signature(struct smb_rqst *rqst, struct
> TCP_Server_Info *server)
> memset(smb2_signature, 0x0, SMB2_HMACSHA256_SIZE);
> memset(smb2_pdu->Signature, 0x0, SMB2_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
>
> + if (server->secmech.hmacsha256 == NULL)
> + smb2_crypto_shash_allocate(server);
> +
> rc = crypto_shash_setkey(server->secmech.hmacsha256,
> server->session_key.response, SMB2_NTLMV2_SESSKEY_SIZE);
> if (rc) {
> @@ -129,6 +191,10 @@ generate_smb3signingkey(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
> memset(prfhash, 0x0, SMB2_HMACSHA256_SIZE);
> memset(server->smb3signingkey, 0x0, SMB3_SIGNKEY_SIZE);
>
> + /* SMB3 essentially requires signing so no harm allocating it early */
> + if (server->secmech.hmacsha256 == NULL)
> + smb3_crypto_shash_allocate(server);
> +
> rc = crypto_shash_setkey(server->secmech.hmacsha256,
> server->session_key.response, SMB2_NTLMV2_SESSKEY_SIZE);
> if (rc) {
> @@ -210,6 +276,9 @@ smb3_calc_signature(struct smb_rqst *rqst, struct
> TCP_Server_Info *server)
> return rc;
> }
>
> + /* we already allocate sdesccmacaes when we init smb3 signing key,
> + so unlike smb2 we do not have to check here if secmech
> + are initialized */
> rc = crypto_shash_init(&server->secmech.sdesccmacaes->shash);
> if (rc) {
> cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not init cmac aes\n", __func__);
>
> On Sun, Jun 30, 2013 at 5:25 AM, Jeff Layton <jlayton@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > On Sat, 29 Jun 2013 23:06:12 -0500
> > Steve French <smfrench@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> >> if we setup a socket we send a negotiate protocol
> >> and decide on the smb version at that point. If we mount a second
> >> user to the same server, he will use the same socket and thus the same
> >> dialect that we did the first mount on - i don't know a way to mix
> >> multiple dialects on the same socket and I don't think we should.
> >>
> > In any case...match_server does this:
> >
> > if ((server->vals != vol->vals) || (server->ops != vol->ops))
> > return 0;
> >
> > ...which should make it impossible to share sockets when the versions
> > don't match. In principle, I guess we could probably share sockets
> > between (for instance) 2.1 and 2.002, but that's an optimization that
> > could be done later.
>
> I also don't think that that is a good idea to change the dialect of a user of
> the socket on the fly. We will send the negotiate and decide on the dialect
> when connecting to the socket(s), and each subsequent user will
> create an new smb2/smb3 session on the same socket, thus with
> the same smb2 dialect. I don't think there is any case where you expect
> the server to change from smb2.1 to smb3 or to smb3.02 without
> dropping the tcp session) - although I am open to the idea of allowing
> "upgrading security on the fly" to mandate signing (or encryption) on the
> fly if security needs change due to an emergency.
>
Yeah, scratch that. I wasn't thinking about this correctly...
The dialect is set during the NEGOTIATE, so you really *can't* share
sockets between different versions.
>
> > The way the crypto is allocated is a serious wart. The algorithms are
> > being allocated too early. It would be preferable even to delay
> > allocating the crypto stuff at all until it's actually needed.
>
> Well - the patch I proposed at least allocates the smb2 ones
> when we have negotiated smb2 or smb2.1, and smb3 ones when
> smb3 or smb3.02 is negotiated. The alternative is fine with me,
> but means checking on EVERY signing request (since you
> don't have to have signing on the first request(s) but then end
> up signing a later one - e.g. for the case of secure renogotiate)
>
An extra NULL pointer check on every signing request doesn't sound too
onerous. In most cases, you'll just do the allocation once (almost
always during the TREE_CONNECT) and hold on to them during the life of
the mount.
> > If, for instance I mount with sec=krb5 and don't request signing,
> > there's no need to allocate any of this stuff. This is not harmless
> > either. We have at least one customer that boots their machines with
> > fips=1. They're basically unable to use cifs.ko at all currently
> > because the crypto allocations fail.
>
> OK - that is a good point.
>
>
--
Jeff Layton <jlayton@xxxxxxxxxx>
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