On 2/14/20 1:09 PM, Oleksij Rempel wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> any comments on this patch?
I'm going to take this patch now for 5.10....Comments?
Marc
>
> On Fri, Jan 24, 2020 at 02:26:56PM +0100, Oleksij Rempel wrote:
>> All user space generated SKBs are owned by a socket (unless injected
>> into the key via AF_PACKET). If a socket is closed, all associated skbs
>> will be cleaned up.
>>
>> This leads to a problem when a CAN driver calls can_put_echo_skb() on a
>> unshared SKB. If the socket is closed prior to the TX complete handler,
>> can_get_echo_skb() and the subsequent delivering of the echo SKB to
>> all registered callbacks, a SKB with a refcount of 0 is delivered.
>>
>> To avoid the problem, in can_get_echo_skb() the original SKB is now
>> always cloned, regardless of shared SKB or not. If the process exists it
>> can now safely discard its SKBs, without disturbing the delivery of the
>> echo SKB.
>>
>> The problem shows up in the j1939 stack, when it clones the
>> incoming skb, which detects the already 0 refcount.
>>
>> We can easily reproduce this with following example:
>>
>> testj1939 -B -r can0: &
>> cansend can0 1823ff40#0123
>>
>> WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 293 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0x108/0x174
>> refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
>> Modules linked in: coda_vpu imx_vdoa videobuf2_vmalloc dw_hdmi_ahb_audio vcan
>> CPU: 0 PID: 293 Comm: cansend Not tainted 5.5.0-rc6-00376-g9e20dcb7040d #1
>> Hardware name: Freescale i.MX6 Quad/DualLite (Device Tree)
>> Backtrace:
>> [<c010f570>] (dump_backtrace) from [<c010f90c>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24)
>> [<c010f8ec>] (show_stack) from [<c0c3e1a4>] (dump_stack+0x8c/0xa0)
>> [<c0c3e118>] (dump_stack) from [<c0127fec>] (__warn+0xe0/0x108)
>> [<c0127f0c>] (__warn) from [<c01283c8>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0xa8/0xcc)
>> [<c0128324>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c0539c0c>] (refcount_warn_saturate+0x108/0x174)
>> [<c0539b04>] (refcount_warn_saturate) from [<c0ad2cac>] (j1939_can_recv+0x20c/0x210)
>> [<c0ad2aa0>] (j1939_can_recv) from [<c0ac9dc8>] (can_rcv_filter+0xb4/0x268)
>> [<c0ac9d14>] (can_rcv_filter) from [<c0aca2cc>] (can_receive+0xb0/0xe4)
>> [<c0aca21c>] (can_receive) from [<c0aca348>] (can_rcv+0x48/0x98)
>> [<c0aca300>] (can_rcv) from [<c09b1fdc>] (__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x64/0x88)
>> [<c09b1f78>] (__netif_receive_skb_one_core) from [<c09b2070>] (__netif_receive_skb+0x38/0x94)
>> [<c09b2038>] (__netif_receive_skb) from [<c09b2130>] (netif_receive_skb_internal+0x64/0xf8)
>> [<c09b20cc>] (netif_receive_skb_internal) from [<c09b21f8>] (netif_receive_skb+0x34/0x19c)
>> [<c09b21c4>] (netif_receive_skb) from [<c0791278>] (can_rx_offload_napi_poll+0x58/0xb4)
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> ---
>> include/linux/can/skb.h | 20 ++++++++------------
>> 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/linux/can/skb.h b/include/linux/can/skb.h
>> index a954def26c0d..0783b0c6d9e2 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/can/skb.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/can/skb.h
>> @@ -61,21 +61,17 @@ static inline void can_skb_set_owner(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
>> */
>> static inline struct sk_buff *can_create_echo_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
>> {
>> - if (skb_shared(skb)) {
>> - struct sk_buff *nskb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
>> + struct sk_buff *nskb;
>>
>> - if (likely(nskb)) {
>> - can_skb_set_owner(nskb, skb->sk);
>> - consume_skb(skb);
>> - return nskb;
>> - } else {
>> - kfree_skb(skb);
>> - return NULL;
>> - }
>> + nskb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
>> + if (unlikely(!nskb)) {
>> + kfree_skb(skb);
>> + return NULL;
>> }
>>
>> - /* we can assume to have an unshared skb with proper owner */
>> - return skb;
>> + can_skb_set_owner(nskb, skb->sk);
>> + consume_skb(skb);
>> + return nskb;
>> }
>>
>> #endif /* !_CAN_SKB_H */
>> --
>> 2.25.0
>>
>>
>>
>
--
Pengutronix e.K. | Marc Kleine-Budde |
Embedded Linux | https://www.pengutronix.de |
Vertretung West/Dortmund | Phone: +49-231-2826-924 |
Amtsgericht Hildesheim, HRA 2686 | Fax: +49-5121-206917-5555 |
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