Sasha, do your stable patch picker scripts look at syzbot fix commands to select patches to back port? In this case a bug was fixed while adding a new feature. No one noticed the bug fix and there was no Fixes tag. On Sun, Jan 31, 2021 at 06:01:54PM +0800, Hillf Danton wrote: > On Thu, 28 Jan 2021 09:08:24 -0800 > > syzbot found the following issue on: > > > > HEAD commit: b491e6a7 net: lapb: Add locking to the lapb module > > git tree: net > > console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=17ba0f2cd00000 > > kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=be33d8015c9de024 > > dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=3ed6361bf59830ca9138 > > compiler: gcc (GCC) 10.1.0-syz 20200507 > > syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=10628ae8d00000 > > C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=12964b80d00000 > > > > IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit: > > Reported-by: syzbot+3ed6361bf59830ca9138@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > > > > IPVS: ftp: loaded support on port[0] = 21 > > ================================================================== > > BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in add_adv_patterns_monitor+0x91f/0xa90 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:4266 > > Read of size 1 at addr ffff888013251b29 by task syz-executor387/8480 > > > > CPU: 1 PID: 8480 Comm: syz-executor387 Not tainted 5.11.0-rc4-syzkaller #0 > > Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 > > Call Trace: > > __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline] > > dump_stack+0x107/0x163 lib/dump_stack.c:120 > > print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x5b/0x2f8 mm/kasan/report.c:230 > > __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:396 [inline] > > kasan_report.cold+0x79/0xd5 mm/kasan/report.c:413 > > add_adv_patterns_monitor+0x91f/0xa90 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:4266 > > hci_mgmt_cmd net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1603 [inline] > > hci_sock_sendmsg+0x1b98/0x21d0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1738 > > sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline] > > sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:672 > > sock_write_iter+0x289/0x3c0 net/socket.c:999 > > call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1901 [inline] > > new_sync_write+0x426/0x650 fs/read_write.c:518 > > vfs_write+0x791/0xa30 fs/read_write.c:605 > > ksys_write+0x1ee/0x250 fs/read_write.c:658 > > do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 > > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 > > RIP: 0033:0x447579 > > Code: 18 89 d0 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 3b 0e fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 > > RSP: 002b:00007ffe0f4194b8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 > > RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000447579 > > RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000004 > > RBP: 00000000018e1914 R08: 00000000018e1914 R09: 00007ffe0f4194a0 > > R10: 00007ffe0f4194c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000004 > > R13: 0000000000000072 R14: 00000000018e1914 R15: 0000000000000000 > > > > Allocated by task 8480: > > kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38 > > kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:46 [inline] > > set_alloc_info mm/kasan/common.c:401 [inline] > > ____kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0x82/0xa0 mm/kasan/common.c:429 > > kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:557 [inline] > > hci_mgmt_cmd net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1508 [inline] > > hci_sock_sendmsg+0x9b8/0x21d0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1738 > > sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline] > > sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:672 > > sock_write_iter+0x289/0x3c0 net/socket.c:999 > > call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1901 [inline] > > new_sync_write+0x426/0x650 fs/read_write.c:518 > > vfs_write+0x791/0xa30 fs/read_write.c:605 > > ksys_write+0x1ee/0x250 fs/read_write.c:658 > > do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 > > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 > > > > The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888013251b20 > > which belongs to the cache kmalloc-16 of size 16 > > The buggy address is located 9 bytes inside of > > 16-byte region [ffff888013251b20, ffff888013251b30) > > The buggy address belongs to the page: > > page:00000000a4467645 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x13251 > > flags: 0xfff00000000200(slab) > > raw: 00fff00000000200 ffffea00004ed440 0000000300000003 ffff888010041b40 > > raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080800080 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 > > page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected > > > > Memory state around the buggy address: > > ffff888013251a00: fb fb fc fc fb fb fc fc 00 00 fc fc fb fb fc fc > > ffff888013251a80: 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc fb fb fc fc 00 00 fc fc > > >ffff888013251b00: 00 00 fc fc 00 01 fc fc fb fb fc fc fa fb fc fc > > ^ > > ffff888013251b80: 00 00 fc fc fa fb fc fc fa fb fc fc 00 00 fc fc > > ffff888013251c00: fa fb fc fc fa fb fc fc 00 00 fc fc fa fb fc fc > > ================================================================== > > Fix b139553db5cd ("Bluetooth: Add handler of MGMT_OP_ADD_ADV_PATTERNS_MONITOR") > by adding the right-hand buffer boundary check. > > --- a/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c > +++ b/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c > @@ -4238,7 +4238,9 @@ static int add_adv_patterns_monitor(stru > > BT_DBG("request for %s", hdev->name); > > - if (len <= sizeof(*cp) || cp->pattern_count == 0) { > + if (len <= sizeof(*cp) || cp->pattern_count == 0 || > + len < sizeof(*cp) + cp->pattern_count * > + sizeof(struct mgmt_adv_pattern)) { > err = mgmt_cmd_status(sk, hdev->id, > MGMT_OP_ADD_ADV_PATTERNS_MONITOR, > MGMT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMS); > I think this was already fixed on Jan 22 commit b4a221ea8a1f ("Bluetooth: advmon offload MSFT add rssi support"). expected_size += cp->pattern_count * sizeof(struct mgmt_adv_pattern); if (len != expected_size) { Now someone needs to backport it to stable. regards, dan carpenter
