Hi Howard,
> Attack scenario:
> 1. A Chromebook (let's call this device A) is paired to a legitimate
> Bluetooth classic device (e.g. a speaker) (let's call this device
> B).
> 2. A malicious device (let's call this device C) pretends to be the
> Bluetooth speaker by using the same BT address.
> 3. If device A is not currently connected to device B, device A will
> be ready to accept connection from device B in the background
> (technically, doing Page Scan).
> 4. Therefore, device C can initiate connection to device A
> (because device A is doing Page Scan) and device A will accept the
> connection because device A trusts device C's address which is the
> same as device B's address.
> 5. Device C won't be able to communicate at any high level Bluetooth
> profile with device A because device A enforces that device C is
> encrypted with their common Link Key, which device C doesn't have.
> But device C can initiate pairing with device A with just-works
> model without requiring user interaction (there is only pairing
> notification). After pairing, device A now trusts device C with a
> new different link key, common between device A and C.
> 6. From now on, device A trusts device C, so device C can at anytime
> connect to device A to do any kind of high-level hijacking, e.g.
> speaker hijack or mouse/keyboard hijack.
>
> Since we don't know whether the repairing is legitimate or not,
> leave the decision to user space if all the conditions below are met.
> - the pairing is initialized by peer
> - the authorization method is just-work
> - host already had the link key to the peer
>
> Signed-off-by: Howard Chung <howardchung@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
>
> Changes in v4:
> - optimise the check in smp.c.
>
> Changes in v3:
> - Change confirm_hint from 2 to 1
> - Fix coding style (declaration order)
>
> Changes in v2:
> - Remove the HCI_PERMIT_JUST_WORK_REPAIR debugfs option
> - Fix the added code in classic
> - Add a similar fix for LE
>
> net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 10 ++++++++++
> net/bluetooth/smp.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
> index 2c833dae9366..e6982f4f51ea 100644
> --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
> +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
> @@ -4571,6 +4571,16 @@ static void hci_user_confirm_request_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev,
> goto confirm;
> }
>
> + /* If there already exists link key in local host, leave the
> + * decision to user space since the remote device could be
> + * legitimate or malicious.
> + */
> + if (hci_find_link_key(hdev, &ev->bdaddr)) {
> + bt_dev_warn(hdev, "Local host already has link key");
I would turn this into bt_dev_dbg actually.
> + confirm_hint = 1;
> + goto confirm;
> + }
> +
> BT_DBG("Auto-accept of user confirmation with %ums delay",
> hdev->auto_accept_delay);
>
> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
> index 2cba6e07c02b..bea64071bdd1 100644
> --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
> +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
> @@ -2192,6 +2192,25 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
> smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
> smp->prnd);
> SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
> +
> + /* May need further confirmation for Just-Works pairing */
This comment is misleading and has two spaces at the end. My proposal would be this:
/* Only Just-Works pairing requires extra checks */
> + if (smp->method != JUST_WORKS)
> + goto mackey_and_ltk;
> +
> + /* If there already exists link key in local host, leave the
> + * decision to user space since the remote device could be
> + * legitimate or malicious.
> + */
> + if (hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
> + hcon->role)) {
> + err = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
> + hcon->type,
> + hcon->dst_type, passkey,
> + 1);
> + if (err)
> + return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
> + set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
> + }
> }
Rest looks good. Either you send me a v5 or tell me to fix it up before applying the patch.
Regards
Marcel
