---
mesh/crypto.c | 1545 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 1545 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 mesh/crypto.c
diff --git a/mesh/crypto.c b/mesh/crypto.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dda867924
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mesh/crypto.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1545 @@
+/*
+ *
+ * BlueZ - Bluetooth protocol stack for Linux
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ *
+ * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
+#include <config.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <ell/ell.h>
+
+#include <linux/if_alg.h>
+
+#ifndef SOL_ALG
+#define SOL_ALG 279
+#endif
+
+#ifndef ALG_SET_AEAD_AUTHSIZE
+#define ALG_SET_AEAD_AUTHSIZE 5
+#endif
+
+#include "mesh/mesh.h"
+#include "mesh/node.h"
+#include "mesh/net.h"
+#include "mesh/crypto.h"
+
+/* Multiply used Zero array */
+static const uint8_t zero[16] = { 0, };
+
+static int alg_new(int fd, const void *keyval, socklen_t keylen,
+ size_t mic_size)
+{
+ if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, keyval, keylen) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (mic_size &&
+ setsockopt(fd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_AEAD_AUTHSIZE,
+ NULL, mic_size) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* FIXME: This should use accept4() with SOCK_CLOEXEC */
+ return accept(fd, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+static bool alg_encrypt(int fd, const void *inbuf, size_t inlen,
+ void *outbuf, size_t outlen)
+{
+ __u32 alg_op = ALG_OP_ENCRYPT;
+ char cbuf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(alg_op))];
+ struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
+ struct msghdr msg;
+ struct iovec iov;
+ ssize_t len;
+
+ memset(cbuf, 0, sizeof(cbuf));
+ memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
+
+ msg.msg_control = cbuf;
+ msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cbuf);
+
+ cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
+ cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_ALG;
+ cmsg->cmsg_type = ALG_SET_OP;
+ cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(alg_op));
+ memcpy(CMSG_DATA(cmsg), &alg_op, sizeof(alg_op));
+
+ iov.iov_base = (void *) inbuf;
+ iov.iov_len = inlen;
+
+ msg.msg_iov = &iov;
+ msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
+
+ len = sendmsg(fd, &msg, 0);
+ if (len < 0)
+ return false;
+
+ len = read(fd, outbuf, outlen);
+ if (len < 0)
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static int aes_ecb_setup(const uint8_t key[16])
+{
+ struct sockaddr_alg salg;
+ int fd, nfd;
+
+ fd = socket(PF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ memset(&salg, 0, sizeof(salg));
+ salg.salg_family = AF_ALG;
+ strcpy((char *) salg.salg_type, "skcipher");
+ strcpy((char *) salg.salg_name, "ecb(aes)");
+
+ if (bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *) &salg, sizeof(salg)) < 0) {
+ close(fd);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ nfd = alg_new(fd, key, 16, 0);
+
+ close(fd);
+
+ return nfd;
+}
+
+static bool aes_ecb(int fd, const uint8_t plaintext[16], uint8_t encrypted[16])
+{
+ return alg_encrypt(fd, plaintext, 16, encrypted, 16);
+}
+
+static void aes_ecb_destroy(int fd)
+{
+ close(fd);
+}
+
+static bool aes_ecb_one(const uint8_t key[16],
+ const uint8_t plaintext[16], uint8_t encrypted[16])
+{
+ bool result;
+ int fd;
+
+ fd = aes_ecb_setup(key);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ return false;
+
+ result = aes_ecb(fd, plaintext, encrypted);
+
+ aes_ecb_destroy(fd);
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+bool mesh_aes_ecb_one(const uint8_t key[16],
+ const uint8_t plaintext[16], uint8_t encrypted[16])
+{
+ return aes_ecb_one(key, plaintext, encrypted);
+}
+
+/* Maximum message length that can be passed to aes_cmac */
+#define CMAC_MSG_MAX (64 + 64 + 17)
+
+static int aes_cmac_setup(const uint8_t key[16])
+{
+ struct sockaddr_alg salg;
+ int fd, nfd;
+
+ fd = socket(PF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ memset(&salg, 0, sizeof(salg));
+ salg.salg_family = AF_ALG;
+ strcpy((char *) salg.salg_type, "hash");
+ strcpy((char *) salg.salg_name, "cmac(aes)");
+
+ if (bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *) &salg, sizeof(salg)) < 0) {
+ close(fd);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ nfd = alg_new(fd, key, 16, 0);
+
+ close(fd);
+
+ return nfd;
+}
+
+static bool aes_cmac(int fd, const uint8_t *msg,
+ size_t msg_len, uint8_t res[16])
+{
+ ssize_t len;
+
+ if (msg_len > CMAC_MSG_MAX)
+ return false;
+
+ len = send(fd, msg, msg_len, 0);
+ if (len < 0)
+ return false;
+
+ len = read(fd, res, 16);
+ if (len < 0)
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static void aes_cmac_destroy(int fd)
+{
+ close(fd);
+}
+
+static int aes_cmac_N_start(const uint8_t N[16])
+{
+ int fd;
+
+ fd = aes_cmac_setup(N);
+ return fd;
+}
+
+static bool aes_cmac_one(const uint8_t key[16], const void *msg,
+ size_t msg_len, uint8_t res[16])
+{
+ bool result;
+ int fd;
+
+ fd = aes_cmac_setup(key);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ return false;
+
+ result = aes_cmac(fd, msg, msg_len, res);
+
+ aes_cmac_destroy(fd);
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+bool mesh_crypto_aes_cmac(const uint8_t key[16], const uint8_t *msg,
+ size_t msg_len, uint8_t res[16])
+{
+ return aes_cmac_one(key, msg, msg_len, res);
+}
+
+bool mesh_crypto_aes_ccm_encrypt(const uint8_t nonce[13], const uint8_t key[16],
+ const uint8_t *aad, uint16_t aad_len,
+ const uint8_t *msg, uint16_t msg_len,
+ uint8_t *out_msg,
+ void *out_mic, size_t mic_size)
+{
+ uint8_t pmsg[16], cmic[16], cmsg[16];
+ uint8_t mic[16], Xn[16];
+ uint16_t blk_cnt, last_blk;
+ bool result;
+ size_t i, j;
+ int fd;
+
+ /* Mesh limits AAD length to 16 */
+ if (aad_len > 16)
+ return false;
+
+ fd = aes_ecb_setup(key);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ return false;
+
+ /* C_mic = e(AppKey, 0x01 || nonce || 0x0000) */
+ pmsg[0] = 0x01;
+ memcpy(pmsg + 1, nonce, 13);
+ l_put_be16(0x0000, pmsg + 14);
+
+ result = aes_ecb(fd, pmsg, cmic);
+ if (!result)
+ goto done;
+
+ /* X_0 = e(AppKey, 0x09 || nonce || length) */
+ if (mic_size == 8)
+ pmsg[0] = 0x19 | (aad_len ? 0x40 : 0x00);
+ else
+ pmsg[0] = 0x09 | (aad_len ? 0x40 : 0x00);
+
+ memcpy(pmsg + 1, nonce, 13);
+ l_put_be16(msg_len, pmsg + 14);
+
+ result = aes_ecb(fd, pmsg, Xn);
+ if (!result)
+ goto done;
+
+ /* If AAD is being used to authenticate, include it here */
+ if (aad_len) {
+ l_put_be16(aad_len, pmsg);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(uint16_t); i++)
+ pmsg[i] = Xn[i] ^ pmsg[i];
+
+ j = 0;
+ aad_len += sizeof(uint16_t);
+ while (aad_len > 16) {
+ do {
+ pmsg[i] = Xn[i] ^ aad[j];
+ i++, j++;
+ } while (i < 16);
+
+ aad_len -= 16;
+ i = 0;
+
+ result = aes_ecb(fd, pmsg, Xn);
+ if (!result)
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < aad_len; i++, j++)
+ pmsg[i] = Xn[i] ^ aad[j];
+
+ for (i = aad_len; i < 16; i++)
+ pmsg[i] = Xn[i];
+
+ result = aes_ecb(fd, pmsg, Xn);
+ if (!result)
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ last_blk = msg_len % 16;
+ blk_cnt = (msg_len + 15) / 16;
+ if (!last_blk)
+ last_blk = 16;
+
+ for (j = 0; j < blk_cnt; j++) {
+ if (j + 1 == blk_cnt) {
+ /* X_1 = e(AppKey, X_0 ^ Payload[0-15]) */
+ for (i = 0; i < last_blk; i++)
+ pmsg[i] = Xn[i] ^ msg[(j * 16) + i];
+ for (i = last_blk; i < 16; i++)
+ pmsg[i] = Xn[i] ^ 0x00;
+
+ result = aes_ecb(fd, pmsg, Xn);
+ if (!result)
+ goto done;
+
+ /* MIC = C_mic ^ X_1 */
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(mic); i++)
+ mic[i] = cmic[i] ^ Xn[i];
+
+ /* C_1 = e(AppKey, 0x01 || nonce || 0x0001) */
+ pmsg[0] = 0x01;
+ memcpy(pmsg + 1, nonce, 13);
+ l_put_be16(j + 1, pmsg + 14);
+
+ result = aes_ecb(fd, pmsg, cmsg);
+ if (!result)
+ goto done;
+
+ if (out_msg) {
+ /* Encrypted = Payload[0-15] ^ C_1 */
+ for (i = 0; i < last_blk; i++)
+ out_msg[(j * 16) + i] =
+ msg[(j * 16) + i] ^ cmsg[i];
+
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* X_1 = e(AppKey, X_0 ^ Payload[0-15]) */
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ pmsg[i] = Xn[i] ^ msg[(j * 16) + i];
+
+ result = aes_ecb(fd, pmsg, Xn);
+ if (!result)
+ goto done;
+
+ /* C_1 = e(AppKey, 0x01 || nonce || 0x0001) */
+ pmsg[0] = 0x01;
+ memcpy(pmsg + 1, nonce, 13);
+ l_put_be16(j + 1, pmsg + 14);
+
+ result = aes_ecb(fd, pmsg, cmsg);
+ if (!result)
+ goto done;
+
+ if (out_msg) {
+ /* Encrypted = Payload[0-15] ^ C_N */
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ out_msg[(j * 16) + i] =
+ msg[(j * 16) + i] ^ cmsg[i];
+ }
+
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (out_msg)
+ memcpy(out_msg + msg_len, mic, mic_size);
+
+ if (out_mic) {
+ switch (mic_size) {
+ case 4:
+ *(uint32_t *)out_mic = l_get_be32(mic);
+ break;
+ case 8:
+ *(uint64_t *)out_mic = l_get_be64(mic);
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Unsupported MIC size */
+ result = false;
+ }
+ }
+
+done:
+ aes_ecb_destroy(fd);
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+bool mesh_crypto_aes_ccm_decrypt(const uint8_t nonce[13], const uint8_t key[16],
+ const uint8_t *aad, uint16_t aad_len,
+ const uint8_t *enc_msg, uint16_t enc_msg_len,
+ uint8_t *out_msg,
+ void *out_mic, size_t mic_size)
+{
+ uint8_t msg[16], pmsg[16], cmic[16], cmsg[16], Xn[16];
+ uint8_t mic[16];
+ uint16_t msg_len = enc_msg_len - mic_size;
+ uint16_t last_blk, blk_cnt;
+ bool result;
+ size_t i, j;
+ int fd;
+
+ if (enc_msg_len < 5 || aad_len > 16)
+ return false;
+
+ fd = aes_ecb_setup(key);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ return false;
+
+ /* C_mic = e(AppKey, 0x01 || nonce || 0x0000) */
+ pmsg[0] = 0x01;
+ memcpy(pmsg + 1, nonce, 13);
+ l_put_be16(0x0000, pmsg + 14);
+
+ result = aes_ecb(fd, pmsg, cmic);
+ if (!result)
+ goto done;
+
+ /* X_0 = e(AppKey, 0x09 || nonce || length) */
+ if (mic_size == 8)
+ pmsg[0] = 0x19 | (aad_len ? 0x40 : 0x00);
+ else
+ pmsg[0] = 0x09 | (aad_len ? 0x40 : 0x00);
+
+ memcpy(pmsg + 1, nonce, 13);
+ l_put_be16(msg_len, pmsg + 14);
+
+ result = aes_ecb(fd, pmsg, Xn);
+ if (!result)
+ goto done;
+
+ /* If AAD is being used to authenticate, include it here */
+ if (aad_len) {
+ l_put_be16(aad_len, pmsg);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(uint16_t); i++)
+ pmsg[i] = Xn[i] ^ pmsg[i];
+
+ j = 0;
+ aad_len += sizeof(uint16_t);
+ while (aad_len > 16) {
+ do {
+ pmsg[i] = Xn[i] ^ aad[j];
+ i++, j++;
+ } while (i < 16);
+
+ aad_len -= 16;
+ i = 0;
+
+ result = aes_ecb(fd, pmsg, Xn);
+ if (!result)
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < aad_len; i++, j++)
+ pmsg[i] = Xn[i] ^ aad[j];
+
+ for (i = aad_len; i < 16; i++)
+ pmsg[i] = Xn[i];
+
+ result = aes_ecb(fd, pmsg, Xn);
+ if (!result)
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ last_blk = msg_len % 16;
+ blk_cnt = (msg_len + 15) / 16;
+ if (!last_blk)
+ last_blk = 16;
+
+ for (j = 0; j < blk_cnt; j++) {
+ if (j + 1 == blk_cnt) {
+ /* C_1 = e(AppKey, 0x01 || nonce || 0x0001) */
+ pmsg[0] = 0x01;
+ memcpy(pmsg + 1, nonce, 13);
+ l_put_be16(j + 1, pmsg + 14);
+
+ result = aes_ecb(fd, pmsg, cmsg);
+ if (!result)
+ goto done;
+
+ /* Encrypted = Payload[0-15] ^ C_1 */
+ for (i = 0; i < last_blk; i++)
+ msg[i] = enc_msg[(j * 16) + i] ^ cmsg[i];
+
+ if (out_msg)
+ memcpy(out_msg + (j * 16), msg, last_blk);
+
+ /* X_1 = e(AppKey, X_0 ^ Payload[0-15]) */
+ for (i = 0; i < last_blk; i++)
+ pmsg[i] = Xn[i] ^ msg[i];
+ for (i = last_blk; i < 16; i++)
+ pmsg[i] = Xn[i] ^ 0x00;
+
+ result = aes_ecb(fd, pmsg, Xn);
+ if (!result)
+ goto done;
+
+ /* MIC = C_mic ^ X_1 */
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(mic); i++)
+ mic[i] = cmic[i] ^ Xn[i];
+ } else {
+ /* C_1 = e(AppKey, 0x01 || nonce || 0x0001) */
+ pmsg[0] = 0x01;
+ memcpy(pmsg + 1, nonce, 13);
+ l_put_be16(j + 1, pmsg + 14);
+
+ result = aes_ecb(fd, pmsg, cmsg);
+ if (!result)
+ goto done;
+
+ /* Encrypted = Payload[0-15] ^ C_1 */
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ msg[i] = enc_msg[(j * 16) + i] ^ cmsg[i];
+
+ if (out_msg)
+ memcpy(out_msg + (j * 16), msg, 16);
+
+ /* X_1 = e(AppKey, X_0 ^ Payload[0-15]) */
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ pmsg[i] = Xn[i] ^ msg[i];
+
+ result = aes_ecb(fd, pmsg, Xn);
+ if (!result)
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (out_mic) {
+ switch (mic_size) {
+ case 4:
+ *(uint32_t *)out_mic = l_get_be32(mic);
+ break;
+ case 8:
+ *(uint64_t *)out_mic = l_get_be64(mic);
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Unsupported MIC size */
+ result = false;
+ }
+ }
+
+done:
+ aes_ecb_destroy(fd);
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+bool mesh_crypto_k1(const uint8_t ikm[16], const uint8_t salt[16],
+ const void *info, size_t info_len, uint8_t okm[16])
+{
+ uint8_t res[16];
+
+ if (!aes_cmac_one(salt, ikm, 16, res))
+ return false;
+
+ return aes_cmac_one(res, info, info_len, okm);
+}
+
+bool mesh_crypto_k2(const uint8_t n[16], const uint8_t *p, size_t p_len,
+ uint8_t net_id[1],
+ uint8_t enc_key[16],
+ uint8_t priv_key[16])
+{
+ int fd;
+ uint8_t output[16];
+ uint8_t t[16];
+ uint8_t *stage;
+ bool success = false;
+
+ stage = l_malloc(sizeof(output) + p_len + 1);
+ if (!stage)
+ return false;
+
+ if (!mesh_crypto_s1("smk2", 4, stage))
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (!aes_cmac_one(stage, n, 16, t))
+ goto fail;
+
+ fd = aes_cmac_N_start(t);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ memcpy(stage, p, p_len);
+ stage[p_len] = 1;
+
+ if (!aes_cmac(fd, stage, p_len + 1, output))
+ goto done;
+
+ net_id[0] = output[15] & 0x7f;
+
+ memcpy(stage, output, 16);
+ memcpy(stage + 16, p, p_len);
+ stage[p_len + 16] = 2;
+
+ if (!aes_cmac(fd, stage, p_len + 16 + 1, output))
+ goto done;
+
+ memcpy(enc_key, output, 16);
+
+ memcpy(stage, output, 16);
+ memcpy(stage + 16, p, p_len);
+ stage[p_len + 16] = 3;
+
+ if (!aes_cmac(fd, stage, p_len + 16 + 1, output))
+ goto done;
+
+ memcpy(priv_key, output, 16);
+ success = true;
+
+done:
+ aes_cmac_destroy(fd);
+fail:
+ l_free(stage);
+
+ return success;
+}
+
+static bool crypto_128(const uint8_t n[16], const char *s, uint8_t out128[16])
+{
+ const uint8_t id128[] = { 'i', 'd', '1', '2', '8', 0x01 };
+ uint8_t salt[16];
+
+ if (!mesh_crypto_s1(s, 4, salt))
+ return false;
+
+ return mesh_crypto_k1(n, salt, id128, sizeof(id128), out128);
+}
+
+bool mesh_crypto_nkik(const uint8_t n[16], uint8_t identity_key[16])
+{
+ return crypto_128(n, "nkik", identity_key);
+}
+
+bool mesh_crypto_identity(const uint8_t net_key[16], uint16_t addr,
+ uint8_t id[16])
+{
+ uint8_t id_key[16];
+ uint8_t tmp[16];
+
+ if (!mesh_crypto_nkik(net_key, id_key))
+ return false;
+
+ if (!l_get_be64(id + 8))
+ l_getrandom(id + 8, 8);
+
+ memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
+ memcpy(tmp + 6, id + 8, 8);
+ l_put_be16(addr, tmp + 14);
+
+ if (!aes_ecb_one(id_key, tmp, tmp))
+ return false;
+
+ memcpy(id, tmp + 8, 8);
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool mesh_crypto_nkbk(const uint8_t n[16], uint8_t beacon_key[16])
+{
+ return crypto_128(n, "nkbk", beacon_key);
+}
+
+bool mesh_crypto_nkpk(const uint8_t n[16], uint8_t proxy_key[16])
+{
+ return crypto_128(n, "nkpk", proxy_key);
+}
+
+bool mesh_crypto_k3(const uint8_t n[16], uint8_t out64[8])
+{
+ const uint8_t id64[] = { 'i', 'd', '6', '4', 0x01 };
+ uint8_t tmp[16];
+ uint8_t t[16];
+
+ if (!mesh_crypto_s1("smk3", 4, tmp))
+ return false;
+
+ if (!aes_cmac_one(tmp, n, 16, t))
+ return false;
+
+ if (!aes_cmac_one(t, id64, sizeof(id64), tmp))
+ return false;
+
+ memcpy(out64, tmp + 8, 8);
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool mesh_crypto_k4(const uint8_t a[16], uint8_t out6[1])
+{
+ const uint8_t id6[] = { 'i', 'd', '6', 0x01 };
+ uint8_t tmp[16];
+ uint8_t t[16];
+
+ if (!mesh_crypto_s1("smk4", 4, tmp))
+ return false;
+
+ if (!aes_cmac_one(tmp, a, 16, t))
+ return false;
+
+ if (!aes_cmac_one(t, id6, sizeof(id6), tmp))
+ return false;
+
+ out6[0] = tmp[15] & 0x3f;
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool mesh_crypto_beacon_cmac(const uint8_t encryption_key[16],
+ const uint8_t network_id[8],
+ uint32_t iv_index, bool kr, bool iu,
+ uint64_t *cmac)
+{
+ uint8_t msg[13], tmp[16];
+
+ if (!cmac)
+ return false;
+
+ msg[0] = kr ? 0x01 : 0x00;
+ msg[0] |= iu ? 0x02 : 0x00;
+ memcpy(msg + 1, network_id, 8);
+ l_put_be32(iv_index, msg + 9);
+
+ if (!aes_cmac_one(encryption_key, msg, 13, tmp))
+ return false;
+
+ *cmac = l_get_be64(tmp);
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool mesh_crypto_network_nonce(bool ctl, uint8_t ttl, uint32_t seq,
+ uint16_t src, uint32_t iv_index,
+ uint8_t nonce[13])
+{
+ nonce[0] = 0;
+ nonce[1] = (ttl & TTL_MASK) | (ctl ? CTL : 0x00);
+ nonce[2] = (seq >> 16) & 0xff;
+ nonce[3] = (seq >> 8) & 0xff;
+ nonce[4] = seq & 0xff;
+
+ /* SRC */
+ l_put_be16(src, nonce + 5);
+
+ l_put_be16(0, nonce + 7);
+
+ /* IV Index */
+ l_put_be32(iv_index, nonce + 9);
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool mesh_crypto_network_encrypt(bool ctl, uint8_t ttl,
+ uint32_t seq, uint16_t src,
+ uint32_t iv_index,
+ const uint8_t net_key[16],
+ const uint8_t *enc_msg, uint8_t enc_msg_len,
+ uint8_t *out, void *net_mic)
+{
+ uint8_t nonce[13];
+
+ if (!mesh_crypto_network_nonce(ctl, ttl, seq, src, iv_index, nonce))
+ return false;
+
+ return mesh_crypto_aes_ccm_encrypt(nonce, net_key, NULL, 0, enc_msg,
+ enc_msg_len, out, net_mic,
+ ctl ? 8 : 4);
+}
+
+bool mesh_crypto_network_decrypt(bool ctl, uint8_t ttl,
+ uint32_t seq, uint16_t src,
+ uint32_t iv_index,
+ const uint8_t net_key[16],
+ const uint8_t *enc_msg, uint8_t enc_msg_len,
+ uint8_t *out, void *net_mic, size_t mic_size)
+{
+ uint8_t nonce[13];
+
+ if (!mesh_crypto_network_nonce(ctl, ttl, seq, src, iv_index, nonce))
+ return false;
+
+ return mesh_crypto_aes_ccm_decrypt(nonce, net_key, NULL, 0,
+ enc_msg, enc_msg_len, out,
+ net_mic, mic_size);
+}
+
+bool mesh_crypto_application_nonce(uint32_t seq, uint16_t src,
+ uint16_t dst, uint32_t iv_index,
+ bool aszmic, uint8_t nonce[13])
+{
+ nonce[0] = 0x01;
+ nonce[1] = aszmic ? 0x80 : 0x00;
+ nonce[2] = (seq & 0x00ff0000) >> 16;
+ nonce[3] = (seq & 0x0000ff00) >> 8;
+ nonce[4] = (seq & 0x000000ff);
+ nonce[5] = (src & 0xff00) >> 8;
+ nonce[6] = (src & 0x00ff);
+ nonce[7] = (dst & 0xff00) >> 8;
+ nonce[8] = (dst & 0x00ff);
+ l_put_be32(iv_index, nonce + 9);
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool mesh_crypto_device_nonce(uint32_t seq, uint16_t src,
+ uint16_t dst, uint32_t iv_index,
+ bool aszmic, uint8_t nonce[13])
+{
+ nonce[0] = 0x02;
+ nonce[1] = aszmic ? 0x80 : 0x00;
+ nonce[2] = (seq & 0x00ff0000) >> 16;
+ nonce[3] = (seq & 0x0000ff00) >> 8;
+ nonce[4] = (seq & 0x000000ff);
+ nonce[5] = (src & 0xff00) >> 8;
+ nonce[6] = (src & 0x00ff);
+ nonce[7] = (dst & 0xff00) >> 8;
+ nonce[8] = (dst & 0x00ff);
+ l_put_be32(iv_index, nonce + 9);
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool mesh_crypto_application_encrypt(uint8_t key_id, uint32_t seq, uint16_t src,
+ uint16_t dst, uint32_t iv_index,
+ const uint8_t app_key[16],
+ const uint8_t *aad, uint8_t aad_len,
+ const uint8_t *msg, uint8_t msg_len,
+ uint8_t *out,
+ void *app_mic, size_t mic_size)
+{
+ uint8_t nonce[13];
+ bool aszmic = (mic_size == 8) ? true : false;
+
+ if (!key_id && !mesh_crypto_device_nonce(seq, src, dst,
+ iv_index, aszmic, nonce))
+ return false;
+
+ if (key_id && !mesh_crypto_application_nonce(seq, src, dst,
+ iv_index, aszmic, nonce))
+ return false;
+
+ return mesh_crypto_aes_ccm_encrypt(nonce, app_key, aad, aad_len,
+ msg, msg_len,
+ out, app_mic, mic_size);
+}
+
+bool mesh_crypto_application_decrypt(uint8_t key_id, uint32_t seq, uint16_t src,
+ uint16_t dst, uint32_t iv_index,
+ const uint8_t app_key[16],
+ const uint8_t *aad, uint8_t aad_len,
+ const uint8_t *enc_msg, uint8_t enc_msg_len,
+ uint8_t *out, void *app_mic, size_t mic_size)
+{
+ uint8_t nonce[13];
+ bool aszmic = (mic_size == 8) ? true : false;
+
+ if (!key_id && !mesh_crypto_device_nonce(seq, src, dst,
+ iv_index, aszmic, nonce))
+ return false;
+
+ if (key_id && !mesh_crypto_application_nonce(seq, src, dst,
+ iv_index, aszmic, nonce))
+ return false;
+
+ return mesh_crypto_aes_ccm_decrypt(nonce, app_key,
+ aad, aad_len, enc_msg,
+ enc_msg_len, out,
+ app_mic, mic_size);
+}
+
+bool mesh_crypto_session_key(const uint8_t secret[32],
+ const uint8_t salt[16],
+ uint8_t session_key[16])
+{
+ const uint8_t prsk[4] = "prsk";
+
+ if (!aes_cmac_one(salt, secret, 32, session_key))
+ return false;
+
+ return aes_cmac_one(session_key, prsk, 4, session_key);
+}
+
+bool mesh_crypto_nonce(const uint8_t secret[32],
+ const uint8_t salt[16],
+ uint8_t nonce[13])
+{
+ const uint8_t prsn[4] = "prsn";
+ uint8_t tmp[16];
+ bool result;
+
+ if (!aes_cmac_one(salt, secret, 32, tmp))
+ return false;
+
+ result = aes_cmac_one(tmp, prsn, 4, tmp);
+
+ if (result)
+ memcpy(nonce, tmp + 3, 13);
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+bool mesh_crypto_s1(const void *info, size_t len, uint8_t salt[16])
+{
+ return aes_cmac_one(zero, info, len, salt);
+}
+
+bool mesh_crypto_prov_prov_salt(const uint8_t conf_salt[16],
+ const uint8_t prov_rand[16],
+ const uint8_t dev_rand[16],
+ uint8_t prov_salt[16])
+{
+ uint8_t tmp[16 * 3];
+
+ memcpy(tmp, conf_salt, 16);
+ memcpy(tmp + 16, prov_rand, 16);
+ memcpy(tmp + 32, dev_rand, 16);
+
+ return aes_cmac_one(zero, tmp, sizeof(tmp), prov_salt);
+}
+
+bool mesh_crypto_prov_conf_key(const uint8_t secret[32],
+ const uint8_t salt[16],
+ uint8_t conf_key[16])
+{
+ const uint8_t prck[4] = "prck";
+
+ if (!aes_cmac_one(salt, secret, 32, conf_key))
+ return false;
+
+ return aes_cmac_one(conf_key, prck, 4, conf_key);
+}
+
+bool mesh_crypto_device_key(const uint8_t secret[32],
+ const uint8_t salt[16],
+ uint8_t device_key[16])
+{
+ const uint8_t prdk[4] = "prdk";
+
+ if (!aes_cmac_one(salt, secret, 32, device_key))
+ return false;
+
+ return aes_cmac_one(device_key, prdk, 4, device_key);
+}
+
+bool mesh_crypto_virtual_addr(const uint8_t virtual_label[16],
+ uint16_t *addr)
+{
+ uint8_t tmp[16];
+
+ if (!mesh_crypto_s1("vtad", 4, tmp))
+ return false;
+
+ if (!addr || !aes_cmac_one(tmp, virtual_label, 16, tmp))
+ return false;
+
+ *addr = (l_get_be16(tmp + 14) & 0x3fff) | 0x8000;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool mesh_crypto_privacy_counter(uint32_t iv_index,
+ const uint8_t *payload,
+ uint8_t privacy_counter[16])
+{
+ memset(privacy_counter, 0, 5);
+ l_put_be32(iv_index, privacy_counter + 5);
+ memcpy(privacy_counter + 9, payload, 7);
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool mesh_crypto_network_obfuscate(const uint8_t privacy_key[16],
+ const uint8_t privacy_counter[16],
+ bool ctl, uint8_t ttl, uint32_t seq,
+ uint16_t src, uint8_t *out)
+{
+ uint8_t ecb[16], tmp[16];
+ int i;
+
+ if (!aes_ecb_one(privacy_key, privacy_counter, ecb))
+ return false;
+
+ tmp[0] = ((!!ctl) << 7) | (ttl & TTL_MASK);
+ tmp[1] = (seq & 0xff0000) >> 16;
+ tmp[2] = (seq & 0x00ff00) >> 8;
+ tmp[3] = (seq & 0x0000ff);
+ tmp[4] = (src & 0xff00) >> 8;
+ tmp[5] = (src & 0x00ff);
+
+ if (out) {
+ for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
+ out[i] = ecb[i] ^ tmp[i];
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool mesh_crypto_network_clarify(const uint8_t privacy_key[16],
+ const uint8_t privacy_counter[16],
+ const uint8_t net_hdr[6],
+ bool *ctl, uint8_t *ttl,
+ uint32_t *seq, uint16_t *src)
+{
+ uint8_t ecb[16], tmp[6];
+ int i;
+
+ if (!aes_ecb_one(privacy_key, privacy_counter, ecb))
+ return false;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
+ tmp[i] = ecb[i] ^ net_hdr[i];
+
+ if (ctl)
+ *ctl = !!(tmp[0] & CTL);
+
+ if (ttl)
+ *ttl = tmp[0] & TTL_MASK;
+
+ if (seq)
+ *seq = l_get_be32(tmp) & SEQ_MASK;
+
+ if (src)
+ *src = l_get_be16(tmp + 4);
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool mesh_crypto_packet_build(bool ctl, uint8_t ttl,
+ uint32_t seq,
+ uint16_t src, uint16_t dst,
+ uint8_t opcode,
+ bool segmented, uint8_t key_id,
+ bool szmic, bool relay, uint16_t seqZero,
+ uint8_t segO, uint8_t segN,
+ const uint8_t *payload, uint8_t payload_len,
+ uint8_t *packet, uint8_t *packet_len)
+{
+ uint32_t hdr;
+ size_t n;
+
+ l_put_be32(seq, packet + 1);
+ packet[1] = (ctl ? CTL : 0) | (ttl & TTL_MASK);
+
+ l_put_be16(src, packet + 5);
+ l_put_be16(dst, packet + 7);
+ n = 9;
+
+ if (!ctl) {
+ hdr = segmented << SEG_HDR_SHIFT;
+ hdr |= (key_id & KEY_ID_MASK) << KEY_HDR_SHIFT;
+ if (segmented) {
+ hdr |= szmic << SZMIC_HDR_SHIFT;
+ hdr |= (seqZero & SEQ_ZERO_MASK) << SEQ_ZERO_HDR_SHIFT;
+ hdr |= (segO & SEG_MASK) << SEGO_HDR_SHIFT;
+ hdr |= (segN & SEG_MASK) << SEGN_HDR_SHIFT;
+ }
+ l_put_be32(hdr, packet + n);
+
+ /* Only first octet is valid for unsegmented messages */
+ if (segmented)
+ n += 4;
+ else
+ n += 1;
+
+ memcpy(packet + n, payload, payload_len);
+
+ l_put_be32(0x00000000, packet + payload_len + n);
+ if (packet_len)
+ *packet_len = payload_len + n + 4;
+ } else {
+ if ((opcode & OPCODE_MASK) != opcode)
+ return false;
+
+ hdr = opcode << KEY_HDR_SHIFT;
+ l_put_be32(hdr, packet + n);
+ n += 1;
+
+ memcpy(packet + n, payload, payload_len);
+ n += payload_len;
+
+ l_put_be64(0x0000000000000000, packet + n);
+ if (packet_len)
+ *packet_len = n + 8;
+ }
+
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool mesh_crypto_packet_parse(const uint8_t *packet, uint8_t packet_len,
+ bool *ctl, uint8_t *ttl, uint32_t *seq,
+ uint16_t *src, uint16_t *dst,
+ uint32_t *cookie, uint8_t *opcode,
+ bool *segmented, uint8_t *key_id,
+ bool *szmic, bool *relay, uint16_t *seqZero,
+ uint8_t *segO, uint8_t *segN,
+ const uint8_t **payload, uint8_t *payload_len)
+{
+ uint32_t hdr;
+ uint16_t this_dst;
+ bool is_segmented;
+
+ if (packet_len < 14)
+ return false;
+
+ this_dst = l_get_be16(packet + 7);
+
+ /* Try to keep bits in the order they exist within the packet */
+ if (ctl)
+ *ctl = !!(packet[1] & CTL);
+
+ if (ttl)
+ *ttl = packet[1] & TTL_MASK;
+
+ if (seq)
+ *seq = l_get_be32(packet + 1) & SEQ_MASK;
+
+ if (src)
+ *src = l_get_be16(packet + 5);
+
+ if (dst)
+ *dst = this_dst;
+
+ hdr = l_get_be32(packet + 9);
+
+ is_segmented = !!((hdr >> SEG_HDR_SHIFT) & true);
+ if (segmented)
+ *segmented = is_segmented;
+
+ if (packet[1] & CTL) {
+ uint8_t this_opcode = packet[9] & OPCODE_MASK;
+
+ if (cookie)
+ *cookie = l_get_be32(packet + 9);
+
+ if (opcode)
+ *opcode = this_opcode;
+
+ if (this_dst && this_opcode == NET_OP_SEG_ACKNOWLEDGE) {
+ if (relay)
+ *relay = !!((hdr >> RELAY_HDR_SHIFT) & true);
+
+ if (seqZero)
+ *seqZero = (hdr >> SEQ_ZERO_HDR_SHIFT) &
+ SEQ_ZERO_MASK;
+
+ if (payload)
+ *payload = packet + 9;
+
+ if (payload_len)
+ *payload_len = packet_len - 9 - 8;
+ } else {
+ if (payload)
+ *payload = packet + 10;
+
+ if (payload_len)
+ *payload_len = packet_len - 10 - 8;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (cookie)
+ *cookie = l_get_be32(packet + packet_len - 8);
+
+ if (key_id)
+ *key_id = (hdr >> KEY_HDR_SHIFT) & KEY_ID_MASK;
+
+ if (is_segmented) {
+ if (szmic)
+ *szmic = !!((hdr >> SZMIC_HDR_SHIFT) & true);
+
+ if (seqZero)
+ *seqZero = (hdr >> SEQ_ZERO_HDR_SHIFT) &
+ SEQ_ZERO_MASK;
+
+ if (segO)
+ *segO = (hdr >> SEGO_HDR_SHIFT) & SEG_MASK;
+
+ if (segN)
+ *segN = (hdr >> SEGN_HDR_SHIFT) & SEG_MASK;
+
+ if (payload)
+ *payload = packet + 13;
+
+ if (payload_len)
+ *payload_len = packet_len - 13 - 4;
+ } else {
+ if (payload)
+ *payload = packet + 10;
+
+ if (payload_len)
+ *payload_len = packet_len - 10 - 4;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool mesh_crypto_payload_encrypt(uint8_t *aad, const uint8_t *payload,
+ uint8_t *out, uint16_t payload_len,
+ uint16_t src, uint16_t dst, uint8_t key_id,
+ uint32_t seq_num, uint32_t iv_index,
+ bool aszmic,
+ const uint8_t application_key[16])
+{
+ uint8_t application_nonce[13] = { 0x01, };
+
+ if (payload_len < 1)
+ return false;
+
+ /* Key_ID == 0 means the Device Key is being used */
+ if (!key_id)
+ application_nonce[0] = 0x02;
+
+ /* Seq Num */
+ l_put_be32(seq_num, application_nonce + 1);
+
+ /* ASZMIC */
+ application_nonce[1] |= aszmic ? 0x80 : 0x00;
+
+ /* SRC */
+ l_put_be16(src, application_nonce + 5);
+
+ /* DST */
+ l_put_be16(dst, application_nonce + 7);
+
+ /* IV Index */
+ l_put_be32(iv_index, application_nonce + 9);
+
+ if (!mesh_crypto_aes_ccm_encrypt(application_nonce, application_key,
+ aad, aad ? 16 : 0,
+ payload, payload_len,
+ out, NULL,
+ aszmic ? 8 : 4))
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool mesh_crypto_payload_decrypt(uint8_t *aad, uint16_t aad_len,
+ const uint8_t *payload, uint16_t payload_len,
+ bool szmict,
+ uint16_t src, uint16_t dst,
+ uint8_t key_id, uint32_t seq_num,
+ uint32_t iv_index, uint8_t *out,
+ const uint8_t app_key[16])
+{
+ uint8_t app_nonce[13] = { 0x01, };
+ uint32_t mic32;
+ uint64_t mic64;
+
+ if (payload_len < 5 || !out)
+ return false;
+
+ /* Key_ID == 0 means the Device Key is being used */
+ if (!key_id)
+ app_nonce[0] = 0x02;
+
+ /* Seq Num */
+ l_put_be32(seq_num, app_nonce + 1);
+
+ /* ASZMIC */
+ app_nonce[1] |= szmict ? 0x80 : 0x00;
+
+ /* SRC */
+ l_put_be16(src, app_nonce + 5);
+
+ /* DST */
+ l_put_be16(dst, app_nonce + 7);
+
+ /* IV Index */
+ l_put_be32(iv_index, app_nonce + 9);
+
+ memcpy(out, payload, payload_len);
+
+ if (szmict) {
+ if (!mesh_crypto_aes_ccm_decrypt(app_nonce, app_key,
+ aad, aad_len,
+ payload, payload_len,
+ out, &mic64, sizeof(mic64)))
+ return false;
+
+ mic64 ^= l_get_be64(out + payload_len - 8);
+ l_put_be64(mic64, out + payload_len - 8);
+
+ if (mic64)
+ return false;
+ } else {
+ if (!mesh_crypto_aes_ccm_decrypt(app_nonce, app_key,
+ aad, aad_len,
+ payload, payload_len,
+ out, &mic32, sizeof(mic32)))
+ return false;
+
+ mic32 ^= l_get_be32(out + payload_len - 4);
+ l_put_be32(mic32, out + payload_len - 4);
+
+ if (mic32)
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool mesh_crypto_packet_encode(uint8_t *packet, uint8_t packet_len,
+ const uint8_t network_key[16],
+ uint32_t iv_index,
+ const uint8_t privacy_key[16])
+{
+ uint8_t network_nonce[13] = { 0x00, 0x00 };
+ uint8_t privacy_counter[16] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, };
+ uint8_t tmp[16];
+ int i;
+
+ if (packet_len < 14)
+ return false;
+
+ /* Detect Proxy packet by CTL == true && DST == 0x0000 */
+ if ((packet[1] & CTL) && l_get_be16(packet + 7) == 0)
+ network_nonce[0] = 0x03; /* Proxy Nonce */
+ else
+ /* CTL + TTL */
+ network_nonce[1] = packet[1];
+
+ /* Seq Num */
+ network_nonce[2] = packet[2];
+ network_nonce[3] = packet[3];
+ network_nonce[4] = packet[4];
+
+ /* SRC */
+ network_nonce[5] = packet[5];
+ network_nonce[6] = packet[6];
+
+ /* DST not available */
+ network_nonce[7] = 0;
+ network_nonce[8] = 0;
+
+ /* IV Index */
+ l_put_be32(iv_index, network_nonce + 9);
+
+ /* Check for Long net-MIC */
+ if (packet[1] & CTL) {
+ if (!mesh_crypto_aes_ccm_encrypt(network_nonce, network_key,
+ NULL, 0,
+ packet + 7, packet_len - 7 - 8,
+ packet + 7, NULL, 8))
+ return false;
+ } else {
+ if (!mesh_crypto_aes_ccm_encrypt(network_nonce, network_key,
+ NULL, 0,
+ packet + 7, packet_len - 7 - 4,
+ packet + 7, NULL, 4))
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ l_put_be32(iv_index, privacy_counter + 5);
+ memcpy(privacy_counter + 9, packet + 7, 7);
+
+ if (!aes_ecb_one(privacy_key, privacy_counter, tmp))
+ return false;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
+ packet[1 + i] ^= tmp[i];
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool mesh_crypto_packet_decode(const uint8_t *packet, uint8_t packet_len,
+ bool proxy, uint8_t *out, uint32_t iv_index,
+ const uint8_t network_key[16],
+ const uint8_t privacy_key[16])
+{
+ uint8_t privacy_counter[16] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, };
+ uint8_t network_nonce[13] = { 0x00, 0x00, };
+ uint8_t tmp[16];
+ uint16_t src;
+ int i;
+
+ if (packet_len < 14)
+ return false;
+
+ l_put_be32(iv_index, privacy_counter + 5);
+ memcpy(privacy_counter + 9, packet + 7, 7);
+
+ if (!aes_ecb_one(privacy_key, privacy_counter, tmp))
+ return false;
+
+ memcpy(out, packet, packet_len);
+ for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
+ out[1 + i] ^= tmp[i];
+
+ src = l_get_be16(out + 5);
+
+ /* Pre-check SRC address for illegal values */
+ if (!src || src >= 0x8000)
+ return false;
+
+ /* Detect Proxy packet by CTL == true && proxy == true */
+ if ((out[1] & CTL) && proxy)
+ network_nonce[0] = 0x03; /* Proxy Nonce */
+ else
+ /* CTL + TTL */
+ network_nonce[1] = out[1];
+
+ /* Seq Num */
+ network_nonce[2] = out[2];
+ network_nonce[3] = out[3];
+ network_nonce[4] = out[4];
+
+ /* SRC */
+ network_nonce[5] = out[5];
+ network_nonce[6] = out[6];
+
+ /* DST not available */
+ network_nonce[7] = 0;
+ network_nonce[8] = 0;
+
+ /* IV Index */
+ l_put_be32(iv_index, network_nonce + 9);
+
+ /* Check for Long MIC */
+ if (out[1] & CTL) {
+ uint64_t mic;
+
+ if (!mesh_crypto_aes_ccm_decrypt(network_nonce, network_key,
+ NULL, 0, packet + 7, packet_len - 7,
+ out + 7, &mic, sizeof(mic)))
+ return false;
+
+ mic ^= l_get_be64(out + packet_len - 8);
+ l_put_be64(mic, out + packet_len - 8);
+
+ if (mic)
+ return false;
+ } else {
+ uint32_t mic;
+
+ if (!mesh_crypto_aes_ccm_decrypt(network_nonce, network_key,
+ NULL, 0, packet + 7, packet_len - 7,
+ out + 7, &mic, sizeof(mic)))
+ return false;
+
+ mic ^= l_get_be32(out + packet_len - 4);
+ l_put_be32(mic, out + packet_len - 4);
+
+ if (mic)
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool mesh_crypto_packet_label(uint8_t *packet, uint8_t packet_len,
+ uint16_t iv_index, uint8_t network_id)
+{
+ packet[0] = (iv_index & 0x0001) << 7 | (network_id & 0x7f);
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+/* reversed, 8-bit, poly=0x07 */
+static const uint8_t crc_table[256] = {
+ 0x00, 0x91, 0xe3, 0x72, 0x07, 0x96, 0xe4, 0x75,
+ 0x0e, 0x9f, 0xed, 0x7c, 0x09, 0x98, 0xea, 0x7b,
+ 0x1c, 0x8d, 0xff, 0x6e, 0x1b, 0x8a, 0xf8, 0x69,
+ 0x12, 0x83, 0xf1, 0x60, 0x15, 0x84, 0xf6, 0x67,
+
+ 0x38, 0xa9, 0xdb, 0x4a, 0x3f, 0xae, 0xdc, 0x4d,
+ 0x36, 0xa7, 0xd5, 0x44, 0x31, 0xa0, 0xd2, 0x43,
+ 0x24, 0xb5, 0xc7, 0x56, 0x23, 0xb2, 0xc0, 0x51,
+ 0x2a, 0xbb, 0xc9, 0x58, 0x2d, 0xbc, 0xce, 0x5f,
+
+ 0x70, 0xe1, 0x93, 0x02, 0x77, 0xe6, 0x94, 0x05,
+ 0x7e, 0xef, 0x9d, 0x0c, 0x79, 0xe8, 0x9a, 0x0b,
+ 0x6c, 0xfd, 0x8f, 0x1e, 0x6b, 0xfa, 0x88, 0x19,
+ 0x62, 0xf3, 0x81, 0x10, 0x65, 0xf4, 0x86, 0x17,
+
+ 0x48, 0xd9, 0xab, 0x3a, 0x4f, 0xde, 0xac, 0x3d,
+ 0x46, 0xd7, 0xa5, 0x34, 0x41, 0xd0, 0xa2, 0x33,
+ 0x54, 0xc5, 0xb7, 0x26, 0x53, 0xc2, 0xb0, 0x21,
+ 0x5a, 0xcb, 0xb9, 0x28, 0x5d, 0xcc, 0xbe, 0x2f,
+
+ 0xe0, 0x71, 0x03, 0x92, 0xe7, 0x76, 0x04, 0x95,
+ 0xee, 0x7f, 0x0d, 0x9c, 0xe9, 0x78, 0x0a, 0x9b,
+ 0xfc, 0x6d, 0x1f, 0x8e, 0xfb, 0x6a, 0x18, 0x89,
+ 0xf2, 0x63, 0x11, 0x80, 0xf5, 0x64, 0x16, 0x87,
+
+ 0xd8, 0x49, 0x3b, 0xaa, 0xdf, 0x4e, 0x3c, 0xad,
+ 0xd6, 0x47, 0x35, 0xa4, 0xd1, 0x40, 0x32, 0xa3,
+ 0xc4, 0x55, 0x27, 0xb6, 0xc3, 0x52, 0x20, 0xb1,
+ 0xca, 0x5b, 0x29, 0xb8, 0xcd, 0x5c, 0x2e, 0xbf,
+
+ 0x90, 0x01, 0x73, 0xe2, 0x97, 0x06, 0x74, 0xe5,
+ 0x9e, 0x0f, 0x7d, 0xec, 0x99, 0x08, 0x7a, 0xeb,
+ 0x8c, 0x1d, 0x6f, 0xfe, 0x8b, 0x1a, 0x68, 0xf9,
+ 0x82, 0x13, 0x61, 0xf0, 0x85, 0x14, 0x66, 0xf7,
+
+ 0xa8, 0x39, 0x4b, 0xda, 0xaf, 0x3e, 0x4c, 0xdd,
+ 0xa6, 0x37, 0x45, 0xd4, 0xa1, 0x30, 0x42, 0xd3,
+ 0xb4, 0x25, 0x57, 0xc6, 0xb3, 0x22, 0x50, 0xc1,
+ 0xba, 0x2b, 0x59, 0xc8, 0xbd, 0x2c, 0x5e, 0xcf
+};
+
+uint8_t mesh_crypto_compute_fcs(const uint8_t *packet, uint8_t packet_len)
+{
+ uint8_t fcs = 0xff;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < packet_len; i++)
+ fcs = crc_table[fcs ^ packet[i]];
+
+ return 0xff - fcs;
+}
+
+bool mesh_crypto_check_fcs(const uint8_t *packet, uint8_t packet_len,
+ uint8_t received_fcs)
+{
+ uint8_t fcs = 0xff;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < packet_len; i++)
+ fcs = crc_table[fcs ^ packet[i]];
+
+ fcs = crc_table[fcs ^ received_fcs];
+
+ return fcs == 0xcf;
+}
--
2.14.4
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