Hi Brian,
> ---
> mesh/crypto.c | 1607 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 1607 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 mesh/crypto.c
what I am missing is a unit/test-mesh-crypto with the Mesh test vectors.
>
> diff --git a/mesh/crypto.c b/mesh/crypto.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000..c424cf622
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/mesh/crypto.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,1607 @@
> +/*
> + *
> + * BlueZ - Bluetooth protocol stack for Linux
> + *
> + * Copyright (C) 2018 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
> + *
> + *
> + * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
> + * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
> + * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
> + * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
> + *
> + * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
> + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
> + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
> + * Lesser General Public License for more details.
> + *
> + */
> +
> +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
> +#include <config.h>
> +#endif
> +
> +#include <fcntl.h>
> +#include <unistd.h>
> +#include <string.h>
> +#include <sys/socket.h>
> +#include <ell/ell.h>
> +
> +#include <linux/if_alg.h>
> +
> +#ifndef SOL_ALG
> +#define SOL_ALG 279
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifndef ALG_SET_AEAD_AUTHSIZE
> +#define ALG_SET_AEAD_AUTHSIZE 5
> +#endif
> +
> +#include "mesh/mesh.h"
> +#include "mesh/node.h"
> +#include "mesh/net.h"
> +#include "mesh/crypto.h"
> +#include "mesh/display.h"
No idea why you would need mesh/display.h here.
> +
> +static int alg_new(int fd, const void *keyval, socklen_t keylen,
> + size_t mic_size)
> +{
> + if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, keyval, keylen) < 0) {
> + l_error("key");
> + return -1;
> + }
> +
> + if (mic_size &&
> + setsockopt(fd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_AEAD_AUTHSIZE,
> + NULL, mic_size) < 0) {
> + l_error("taglen");
I am not sure we should print errors here.
> + return -1;
> + }
> +
> + /* FIXME: This should use accept4() with SOCK_CLOEXEC */
> + return accept(fd, NULL, 0);
> +}
> +
> +static bool alg_encrypt(int fd, const void *inbuf, size_t inlen,
> + void *outbuf, size_t outlen)
> +{
> + __u32 alg_op = ALG_OP_ENCRYPT;
> + char cbuf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(alg_op))];
> + struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
> + struct msghdr msg;
> + struct iovec iov;
> + ssize_t len;
> +
> + memset(cbuf, 0, sizeof(cbuf));
> + memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
> +
> + msg.msg_control = cbuf;
> + msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cbuf);
> +
> + cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
> + cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_ALG;
> + cmsg->cmsg_type = ALG_SET_OP;
> + cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(alg_op));
> + memcpy(CMSG_DATA(cmsg), &alg_op, sizeof(alg_op));
> +
> + iov.iov_base = (void *) inbuf;
> + iov.iov_len = inlen;
> +
> + msg.msg_iov = &iov;
> + msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
> +
> + len = sendmsg(fd, &msg, 0);
> + if (len < 0)
> + return false;
> +
> + len = read(fd, outbuf, outlen);
> + if (len < 0)
> + return false;
> +
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> +static int aes_ecb_setup(const uint8_t key[16])
> +{
> + struct sockaddr_alg salg;
> + int fd, nfd;
> +
> + fd = socket(PF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
> + if (fd < 0)
> + return -1;
> +
> + memset(&salg, 0, sizeof(salg));
> + salg.salg_family = AF_ALG;
> + strcpy((char *) salg.salg_type, "skcipher");
> + strcpy((char *) salg.salg_name, "ecb(aes)");
> +
> + if (bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *) &salg, sizeof(salg)) < 0) {
> + close(fd);
> + return -1;
> + }
> +
> + nfd = alg_new(fd, key, 16, 0);
> +
> + close(fd);
> +
> + return nfd;
> +}
> +
> +static bool aes_ecb(int fd, const uint8_t plaintext[16], uint8_t encrypted[16])
> +{
> + return alg_encrypt(fd, plaintext, 16, encrypted, 16);
> +}
> +
> +static void aes_ecb_destroy(int fd)
> +{
> + close(fd);
> +}
> +
> +static bool aes_ecb_one(const uint8_t key[16],
> + const uint8_t plaintext[16], uint8_t encrypted[16])
> +{
> + bool result;
> + int fd;
> +
> + fd = aes_ecb_setup(key);
> + if (fd < 0)
> + return false;
> +
> + result = aes_ecb(fd, plaintext, encrypted);
> +
> + aes_ecb_destroy(fd);
> +
> + return result;
> +}
> +
> +bool mesh_aes_ecb_one(const uint8_t key[16],
> + const uint8_t plaintext[16], uint8_t encrypted[16])
> +{
> + return aes_ecb_one(key, plaintext, encrypted);
> +}
> +
> +/* Maximum message length that can be passed to aes_cmac */
> +#define CMAC_MSG_MAX (64 + 64 + 17)
> +
> +static int aes_cmac_setup(const uint8_t key[16])
> +{
> + struct sockaddr_alg salg;
> + int fd, nfd;
> +
> + fd = socket(PF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
> + if (fd < 0)
> + return -1;
> +
> + memset(&salg, 0, sizeof(salg));
> + salg.salg_family = AF_ALG;
> + strcpy((char *) salg.salg_type, "hash");
> + strcpy((char *) salg.salg_name, "cmac(aes)");
> +
> + if (bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *) &salg, sizeof(salg)) < 0) {
> + close(fd);
> + return -1;
> + }
> +
> + nfd = alg_new(fd, key, 16, 0);
> +
> + close(fd);
> +
> + return nfd;
> +}
> +
> +static bool aes_cmac(int fd, const uint8_t *msg,
> + size_t msg_len, uint8_t res[16])
> +{
> + ssize_t len;
> +
> + if (msg_len > CMAC_MSG_MAX)
> + return false;
> +
> + len = send(fd, msg, msg_len, 0);
> + if (len < 0)
> + return false;
> +
> + len = read(fd, res, 16);
> + if (len < 0)
> + return false;
> +
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> +static void aes_cmac_destroy(int fd)
> +{
> + close(fd);
> +}
> +
> +static int aes_cmac_N_start(const uint8_t N[16])
> +{
> + int fd;
> +
> + fd = aes_cmac_setup(N);
> + return fd;
> +}
> +
> +static bool aes_cmac_one(const uint8_t key[16], const void *msg,
> + size_t msg_len, uint8_t res[16])
> +{
> + bool result;
> + int fd;
> +
> + fd = aes_cmac_setup(key);
> + if (fd < 0)
> + return false;
> +
> + result = aes_cmac(fd, msg, msg_len, res);
> +
> + aes_cmac_destroy(fd);
> +
> + return result;
> +}
> +
> +bool mesh_crypto_aes_cmac(const uint8_t key[16], const uint8_t *msg,
> + size_t msg_len, uint8_t res[16])
> +{
> + return aes_cmac_one(key, msg, msg_len, res);
> +}
> +
> +bool mesh_crypto_aes_ccm_encrypt(const uint8_t nonce[13], const uint8_t key[16],
> + const uint8_t *aad, uint16_t aad_len,
> + const uint8_t *msg, uint16_t msg_len,
> + uint8_t *out_msg,
> + void *out_mic, size_t mic_size)
> +{
> + uint8_t pmsg[16], cmic[16], cmsg[16];
> + uint8_t mic[16], Xn[16];
> + uint16_t blk_cnt, last_blk;
> + bool result;
> + size_t i, j;
> + int fd;
> +
> + if (aad_len >= 0xff00) {
> + l_error("Unsupported AAD size");
> + return false;
> + }
Same comment for the errors.
In a follow up patch, I would prefer that we move over to use the kernel AES-CMAC support.
> +
> + fd = aes_ecb_setup(key);
> + if (fd < 0)
> + return false;
> +
> + /* C_mic = e(AppKey, 0x01 || nonce || 0x0000) */
> + pmsg[0] = 0x01;
> + memcpy(pmsg + 1, nonce, 13);
> + l_put_be16(0x0000, pmsg + 14);
> +
> + result = aes_ecb(fd, pmsg, cmic);
> + if (!result)
> + goto done;
> +
> + /* X_0 = e(AppKey, 0x09 || nonce || length) */
> + if (mic_size == sizeof(uint64_t))
> + pmsg[0] = 0x19 | (aad_len ? 0x40 : 0x00);
> + else
> + pmsg[0] = 0x09 | (aad_len ? 0x40 : 0x00);
> +
> + memcpy(pmsg + 1, nonce, 13);
> + l_put_be16(msg_len, pmsg + 14);
> +
> + result = aes_ecb(fd, pmsg, Xn);
> + if (!result)
> + goto done;
> +
> + /* If AAD is being used to authenticate, include it here */
> + if (aad_len) {
> + l_put_be16(aad_len, pmsg);
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(uint16_t); i++)
> + pmsg[i] = Xn[i] ^ pmsg[i];
> +
> + j = 0;
> + aad_len += sizeof(uint16_t);
> + while (aad_len > 16) {
> + do {
> + pmsg[i] = Xn[i] ^ aad[j];
> + i++, j++;
> + } while (i < 16);
> +
> + aad_len -= 16;
> + i = 0;
> +
> + result = aes_ecb(fd, pmsg, Xn);
> + if (!result)
> + goto done;
> + }
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < aad_len; i++, j++)
> + pmsg[i] = Xn[i] ^ aad[j];
> +
> + for (i = aad_len; i < 16; i++)
> + pmsg[i] = Xn[i];
> +
> + result = aes_ecb(fd, pmsg, Xn);
> + if (!result)
> + goto done;
> + }
> +
> + last_blk = msg_len % 16;
> + blk_cnt = (msg_len + 15) / 16;
> + if (!last_blk)
> + last_blk = 16;
> +
> + for (j = 0; j < blk_cnt; j++) {
> + if (j + 1 == blk_cnt) {
> + /* X_1 = e(AppKey, X_0 ^ Payload[0-15]) */
> + for (i = 0; i < last_blk; i++)
> + pmsg[i] = Xn[i] ^ msg[(j * 16) + i];
> + for (i = last_blk; i < 16; i++)
> + pmsg[i] = Xn[i] ^ 0x00;
> +
> + result = aes_ecb(fd, pmsg, Xn);
> + if (!result)
> + goto done;
> +
> + /* MIC = C_mic ^ X_1 */
> + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(mic); i++)
> + mic[i] = cmic[i] ^ Xn[i];
> +
> + /* C_1 = e(AppKey, 0x01 || nonce || 0x0001) */
> + pmsg[0] = 0x01;
> + memcpy(pmsg + 1, nonce, 13);
> + l_put_be16(j + 1, pmsg + 14);
> +
> + result = aes_ecb(fd, pmsg, cmsg);
> + if (!result)
> + goto done;
> +
> + if (out_msg) {
> + /* Encrypted = Payload[0-15] ^ C_1 */
> + for (i = 0; i < last_blk; i++)
> + out_msg[(j * 16) + i] =
> + msg[(j * 16) + i] ^ cmsg[i];
> +
> + }
> + } else {
> + /* X_1 = e(AppKey, X_0 ^ Payload[0-15]) */
> + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
> + pmsg[i] = Xn[i] ^ msg[(j * 16) + i];
> +
> + result = aes_ecb(fd, pmsg, Xn);
> + if (!result)
> + goto done;
> +
> + /* C_1 = e(AppKey, 0x01 || nonce || 0x0001) */
> + pmsg[0] = 0x01;
> + memcpy(pmsg + 1, nonce, 13);
> + l_put_be16(j + 1, pmsg + 14);
> +
> + result = aes_ecb(fd, pmsg, cmsg);
> + if (!result)
> + goto done;
> +
> + if (out_msg) {
> + /* Encrypted = Payload[0-15] ^ C_N */
> + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
> + out_msg[(j * 16) + i] =
> + msg[(j * 16) + i] ^ cmsg[i];
> + }
> +
> + }
> + }
> +
> + if (out_msg)
> + memcpy(out_msg + msg_len, mic, mic_size);
> +
> + if (out_mic) {
> + switch (mic_size) {
> + case sizeof(uint32_t):
> + *(uint32_t *)out_mic = l_get_be32(mic);
> + break;
> + case sizeof(uint64_t):
> + *(uint64_t *)out_mic = l_get_be64(mic);
> + break;
> + default:
> + l_error("Unsupported MIC size");
> + }
> + }
> +
> +done:
> + aes_ecb_destroy(fd);
> +
> + return result;
> +}
> +
> +bool mesh_crypto_aes_ccm_decrypt(const uint8_t nonce[13], const uint8_t key[16],
> + const uint8_t *aad, uint16_t aad_len,
> + const uint8_t *enc_msg, uint16_t enc_msg_len,
> + uint8_t *out_msg,
> + void *out_mic, size_t mic_size)
> +{
> + uint8_t msg[16], pmsg[16], cmic[16], cmsg[16], Xn[16];
> + uint8_t mic[16];
> + uint16_t msg_len = enc_msg_len - mic_size;
> + uint16_t last_blk, blk_cnt;
> + bool result;
> + size_t i, j;
> + int fd;
> +
> + if (enc_msg_len < 5 || aad_len >= 0xff00)
> + return false;
> +
> + fd = aes_ecb_setup(key);
> + if (fd < 0)
> + return false;
> +
> + /* C_mic = e(AppKey, 0x01 || nonce || 0x0000) */
> + pmsg[0] = 0x01;
> + memcpy(pmsg + 1, nonce, 13);
> + l_put_be16(0x0000, pmsg + 14);
> +
> + result = aes_ecb(fd, pmsg, cmic);
> + if (!result)
> + goto done;
> +
> + /* X_0 = e(AppKey, 0x09 || nonce || length) */
> + if (mic_size == sizeof(uint64_t))
> + pmsg[0] = 0x19 | (aad_len ? 0x40 : 0x00);
> + else
> + pmsg[0] = 0x09 | (aad_len ? 0x40 : 0x00);
> +
> + memcpy(pmsg + 1, nonce, 13);
> + l_put_be16(msg_len, pmsg + 14);
> +
> + result = aes_ecb(fd, pmsg, Xn);
> + if (!result)
> + goto done;
> +
> + /* If AAD is being used to authenticate, include it here */
> + if (aad_len) {
> + l_put_be16(aad_len, pmsg);
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(uint16_t); i++)
> + pmsg[i] = Xn[i] ^ pmsg[i];
> +
> + j = 0;
> + aad_len += sizeof(uint16_t);
> + while (aad_len > 16) {
> + do {
> + pmsg[i] = Xn[i] ^ aad[j];
> + i++, j++;
> + } while (i < 16);
> +
> + aad_len -= 16;
> + i = 0;
> +
> + result = aes_ecb(fd, pmsg, Xn);
> + if (!result)
> + goto done;
> + }
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < aad_len; i++, j++)
> + pmsg[i] = Xn[i] ^ aad[j];
> +
> + for (i = aad_len; i < 16; i++)
> + pmsg[i] = Xn[i];
> +
> + result = aes_ecb(fd, pmsg, Xn);
> + if (!result)
> + goto done;
> + }
> +
> + last_blk = msg_len % 16;
> + blk_cnt = (msg_len + 15) / 16;
> + if (!last_blk)
> + last_blk = 16;
> +
> + for (j = 0; j < blk_cnt; j++) {
> + if (j + 1 == blk_cnt) {
> + /* C_1 = e(AppKey, 0x01 || nonce || 0x0001) */
> + pmsg[0] = 0x01;
> + memcpy(pmsg + 1, nonce, 13);
> + l_put_be16(j + 1, pmsg + 14);
> +
> + result = aes_ecb(fd, pmsg, cmsg);
> + if (!result)
> + goto done;
> +
> + /* Encrypted = Payload[0-15] ^ C_1 */
> + for (i = 0; i < last_blk; i++)
> + msg[i] = enc_msg[(j * 16) + i] ^ cmsg[i];
> +
> + if (out_msg)
> + memcpy(out_msg + (j * 16), msg, last_blk);
> +
> + /* X_1 = e(AppKey, X_0 ^ Payload[0-15]) */
> + for (i = 0; i < last_blk; i++)
> + pmsg[i] = Xn[i] ^ msg[i];
> + for (i = last_blk; i < 16; i++)
> + pmsg[i] = Xn[i] ^ 0x00;
> +
> + result = aes_ecb(fd, pmsg, Xn);
> + if (!result)
> + goto done;
> +
> + /* MIC = C_mic ^ X_1 */
> + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(mic); i++)
> + mic[i] = cmic[i] ^ Xn[i];
> + } else {
> + /* C_1 = e(AppKey, 0x01 || nonce || 0x0001) */
> + pmsg[0] = 0x01;
> + memcpy(pmsg + 1, nonce, 13);
> + l_put_be16(j + 1, pmsg + 14);
> +
> + result = aes_ecb(fd, pmsg, cmsg);
> + if (!result)
> + goto done;
> +
> + /* Encrypted = Payload[0-15] ^ C_1 */
> + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
> + msg[i] = enc_msg[(j * 16) + i] ^ cmsg[i];
> +
> + if (out_msg)
> + memcpy(out_msg + (j * 16), msg, 16);
> +
> + /* X_1 = e(AppKey, X_0 ^ Payload[0-15]) */
> + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
> + pmsg[i] = Xn[i] ^ msg[i];
> +
> + result = aes_ecb(fd, pmsg, Xn);
> + if (!result)
> + goto done;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + if (out_mic) {
> + switch (mic_size) {
> + case sizeof(uint32_t):
> + *(uint32_t *)out_mic = l_get_be32(mic);
> + break;
> + case sizeof(uint64_t):
> + *(uint64_t *)out_mic = l_get_be64(mic);
> + break;
> + default:
> + l_error("Unsupported MIC size");
> + }
> + }
> +
> +done:
> + aes_ecb_destroy(fd);
> +
> + return result;
> +}
> +
> +bool mesh_crypto_k1(const uint8_t ikm[16], const uint8_t salt[16],
> + const void *info, size_t info_len, uint8_t okm[16])
> +{
> + uint8_t res[16];
> +
> + if (!aes_cmac_one(salt, ikm, 16, res))
> + return false;
> +
> + return aes_cmac_one(res, info, info_len, okm);
> +}
> +
> +bool mesh_crypto_k2(const uint8_t n[16], const uint8_t *p, size_t p_len,
> + uint8_t net_id[1],
> + uint8_t enc_key[16],
> + uint8_t priv_key[16])
> +{
> + int fd;
> + uint8_t output[16];
> + uint8_t t[16];
> + uint8_t *stage;
> + bool success = false;
> +
> + print_packet("K2-N", n, 16);
> + stage = l_malloc(sizeof(output) + p_len + 1);
> + if (stage == NULL)
> + return false;
I prefer if (!stage) constructs.
> +
> + if (!mesh_crypto_s1("smk2", 4, stage))
> + goto fail;
> + print_packet("K2-S1(smk2)", stage, 16);
> + print_packet("K2-P", p, p_len);
This print_packet is really not acceptable.
> +
> + if (!aes_cmac_one(stage, n, 16, t))
> + goto fail;
> +
> + print_packet("K2-T", t, 16);
> +
> + fd = aes_cmac_N_start(t);
> + if (fd < 0)
> + goto fail;
> +
> + memcpy(stage, p, p_len);
> + stage[p_len] = 1;
> +
> + if (!aes_cmac(fd, stage, p_len + 1, output))
> + goto done;
> +
> + print_packet("K2-T1", output, 16);
> +
> + net_id[0] = output[15] & 0x7f;
> +
> + memcpy(stage, output, 16);
> + memcpy(stage + 16, p, p_len);
> + stage[p_len + 16] = 2;
> +
> + if (!aes_cmac(fd, stage, p_len + 16 + 1, output))
> + goto done;
> + print_packet("K2-T2", output, 16);
> +
> + memcpy(enc_key, output, 16);
> +
> + memcpy(stage, output, 16);
> + memcpy(stage + 16, p, p_len);
> + stage[p_len + 16] = 3;
> +
> + if (!aes_cmac(fd, stage, p_len + 16 + 1, output))
> + goto done;
> + print_packet("K2-T3", output, 16);
> +
> + memcpy(priv_key, output, 16);
> + success = true;
> +
> +done:
> + aes_cmac_destroy(fd);
> +fail:
> + l_free(stage);
> +
> + return success;
> +}
> +
> +static bool crypto_128(const uint8_t n[16], const char *s, uint8_t out128[16])
> +{
> + uint8_t id128[] = { 'i', 'd', '1', '2', '8', 0x01 };
> + uint8_t salt[16];
> +
> + if (!mesh_crypto_s1(s, 4, salt))
> + return false;
> +
> + return mesh_crypto_k1(n, salt, id128, sizeof(id128), out128);
> +}
> +
> +bool mesh_crypto_nkik(const uint8_t n[16], uint8_t identity_key[16])
> +{
> + return crypto_128(n, "nkik", identity_key);
> +}
> +
> +bool mesh_crypto_identity(const uint8_t net_key[16], uint16_t addr,
> + uint8_t id[16])
> +{
> + uint8_t id_key[16];
> + uint8_t tmp[16];
> +
> + print_packet("Net_Key", net_key, 16);
> +
> + if (!mesh_crypto_nkik(net_key, id_key))
> + return false;
> +
> + print_packet("ID_Key", id_key, 16);
> +
> + if (!l_get_be64(id + 8))
> + l_getrandom(id + 8, 8);
> +
> + memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
> + memcpy(tmp + 6, id + 8, 8);
> + l_put_be16(addr, tmp + 14);
> +
> + print_packet("Nonce", tmp, 16);
> + if (!aes_ecb_one(id_key, tmp, tmp))
> + return false;
> +
> + print_packet("result", tmp, 16);
> +
> + memcpy(id, tmp + 8, 8);
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> +bool mesh_crypto_nkbk(const uint8_t n[16], uint8_t beacon_key[16])
> +{
> + return crypto_128(n, "nkbk", beacon_key);
> +}
> +
> +bool mesh_crypto_nkpk(const uint8_t n[16], uint8_t proxy_key[16])
> +{
> + return crypto_128(n, "nkpk", proxy_key);
> +}
> +
> +bool mesh_crypto_k3(const uint8_t n[16], uint8_t out64[8])
> +{
> + uint8_t tmp[16];
> + uint8_t t[16];
> + uint8_t id64[] = { 'i', 'd', '6', '4', 0x01 };
> +
> + if (!mesh_crypto_s1("smk3", 4, tmp))
> + return false;
> +
> + if (!aes_cmac_one(tmp, n, 16, t))
> + return false;
> +
> + if (!aes_cmac_one(t, id64, sizeof(id64), tmp))
> + return false;
> +
> + memcpy(out64, tmp + 8, 8);
> +
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> +bool mesh_crypto_k4(const uint8_t a[16], uint8_t out6[1])
> +{
> + uint8_t tmp[16];
> + uint8_t t[16];
> + uint8_t id6[] = { 'i', 'd', '6', 0x01 };
These should come first and most likely be declared const.
> +
> + if (!mesh_crypto_s1("smk4", 4, tmp))
> + return false;
> +
> + if (!aes_cmac_one(tmp, a, 16, t))
> + return false;
> +
> + if (!aes_cmac_one(t, id6, sizeof(id6), tmp))
> + return false;
> +
> + out6[0] = tmp[15] & 0x3f;
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> +bool mesh_crypto_beacon_cmac(const uint8_t encryption_key[16],
> + const uint8_t network_id[8],
> + uint32_t iv_index, bool kr, bool iu,
> + uint64_t *cmac)
> +{
> + uint8_t msg[13], tmp[16];
> +
> + if (!cmac)
> + return false;
> +
> + msg[0] = kr ? 0x01 : 0x00;
> + msg[0] |= iu ? 0x02 : 0x00;
> + memcpy(msg + 1, network_id, 8);
> + l_put_be32(iv_index, msg + 9);
> +
> + if (!aes_cmac_one(encryption_key, msg, 13, tmp))
> + return false;
> +
> + *cmac = l_get_be64(tmp);
> +
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> +bool mesh_crypto_network_nonce(bool ctl, uint8_t ttl, uint32_t seq,
> + uint16_t src, uint32_t iv_index,
> + uint8_t nonce[13])
> +{
> + nonce[0] = 0;
> + nonce[1] = (ttl & TTL_MASK) | (ctl ? CTL : 0x00);
> + nonce[2] = (seq >> 16) & 0xff;
> + nonce[3] = (seq >> 8) & 0xff;
> + nonce[4] = seq & 0xff;
> +
> + /* SRC */
> + l_put_be16(src, nonce + 5);
> +
> + l_put_be16(0, nonce + 7);
> +
> + /* IV Index */
> + l_put_be32(iv_index, nonce + 9);
> +
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> +bool mesh_crypto_network_encrypt(bool ctl, uint8_t ttl,
> + uint32_t seq, uint16_t src,
> + uint32_t iv_index,
> + const uint8_t net_key[16],
> + const uint8_t *enc_msg, uint8_t enc_msg_len,
> + uint8_t *out, void *net_mic)
> +{
> + uint8_t nonce[13];
> +
> + if (!mesh_crypto_network_nonce(ctl, ttl, seq, src, iv_index, nonce))
> + return false;
> +
> + return mesh_crypto_aes_ccm_encrypt(nonce, net_key, NULL, 0, enc_msg,
> + enc_msg_len, out, net_mic,
> + ctl ? sizeof(uint64_t) : sizeof(uint32_t));
> +}
> +
> +bool mesh_crypto_network_decrypt(bool ctl, uint8_t ttl,
> + uint32_t seq, uint16_t src,
> + uint32_t iv_index,
> + const uint8_t net_key[16],
> + const uint8_t *enc_msg, uint8_t enc_msg_len,
> + uint8_t *out, void *net_mic, size_t mic_size)
> +{
> + uint8_t nonce[13];
> +
> + if (!mesh_crypto_network_nonce(ctl, ttl, seq, src, iv_index, nonce))
> + return false;
> +
> + return mesh_crypto_aes_ccm_decrypt(nonce, net_key, NULL, 0,
> + enc_msg, enc_msg_len, out,
> + net_mic, mic_size);
> +}
> +
> +bool mesh_crypto_application_nonce(uint32_t seq, uint16_t src,
> + uint16_t dst, uint32_t iv_index,
> + bool aszmic, uint8_t nonce[13])
> +{
> + nonce[0] = 0x01;
> + nonce[1] = aszmic ? 0x80 : 0x00;
> + nonce[2] = (seq & 0x00ff0000) >> 16;
> + nonce[3] = (seq & 0x0000ff00) >> 8;
> + nonce[4] = (seq & 0x000000ff);
> + nonce[5] = (src & 0xff00) >> 8;
> + nonce[6] = (src & 0x00ff);
> + nonce[7] = (dst & 0xff00) >> 8;
> + nonce[8] = (dst & 0x00ff);
> + l_put_be32(iv_index, nonce + 9);
> +
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> +bool mesh_crypto_device_nonce(uint32_t seq, uint16_t src,
> + uint16_t dst, uint32_t iv_index,
> + bool aszmic, uint8_t nonce[13])
> +{
> + nonce[0] = 0x02;
> + nonce[1] = aszmic ? 0x80 : 0x00;
> + nonce[2] = (seq & 0x00ff0000) >> 16;
> + nonce[3] = (seq & 0x0000ff00) >> 8;
> + nonce[4] = (seq & 0x000000ff);
> + nonce[5] = (src & 0xff00) >> 8;
> + nonce[6] = (src & 0x00ff);
> + nonce[7] = (dst & 0xff00) >> 8;
> + nonce[8] = (dst & 0x00ff);
> + l_put_be32(iv_index, nonce + 9);
> +
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> +bool mesh_crypto_application_encrypt(uint8_t key_id, uint32_t seq, uint16_t src,
> + uint16_t dst, uint32_t iv_index,
> + const uint8_t app_key[16],
> + const uint8_t *aad, uint8_t aad_len,
> + const uint8_t *msg, uint8_t msg_len,
> + uint8_t *out,
> + void *app_mic, size_t mic_size)
> +{
> + uint8_t nonce[13];
> + bool aszmic = (mic_size == sizeof(uint64_t)) ? true : false;
Is this sizeof(uint64_t) construct really a good idea?
> +
> + if (!key_id && !mesh_crypto_device_nonce(seq, src, dst,
> + iv_index, aszmic, nonce))
> + return false;
> +
> + if (key_id && !mesh_crypto_application_nonce(seq, src, dst,
> + iv_index, aszmic, nonce))
> + return false;
> +
> + return mesh_crypto_aes_ccm_encrypt(nonce, app_key, aad, aad_len,
> + msg, msg_len,
> + out, app_mic, mic_size);
> +}
> +
> +bool mesh_crypto_application_decrypt(uint8_t key_id, uint32_t seq, uint16_t src,
> + uint16_t dst, uint32_t iv_index,
> + const uint8_t app_key[16],
> + const uint8_t *aad, uint8_t aad_len,
> + const uint8_t *enc_msg, uint8_t enc_msg_len,
> + uint8_t *out, void *app_mic, size_t mic_size)
> +{
> + uint8_t nonce[13];
> + bool aszmic = (mic_size == sizeof(uint64_t)) ? true : false;
> +
> + if (!key_id && !mesh_crypto_device_nonce(seq, src, dst,
> + iv_index, aszmic, nonce))
> + return false;
> +
> + if (key_id && !mesh_crypto_application_nonce(seq, src, dst,
> + iv_index, aszmic, nonce))
> + return false;
> +
> + return mesh_crypto_aes_ccm_decrypt(nonce, app_key,
> + aad, aad_len, enc_msg,
> + enc_msg_len, out,
> + app_mic, mic_size);
> +}
> +
> +bool mesh_crypto_session_key(const uint8_t secret[32],
> + const uint8_t salt[16],
> + uint8_t session_key[16])
> +{
> + const uint8_t prsk[4] = "prsk";
> +
> + if (!aes_cmac_one(salt, secret, 32, session_key))
> + return false;
> +
> + return aes_cmac_one(session_key, prsk, 4, session_key);
> +}
> +
> +bool mesh_crypto_nonce(const uint8_t secret[32],
> + const uint8_t salt[16],
> + uint8_t nonce[13])
> +{
> + const uint8_t prsn[4] = "prsn";
> + uint8_t tmp[16];
> + bool result;
> +
> + if (!aes_cmac_one(salt, secret, 32, tmp))
> + return false;
> +
> + result = aes_cmac_one(tmp, prsn, 4, tmp);
Double spaces.
> +
> + if (result)
> + memcpy(nonce, tmp + 3, 13);
> +
> + return result;
> +}
> +
> +bool mesh_crypto_s1(const void *info, size_t len, uint8_t salt[16])
> +{
> + const uint8_t zero[16] = {0};
= { 0, };
> +
> + return aes_cmac_one(zero, info, len, salt);
> +}
> +
> +bool mesh_crypto_prov_prov_salt(const uint8_t conf_salt[16],
> + const uint8_t prov_rand[16],
> + const uint8_t dev_rand[16],
> + uint8_t prov_salt[16])
> +{
> + const uint8_t zero[16] = {0};
> + uint8_t tmp[16 * 3];
> +
> + memcpy(tmp, conf_salt, 16);
> + memcpy(tmp + 16, prov_rand, 16);
> + memcpy(tmp + 32, dev_rand, 16);
> +
> + return aes_cmac_one(zero, tmp, sizeof(tmp), prov_salt);
> +}
> +
> +bool mesh_crypto_prov_conf_key(const uint8_t secret[32],
> + const uint8_t salt[16],
> + uint8_t conf_key[16])
> +{
> + const uint8_t prck[4] = "prck";
> +
> + if (!aes_cmac_one(salt, secret, 32, conf_key))
> + return false;
> +
> + return aes_cmac_one(conf_key, prck, 4, conf_key);
> +}
> +
> +bool mesh_crypto_device_key(const uint8_t secret[32],
> + const uint8_t salt[16],
> + uint8_t device_key[16])
> +{
> + const uint8_t prdk[4] = "prdk";
> +
> + if (!aes_cmac_one(salt, secret, 32, device_key))
> + return false;
> +
> + return aes_cmac_one(device_key, prdk, 4, device_key);
> +}
> +
> +bool mesh_crypto_virtual_addr(const uint8_t virtual_label[16],
> + uint16_t *addr)
> +{
> + uint8_t tmp[16];
> +
> + if (!mesh_crypto_s1("vtad", 4, tmp))
> + return false;
> +
> + if (!addr || !aes_cmac_one(tmp, virtual_label, 16, tmp))
> + return false;
> +
> + *addr = (l_get_be16(tmp + 14) & 0x3fff) | 0x8000;
> +
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> +bool mesh_crypto_privacy_counter(uint32_t iv_index,
> + const uint8_t *payload,
> + uint8_t privacy_counter[16])
> +{
> + memset(privacy_counter, 0, 5);
> + l_put_be32(iv_index, privacy_counter + 5);
> + memcpy(privacy_counter + 9, payload, 7);
> +
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> +bool mesh_crypto_network_obfuscate(const uint8_t privacy_key[16],
> + const uint8_t privacy_counter[16],
> + bool ctl, uint8_t ttl, uint32_t seq,
> + uint16_t src, uint8_t *out)
> +{
> + uint8_t ecb[16], tmp[16];
> + int i;
> +
> + if (!aes_ecb_one(privacy_key, privacy_counter, ecb))
> + return false;
> +
> + tmp[0] = ((!!ctl) << 7) | (ttl & TTL_MASK);
> + tmp[1] = (seq & 0xff0000) >> 16;
> + tmp[2] = (seq & 0x00ff00) >> 8;
> + tmp[3] = (seq & 0x0000ff);
> + tmp[4] = (src & 0xff00) >> 8;
> + tmp[5] = (src & 0x00ff);
> +
> + if (out) {
> + for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
> + out[i] = ecb[i] ^ tmp[i];
> + }
> +
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> +bool mesh_crypto_network_clarify(const uint8_t privacy_key[16],
> + const uint8_t privacy_counter[16],
> + const uint8_t net_hdr[6],
> + bool *ctl, uint8_t *ttl,
> + uint32_t *seq, uint16_t *src)
> +{
> + uint8_t ecb[16], tmp[6];
> + int i;
> +
> + if (!aes_ecb_one(privacy_key, privacy_counter, ecb))
> + return false;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
> + tmp[i] = ecb[i] ^ net_hdr[i];
> +
> + if (ctl)
> + *ctl = !!(tmp[0] & CTL);
> +
> + if (ttl)
> + *ttl = tmp[0] & TTL_MASK;
> +
> + if (seq)
> + *seq = l_get_be32(tmp) & SEQ_MASK;
> +
> + if (src)
> + *src = l_get_be16(tmp + 4);
> +
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> +bool mesh_crypto_packet_build(bool ctl, uint8_t ttl,
> + uint32_t seq,
> + uint16_t src, uint16_t dst,
> + uint8_t opcode,
> + bool segmented, uint8_t key_id,
> + bool szmic, bool relay, uint16_t seqZero,
> + uint8_t segO, uint8_t segN,
> + const uint8_t *payload, uint8_t payload_len,
> + uint8_t *packet, uint8_t *packet_len)
> +{
> + uint32_t hdr;
> + size_t n;
> +
> + l_put_be32(seq, packet + 1);
> + packet[1] = (ctl ? CTL : 0) | (ttl & TTL_MASK);
> +
> + l_put_be16(src, packet + 5);
> + l_put_be16(dst, packet + 7);
> + n = 9;
> +
> + if (!ctl) {
> + hdr = segmented << SEG_HDR_SHIFT;
> + hdr |= (key_id & KEY_ID_MASK) << KEY_HDR_SHIFT;
> + if (segmented) {
> + hdr |= szmic << SZMIC_HDR_SHIFT;
> + hdr |= (seqZero & SEQ_ZERO_MASK) << SEQ_ZERO_HDR_SHIFT;
> + hdr |= (segO & SEG_MASK) << SEGO_HDR_SHIFT;
> + hdr |= (segN & SEG_MASK) << SEGN_HDR_SHIFT;
> + }
> + l_put_be32(hdr, packet + n);
> +
> + /* Only first octet is valid for unsegmented messages */
> + if (segmented)
> + n += 4;
> + else
> + n += 1;
> +
> + memcpy(packet + n, payload, payload_len);
> +
> + l_put_be32(0x00000000, packet + payload_len + n);
> + if (packet_len)
> + *packet_len = payload_len + n + 4;
> + } else {
> + if ((opcode & OPCODE_MASK) != opcode)
> + return false;
> +
> + hdr = opcode << KEY_HDR_SHIFT;
> + l_put_be32(hdr, packet + n);
> + n += 1;
> +
> + memcpy(packet + n, payload, payload_len);
> + n += payload_len;
> +
> + l_put_be64(0x0000000000000000, packet + n);
> + if (packet_len)
> + *packet_len = n + 8;
> + }
> +
> +
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> +bool mesh_crypto_packet_parse(const uint8_t *packet, uint8_t packet_len,
> + bool *ctl, uint8_t *ttl, uint32_t *seq,
> + uint16_t *src, uint16_t *dst,
> + uint32_t *cookie, uint8_t *opcode,
> + bool *segmented, uint8_t *key_id,
> + bool *szmic, bool *relay, uint16_t *seqZero,
> + uint8_t *segO, uint8_t *segN,
> + const uint8_t **payload, uint8_t *payload_len)
> +{
> + uint32_t hdr;
> + uint16_t this_dst;
> + bool is_segmented;
> +
> + if (packet_len < 14)
> + return false;
> +
> + this_dst = l_get_be16(packet + 7);
> +
> + /* Try to keep bits in the order they exist within the packet */
> + if (ctl)
> + *ctl = !!(packet[1] & CTL);
> +
> + if (ttl)
> + *ttl = packet[1] & TTL_MASK;
> +
> + if (seq)
> + *seq = l_get_be32(packet + 1) & SEQ_MASK;
> +
> + if (src)
> + *src = l_get_be16(packet + 5);
> +
> + if (dst)
> + *dst = this_dst;
> +
> + hdr = l_get_be32(packet + 9);
> +
> + is_segmented = !!((hdr >> SEG_HDR_SHIFT) & true);
> + if (segmented)
> + *segmented = is_segmented;
> +
> + if (packet[1] & CTL) {
> + uint8_t this_opcode = packet[9] & OPCODE_MASK;
> +
> + if (cookie)
> + *cookie = l_get_be32(packet + 9);
> +
> + if (opcode)
> + *opcode = this_opcode;
> +
> + if (this_dst && this_opcode == NET_OP_SEG_ACKNOWLEDGE) {
> + if (relay)
> + *relay = !!((hdr >> RELAY_HDR_SHIFT) & true);
> +
> + if (seqZero)
> + *seqZero = (hdr >> SEQ_ZERO_HDR_SHIFT) &
> + SEQ_ZERO_MASK;
> +
> + if (payload)
> + *payload = packet + 9;
> +
> + if (payload_len)
> + *payload_len = packet_len - 9 - 8;
> + } else {
> + if (payload)
> + *payload = packet + 10;
> +
> + if (payload_len)
> + *payload_len = packet_len - 10 - 8;
> + }
> + } else {
> + if (cookie)
> + *cookie = l_get_be32(packet + packet_len - 8);
> +
> + if (key_id)
> + *key_id = (hdr >> KEY_HDR_SHIFT) & KEY_ID_MASK;
> +
> + if (is_segmented) {
> + if (szmic)
> + *szmic = !!((hdr >> SZMIC_HDR_SHIFT) & true);
> +
> + if (seqZero)
> + *seqZero = (hdr >> SEQ_ZERO_HDR_SHIFT) &
> + SEQ_ZERO_MASK;
> +
> + if (segO)
> + *segO = (hdr >> SEGO_HDR_SHIFT) & SEG_MASK;
> +
> + if (segN)
> + *segN = (hdr >> SEGN_HDR_SHIFT) & SEG_MASK;
> +
> + if (payload)
> + *payload = packet + 13;
> +
> + if (payload_len)
> + *payload_len = packet_len - 13 - 4;
> + } else {
> + if (payload)
> + *payload = packet + 10;
> +
> + if (payload_len)
> + *payload_len = packet_len - 10 - 4;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> +bool mesh_crypto_payload_encrypt(uint8_t *aad, const uint8_t *payload,
> + uint8_t *out, uint16_t payload_len,
> + uint16_t src, uint16_t dst, uint8_t key_id,
> + uint32_t seq_num, uint32_t iv_index,
> + bool aszmic,
> + const uint8_t application_key[16])
> +{
> + uint8_t application_nonce[13] = { 0x01, };
> +
> + if (payload_len < 1)
> + return false;
> +
> + /* Key_ID == 0 means the Device Key is being used */
> + if (!key_id)
> + application_nonce[0] = 0x02;
> +
> + /* Seq Num */
> + l_put_be32(seq_num, application_nonce + 1);
> +
> + /* ASZMIC */
> + application_nonce[1] |= aszmic ? 0x80 : 0x00;
> +
> + /* SRC */
> + l_put_be16(src, application_nonce + 5);
> +
> + /* DST */
> + l_put_be16(dst, application_nonce + 7);
> +
> + /* IV Index */
> + l_put_be32(iv_index, application_nonce + 9);
> +
> + /* print_packet("AAD", aad, aad ? 16 : 0); */
> + /* print_packet("Nonce", application_nonce, 13); */
> + /* print_packet("Key", application_key, 16); */
> + /* print_packet("Payload[clr]", payload, payload_len); */
> +
> + if (!mesh_crypto_aes_ccm_encrypt(application_nonce, application_key,
> + aad, aad ? 16 : 0,
> + payload, payload_len,
> + out, NULL,
> + aszmic ? 8 : 4))
> + return false;
> +
> + /* print_packet("Payload[enc]", out, payload_len + (aszmic ? 8 : 4)); */
> +
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> +bool mesh_crypto_payload_decrypt(uint8_t *aad, uint16_t aad_len,
> + const uint8_t *payload, uint16_t payload_len,
> + bool szmict,
> + uint16_t src, uint16_t dst,
> + uint8_t key_id, uint32_t seq_num,
> + uint32_t iv_index, uint8_t *out,
> + const uint8_t app_key[16])
> +{
> + uint8_t app_nonce[13] = { 0x01, };
> + uint32_t mic32;
> + uint64_t mic64;
> +
> + if (payload_len < 5 || !out)
> + return false;
> +
> + /* Key_ID == 0 means the Device Key is being used */
> + if (!key_id)
> + app_nonce[0] = 0x02;
> +
> + /* Seq Num */
> + l_put_be32(seq_num, app_nonce + 1);
> +
> + /* ASZMIC */
> + app_nonce[1] |= szmict ? 0x80 : 0x00;
> +
> + /* SRC */
> + l_put_be16(src, app_nonce + 5);
> +
> + /* DST */
> + l_put_be16(dst, app_nonce + 7);
> +
> + /* IV Index */
> + l_put_be32(iv_index, app_nonce + 9);
> +
> + memcpy(out, payload, payload_len);
> +
> + /* print_packet("AAD", aad, aad_len); */
> + /* print_packet("Nonce", app_nonce, 13); */
> + /* print_packet("Key", app_key, 16); */
> + /* print_packet("Payload[enc]", payload, payload_len); */
> +
> + if (szmict) {
> + if (!mesh_crypto_aes_ccm_decrypt(app_nonce, app_key,
> + aad, aad_len,
> + payload, payload_len,
> + out, &mic64, sizeof(mic64)))
> + return false;
> +
> + mic64 ^= l_get_be64(out + payload_len - 8);
> + l_put_be64(mic64, out + payload_len - 8);
> +
> + /* print_packet("Payload[clr]", out, payload_len - 8); */
> +
> + if (mic64)
> + return false;
> + } else {
> + if (!mesh_crypto_aes_ccm_decrypt(app_nonce, app_key,
> + aad, aad_len,
> + payload, payload_len,
> + out, &mic32, sizeof(mic32)))
> + return false;
> +
> + mic32 ^= l_get_be32(out + payload_len - 4);
> + l_put_be32(mic32, out + payload_len - 4);
> +
> + /* print_packet("Payload[clr]", out, payload_len - 4); */
> +
> + if (mic32)
> + return false;
> + }
> +
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> +bool mesh_crypto_packet_encode(uint8_t *packet, uint8_t packet_len,
> + const uint8_t network_key[16],
> + uint32_t iv_index,
> + const uint8_t privacy_key[16])
> +{
> + uint8_t network_nonce[13] = { 0x00, 0x00 };
> + uint8_t privacy_counter[16] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, };
> + uint8_t tmp[16];
> + int i;
> +
> + if (packet_len < 14)
> + return false;
> +
> + /* Detect Proxy packet by CTL == true && DST == 0x0000 */
> + if ((packet[1] & CTL) && l_get_be16(packet + 7) == 0)
> + network_nonce[0] = 0x03; /* Proxy Nonce */
> + else
> + /* CTL + TTL */
> + network_nonce[1] = packet[1];
> +
> + /* Seq Num */
> + network_nonce[2] = packet[2];
> + network_nonce[3] = packet[3];
> + network_nonce[4] = packet[4];
> +
> + /* SRC */
> + network_nonce[5] = packet[5];
> + network_nonce[6] = packet[6];
> +
> + /* DST not available */
> + network_nonce[7] = 0;
> + network_nonce[8] = 0;
> +
> + /* IV Index */
> + l_put_be32(iv_index, network_nonce + 9);
> +
> + /* print_packet("Net-Nonce", network_nonce, 13); */
> + /* print_packet("Net-Key", network_key, 16); */
> + /* print_packet("Net-Payload[clr]", packet, packet_len); */
> +
> + /* Check for Long net-MIC */
> + if (packet[1] & CTL) {
> + if (!mesh_crypto_aes_ccm_encrypt(network_nonce, network_key,
> + NULL, 0,
> + packet + 7, packet_len - 7 - 8,
> + packet + 7, NULL, sizeof(uint64_t)))
> + return false;
> + } else {
> + if (!mesh_crypto_aes_ccm_encrypt(network_nonce, network_key,
> + NULL, 0,
> + packet + 7, packet_len - 7 - 4,
> + packet + 7, NULL, sizeof(uint32_t)))
> + return false;
> + }
> +
> + /* print_packet("Net-Payload[enc]", packet, packet_len); */
> +
> + l_put_be32(iv_index, privacy_counter + 5);
> + memcpy(privacy_counter + 9, packet + 7, 7);
> +
> + /* print_packet("Priv-Random", privacy_counter, 16); */
> +
> + /* print_packet("Priv-Key", privacy_key, 16); */
> +
> +
> + if (!aes_ecb_one(privacy_key, privacy_counter, tmp))
> + return false;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
> + packet[1 + i] ^= tmp[i];
> +
> + /* print_packet("Net-Private", packet, packet_len); */
> +
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> +bool mesh_crypto_packet_decode(const uint8_t *packet, uint8_t packet_len,
> + bool proxy, uint8_t *out, uint32_t iv_index,
> + const uint8_t network_key[16],
> + const uint8_t privacy_key[16])
> +{
> + uint8_t privacy_counter[16] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, };
> + uint8_t network_nonce[13] = { 0x00, 0x00, };
> + uint8_t tmp[16];
> + uint16_t src;
> + int i;
> +
> + if (packet_len < 14)
> + return false;
> +
> + /* print_packet("Priv-Key", privacy_key, 16); */
> +
> + l_put_be32(iv_index, privacy_counter + 5);
> + memcpy(privacy_counter + 9, packet + 7, 7);
> +
> + /* print_packet("Priv-Random", privacy_counter, 16); */
> +
> + if (!aes_ecb_one(privacy_key, privacy_counter, tmp))
> + return false;
> +
> + memcpy(out, packet, packet_len);
> + for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
> + out[1 + i] ^= tmp[i];
> +
> + src = l_get_be16(out + 5);
> +
> + /* Pre-check SRC address for illegal values */
> + if (!src || src >= 0x8000)
> + return false;
> +
> + /* Detect Proxy packet by CTL == true && proxy == true */
> + if ((out[1] & CTL) && proxy)
> + network_nonce[0] = 0x03; /* Proxy Nonce */
> + else
> + /* CTL + TTL */
> + network_nonce[1] = out[1];
> +
> + /* Seq Num */
> + network_nonce[2] = out[2];
> + network_nonce[3] = out[3];
> + network_nonce[4] = out[4];
> +
> + /* SRC */
> + network_nonce[5] = out[5];
> + network_nonce[6] = out[6];
> +
> + /* DST not available */
> + network_nonce[7] = 0;
> + network_nonce[8] = 0;
> +
> + /* IV Index */
> + l_put_be32(iv_index, network_nonce + 9);
> +
> + /* print_packet("Net-Nonce", network_nonce, 13); */
> + /* print_packet("Net-Key", network_key, 16); */
> + /* print_packet("Net-Pkt[enc]", out, packet_len); */
> +
> + /* Check for Long MIC */
> + if (out[1] & CTL) {
> + uint64_t mic;
> +
> + if (!mesh_crypto_aes_ccm_decrypt(network_nonce, network_key,
> + NULL, 0, packet + 7, packet_len - 7,
> + out + 7, &mic, sizeof(mic)))
> + return false;
> +
> + mic ^= l_get_be64(out + packet_len - 8);
> + l_put_be64(mic, out + packet_len - 8);
> +
> + if (mic)
> + return false;
> + } else {
> + uint32_t mic;
> +
> + if (!mesh_crypto_aes_ccm_decrypt(network_nonce, network_key,
> + NULL, 0, packet + 7, packet_len - 7,
> + out + 7, &mic, sizeof(mic)))
> + return false;
> +
> + mic ^= l_get_be32(out + packet_len - 4);
> + l_put_be32(mic, out + packet_len - 4);
> +
> + if (mic)
> + return false;
> + }
> +
> + /* print_packet("Net-Pkt[clr]", out, packet_len); */
> +
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> +bool mesh_crypto_packet_label(uint8_t *packet, uint8_t packet_len,
> + uint16_t iv_index, uint8_t network_id)
> +{
> + packet[0] = (iv_index & 0x0001) << 7 | (network_id & 0x7f);
> +
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> +/* reversed, 8-bit, poly=0x07 */
> +static const uint8_t crc_table[256] = {
> + 0x00, 0x91, 0xe3, 0x72, 0x07, 0x96, 0xe4, 0x75,
> + 0x0e, 0x9f, 0xed, 0x7c, 0x09, 0x98, 0xea, 0x7b,
> + 0x1c, 0x8d, 0xff, 0x6e, 0x1b, 0x8a, 0xf8, 0x69,
> + 0x12, 0x83, 0xf1, 0x60, 0x15, 0x84, 0xf6, 0x67,
> +
> + 0x38, 0xa9, 0xdb, 0x4a, 0x3f, 0xae, 0xdc, 0x4d,
> + 0x36, 0xa7, 0xd5, 0x44, 0x31, 0xa0, 0xd2, 0x43,
> + 0x24, 0xb5, 0xc7, 0x56, 0x23, 0xb2, 0xc0, 0x51,
> + 0x2a, 0xbb, 0xc9, 0x58, 0x2d, 0xbc, 0xce, 0x5f,
> +
> + 0x70, 0xe1, 0x93, 0x02, 0x77, 0xe6, 0x94, 0x05,
> + 0x7e, 0xef, 0x9d, 0x0c, 0x79, 0xe8, 0x9a, 0x0b,
> + 0x6c, 0xfd, 0x8f, 0x1e, 0x6b, 0xfa, 0x88, 0x19,
> + 0x62, 0xf3, 0x81, 0x10, 0x65, 0xf4, 0x86, 0x17,
> +
> + 0x48, 0xd9, 0xab, 0x3a, 0x4f, 0xde, 0xac, 0x3d,
> + 0x46, 0xd7, 0xa5, 0x34, 0x41, 0xd0, 0xa2, 0x33,
> + 0x54, 0xc5, 0xb7, 0x26, 0x53, 0xc2, 0xb0, 0x21,
> + 0x5a, 0xcb, 0xb9, 0x28, 0x5d, 0xcc, 0xbe, 0x2f,
> +
> + 0xe0, 0x71, 0x03, 0x92, 0xe7, 0x76, 0x04, 0x95,
> + 0xee, 0x7f, 0x0d, 0x9c, 0xe9, 0x78, 0x0a, 0x9b,
> + 0xfc, 0x6d, 0x1f, 0x8e, 0xfb, 0x6a, 0x18, 0x89,
> + 0xf2, 0x63, 0x11, 0x80, 0xf5, 0x64, 0x16, 0x87,
> +
> + 0xd8, 0x49, 0x3b, 0xaa, 0xdf, 0x4e, 0x3c, 0xad,
> + 0xd6, 0x47, 0x35, 0xa4, 0xd1, 0x40, 0x32, 0xa3,
> + 0xc4, 0x55, 0x27, 0xb6, 0xc3, 0x52, 0x20, 0xb1,
> + 0xca, 0x5b, 0x29, 0xb8, 0xcd, 0x5c, 0x2e, 0xbf,
> +
> + 0x90, 0x01, 0x73, 0xe2, 0x97, 0x06, 0x74, 0xe5,
> + 0x9e, 0x0f, 0x7d, 0xec, 0x99, 0x08, 0x7a, 0xeb,
> + 0x8c, 0x1d, 0x6f, 0xfe, 0x8b, 0x1a, 0x68, 0xf9,
> + 0x82, 0x13, 0x61, 0xf0, 0x85, 0x14, 0x66, 0xf7,
> +
> + 0xa8, 0x39, 0x4b, 0xda, 0xaf, 0x3e, 0x4c, 0xdd,
> + 0xa6, 0x37, 0x45, 0xd4, 0xa1, 0x30, 0x42, 0xd3,
> + 0xb4, 0x25, 0x57, 0xc6, 0xb3, 0x22, 0x50, 0xc1,
> + 0xba, 0x2b, 0x59, 0xc8, 0xbd, 0x2c, 0x5e, 0xcf
> +};
> +
> +uint8_t mesh_crypto_compute_fcs(const uint8_t *packet, uint8_t packet_len)
> +{
> + uint8_t fcs = 0xff;
> + int i;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < packet_len; i++)
> + fcs = crc_table[fcs ^ packet[i]];
> +
> + return 0xff - fcs;
> +}
> +
> +bool mesh_crypto_check_fcs(const uint8_t *packet, uint8_t packet_len,
> + uint8_t received_fcs)
> +{
> + uint8_t fcs = 0xff;
> + int i;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < packet_len; i++)
> + fcs = crc_table[fcs ^ packet[i]];
> +
> + fcs = crc_table[fcs ^ received_fcs];
> +
> + if (fcs != 0xcf)
> + l_error("IOT Warning! CRC %2.2x != 0xcf", fcs);
This one is bad as well. The caller can print an error if chosen.
Regards
Marcel
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