From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@xxxxxxxxx>
There's no need to export the smp_distribute_keys() function since the
resume callback is called in the same scenario. This patch makes the
smp_notify_keys function private (at the same time moving it higher up
in smp.c to avoid forward declarations) and adds a resume callback for
SMP to call it from there instead.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@xxxxxxxxx>
---
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 6 -
net/bluetooth/smp.c | 380 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
net/bluetooth/smp.h | 1 -
3 files changed, 196 insertions(+), 191 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
index 40b6c06ab2c0..4de1e1827055 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
@@ -7281,12 +7281,6 @@ int l2cap_security_cfm(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 status, u8 encrypt)
BT_DBG("conn %p status 0x%2.2x encrypt %u", conn, status, encrypt);
- if (hcon->type == LE_LINK) {
- if (!status && encrypt)
- smp_distribute_keys(conn);
- cancel_delayed_work(&conn->security_timer);
- }
-
mutex_lock(&conn->chan_lock);
list_for_each_entry(chan, &conn->chan_l, list) {
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 744f678ac3e8..28014ad3d2d3 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -575,6 +575,189 @@ static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp)
return 0;
}
+static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
+{
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+ struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing *req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
+ bool persistent;
+
+ if (smp->remote_irk) {
+ mgmt_new_irk(hdev, smp->remote_irk);
+ /* Now that user space can be considered to know the
+ * identity address track the connection based on it
+ * from now on.
+ */
+ bacpy(&hcon->dst, &smp->remote_irk->bdaddr);
+ hcon->dst_type = smp->remote_irk->addr_type;
+ l2cap_conn_update_id_addr(hcon);
+
+ /* When receiving an indentity resolving key for
+ * a remote device that does not use a resolvable
+ * private address, just remove the key so that
+ * it is possible to use the controller white
+ * list for scanning.
+ *
+ * Userspace will have been told to not store
+ * this key at this point. So it is safe to
+ * just remove it.
+ */
+ if (!bacmp(&smp->remote_irk->rpa, BDADDR_ANY)) {
+ list_del(&smp->remote_irk->list);
+ kfree(smp->remote_irk);
+ smp->remote_irk = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* The LTKs and CSRKs should be persistent only if both sides
+ * had the bonding bit set in their authentication requests.
+ */
+ persistent = !!((req->auth_req & rsp->auth_req) & SMP_AUTH_BONDING);
+
+ if (smp->csrk) {
+ smp->csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
+ bacpy(&smp->csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
+ mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->csrk, persistent);
+ }
+
+ if (smp->slave_csrk) {
+ smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
+ bacpy(&smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
+ mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->slave_csrk, persistent);
+ }
+
+ if (smp->ltk) {
+ smp->ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
+ bacpy(&smp->ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
+ mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->ltk, persistent);
+ }
+
+ if (smp->slave_ltk) {
+ smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
+ bacpy(&smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
+ mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->slave_ltk, persistent);
+ }
+}
+
+static int smp_distribute_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
+{
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+ struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+ __u8 *keydist;
+
+ BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+
+ if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags))
+ return 0;
+
+ rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
+
+ /* The responder sends its keys first */
+ if (hcon->out && (smp->remote_key_dist & 0x07))
+ return 0;
+
+ req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
+
+ if (hcon->out) {
+ keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist;
+ *keydist &= req->init_key_dist;
+ } else {
+ keydist = &rsp->resp_key_dist;
+ *keydist &= req->resp_key_dist;
+ }
+
+ BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", *keydist);
+
+ if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) {
+ struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc;
+ struct smp_cmd_master_ident ident;
+ struct smp_ltk *ltk;
+ u8 authenticated;
+ __le16 ediv;
+ __le64 rand;
+
+ get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, sizeof(enc.ltk));
+ get_random_bytes(&ediv, sizeof(ediv));
+ get_random_bytes(&rand, sizeof(rand));
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO, sizeof(enc), &enc);
+
+ authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
+ ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
+ SMP_LTK_SLAVE, authenticated, enc.ltk,
+ smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand);
+ smp->slave_ltk = ltk;
+
+ ident.ediv = ediv;
+ ident.rand = rand;
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT, sizeof(ident), &ident);
+
+ *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
+ }
+
+ if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) {
+ struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info addrinfo;
+ struct smp_cmd_ident_info idinfo;
+
+ memcpy(idinfo.irk, hdev->irk, sizeof(idinfo.irk));
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO, sizeof(idinfo), &idinfo);
+
+ /* The hci_conn contains the local identity address
+ * after the connection has been established.
+ *
+ * This is true even when the connection has been
+ * established using a resolvable random address.
+ */
+ bacpy(&addrinfo.bdaddr, &hcon->src);
+ addrinfo.addr_type = hcon->src_type;
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO, sizeof(addrinfo),
+ &addrinfo);
+
+ *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
+ }
+
+ if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) {
+ struct smp_cmd_sign_info sign;
+ struct smp_csrk *csrk;
+
+ /* Generate a new random key */
+ get_random_bytes(sign.csrk, sizeof(sign.csrk));
+
+ csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (csrk) {
+ csrk->master = 0x00;
+ memcpy(csrk->val, sign.csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
+ }
+ smp->slave_csrk = csrk;
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign);
+
+ *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;
+ }
+
+ /* If there are still keys to be received wait for them */
+ if ((smp->remote_key_dist & 0x07))
+ return 0;
+
+ clear_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags);
+ cancel_delayed_work_sync(&conn->security_timer);
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
+ smp_notify_keys(conn);
+
+ smp_chan_destroy(conn);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
{
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
@@ -1294,189 +1477,6 @@ done:
return err;
}
-static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
-{
- struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
- struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
- struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
- struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
- struct smp_cmd_pairing *req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
- struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
- bool persistent;
-
- if (smp->remote_irk) {
- mgmt_new_irk(hdev, smp->remote_irk);
- /* Now that user space can be considered to know the
- * identity address track the connection based on it
- * from now on.
- */
- bacpy(&hcon->dst, &smp->remote_irk->bdaddr);
- hcon->dst_type = smp->remote_irk->addr_type;
- l2cap_conn_update_id_addr(hcon);
-
- /* When receiving an indentity resolving key for
- * a remote device that does not use a resolvable
- * private address, just remove the key so that
- * it is possible to use the controller white
- * list for scanning.
- *
- * Userspace will have been told to not store
- * this key at this point. So it is safe to
- * just remove it.
- */
- if (!bacmp(&smp->remote_irk->rpa, BDADDR_ANY)) {
- list_del(&smp->remote_irk->list);
- kfree(smp->remote_irk);
- smp->remote_irk = NULL;
- }
- }
-
- /* The LTKs and CSRKs should be persistent only if both sides
- * had the bonding bit set in their authentication requests.
- */
- persistent = !!((req->auth_req & rsp->auth_req) & SMP_AUTH_BONDING);
-
- if (smp->csrk) {
- smp->csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
- bacpy(&smp->csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
- mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->csrk, persistent);
- }
-
- if (smp->slave_csrk) {
- smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
- bacpy(&smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
- mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->slave_csrk, persistent);
- }
-
- if (smp->ltk) {
- smp->ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
- bacpy(&smp->ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
- mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->ltk, persistent);
- }
-
- if (smp->slave_ltk) {
- smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
- bacpy(&smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
- mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->slave_ltk, persistent);
- }
-}
-
-int smp_distribute_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
-{
- struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
- struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
- struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
- struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
- struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
- __u8 *keydist;
-
- BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
-
- if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags))
- return 0;
-
- rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
-
- /* The responder sends its keys first */
- if (hcon->out && (smp->remote_key_dist & 0x07))
- return 0;
-
- req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
-
- if (hcon->out) {
- keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist;
- *keydist &= req->init_key_dist;
- } else {
- keydist = &rsp->resp_key_dist;
- *keydist &= req->resp_key_dist;
- }
-
- BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", *keydist);
-
- if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) {
- struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc;
- struct smp_cmd_master_ident ident;
- struct smp_ltk *ltk;
- u8 authenticated;
- __le16 ediv;
- __le64 rand;
-
- get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, sizeof(enc.ltk));
- get_random_bytes(&ediv, sizeof(ediv));
- get_random_bytes(&rand, sizeof(rand));
-
- smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO, sizeof(enc), &enc);
-
- authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
- ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
- SMP_LTK_SLAVE, authenticated, enc.ltk,
- smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand);
- smp->slave_ltk = ltk;
-
- ident.ediv = ediv;
- ident.rand = rand;
-
- smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT, sizeof(ident), &ident);
-
- *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
- }
-
- if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) {
- struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info addrinfo;
- struct smp_cmd_ident_info idinfo;
-
- memcpy(idinfo.irk, hdev->irk, sizeof(idinfo.irk));
-
- smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO, sizeof(idinfo), &idinfo);
-
- /* The hci_conn contains the local identity address
- * after the connection has been established.
- *
- * This is true even when the connection has been
- * established using a resolvable random address.
- */
- bacpy(&addrinfo.bdaddr, &hcon->src);
- addrinfo.addr_type = hcon->src_type;
-
- smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO, sizeof(addrinfo),
- &addrinfo);
-
- *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
- }
-
- if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) {
- struct smp_cmd_sign_info sign;
- struct smp_csrk *csrk;
-
- /* Generate a new random key */
- get_random_bytes(sign.csrk, sizeof(sign.csrk));
-
- csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (csrk) {
- csrk->master = 0x00;
- memcpy(csrk->val, sign.csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
- }
- smp->slave_csrk = csrk;
-
- smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign);
-
- *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;
- }
-
- /* If there are still keys to be received wait for them */
- if ((smp->remote_key_dist & 0x07))
- return 0;
-
- clear_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags);
- cancel_delayed_work_sync(&conn->security_timer);
- set_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
- smp_notify_keys(conn);
-
- smp_chan_destroy(conn);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
static void smp_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err)
{
struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
@@ -1492,6 +1492,18 @@ static void smp_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err)
l2cap_chan_put(chan);
}
+static void smp_resume_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
+{
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+
+ BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
+
+ if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
+ smp_distribute_keys(conn);
+ cancel_delayed_work(&conn->security_timer);
+}
+
static void smp_ready_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
{
struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
@@ -1524,13 +1536,13 @@ static const struct l2cap_ops smp_chan_ops = {
.recv = smp_recv_cb,
.alloc_skb = smp_alloc_skb_cb,
.teardown = smp_teardown_cb,
+ .resume = smp_resume_cb,
.new_connection = l2cap_chan_no_new_connection,
.state_change = l2cap_chan_no_state_change,
.close = l2cap_chan_no_close,
.defer = l2cap_chan_no_defer,
.suspend = l2cap_chan_no_suspend,
- .resume = l2cap_chan_no_resume,
.set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown,
.get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo,
.memcpy_fromiovec = l2cap_chan_no_memcpy_fromiovec,
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.h b/net/bluetooth/smp.h
index 161ace3c3234..59a594278a85 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.h
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.h
@@ -126,7 +126,6 @@ enum {
/* SMP Commands */
bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level);
int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level);
-int smp_distribute_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn);
int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *conn, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey);
void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn);
--
1.9.3
--
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