Hi Lizardo, On Tue, Feb 14, 2012, Anderson Lizardo wrote: > This series fixes issues when doing reverse GATT service discovery over LE. > > There is still one open issue: If BlueZ creates a device without bonding (i.e. > CreateDevice() D-Bus method), but the remote requests SMP pairing with > "Security Request", at the end of the pairing a reverse GATT service discovery > is issued, *regardless* of BlueZ being the initiator or not. BlueZ should only > do reverse discovery if it is the acceptor (see comments on the > device_bonding_complete() function on src/device.c). > > To fix this, I think we need to have a more robust way to check whether we are > initiator or acceptor, instead of simply checking for an active bonding > request. Currently, if BlueZ receives keys from kernel over mgmt, > device_bonding_complete() is eventually called, and if there is no active > bonding, BlueZ assumes to be an acceptor. > > In any case, with these patches we make sure this spurious service discovery > will not crash BlueZ or create leaks. It is also applicable for "normal" > reverse service discovery as well. All four patches have been applied. Thanks. Johan -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-bluetooth" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
