This adds support for generating and distributing all the keys
specified in the third phase of SMP.
This will make possible to re-establish secure connections, resolve
private addresses and sign commands.
For now, the values generated are random.
Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
include/net/bluetooth/smp.h | 1 +
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 1 +
net/bluetooth/smp.c | 114 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
3 files changed, 114 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/smp.h b/include/net/bluetooth/smp.h
index 4fb7d19..46c4576 100644
--- a/include/net/bluetooth/smp.h
+++ b/include/net/bluetooth/smp.h
@@ -118,5 +118,6 @@ struct smp_cmd_security_req {
/* SMP Commands */
int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level);
int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb);
+int smp_distribute_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 force);
#endif /* __SMP_H */
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
index bd5d992..78e5b68 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
@@ -4177,6 +4177,7 @@ static int l2cap_security_cfm(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 status, u8 encrypt)
chan->sec_level = hcon->sec_level;
del_timer(&conn->security_timer);
l2cap_chan_ready(sk);
+ smp_distribute_keys(conn, 0);
}
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index ba55bd4..82443b9 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -202,8 +202,8 @@ static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
cmd->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
cmd->oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
cmd->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
- cmd->init_key_dist = 0x00;
- cmd->resp_key_dist = 0x00;
+ cmd->init_key_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_ID_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
+ cmd->resp_key_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_ID_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
cmd->auth_req = authreq;
}
@@ -474,6 +474,26 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level)
return 0;
}
+static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+ /* FIXME: store the ltk */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing *paircmd = (void *) &conn->prsp[1];
+ u8 keydist = paircmd->init_key_dist;
+
+ BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", keydist);
+ /* FIXME: store ediv and rand */
+
+ smp_distribute_keys(conn, 1);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
__u8 code = skb->data[0];
@@ -521,10 +541,20 @@ int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
break;
case SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO:
+ reason = smp_cmd_encrypt_info(conn, skb);
+ break;
+
case SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT:
+ reason = smp_cmd_master_ident(conn, skb);
+ break;
+
case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO:
case SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO:
case SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO:
+ /* Just ignored */
+ reason = 0;
+ break;
+
default:
BT_DBG("Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code);
@@ -541,3 +571,83 @@ done:
kfree_skb(skb);
return err;
}
+
+int smp_distribute_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 force)
+{
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
+ __u8 *keydist;
+
+ BT_DBG("conn %p force %d", conn, force);
+
+ if (IS_ERR(conn->hcon->hdev->tfm))
+ return PTR_ERR(conn->hcon->hdev->tfm);
+
+ rsp = (void *) &conn->prsp[1];
+
+ /* The responder sends its keys first */
+ if (!force && conn->hcon->out && (rsp->resp_key_dist & 0x07))
+ return 0;
+
+ req = (void *) &conn->preq[1];
+
+ if (conn->hcon->out) {
+ keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist;
+ *keydist &= req->init_key_dist;
+ } else {
+ keydist = &rsp->resp_key_dist;
+ *keydist &= req->resp_key_dist;
+ }
+
+
+ BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", *keydist);
+
+ if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) {
+ struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc;
+ struct smp_cmd_master_ident ident;
+ __le16 ediv;
+
+ get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, sizeof(enc.ltk));
+ get_random_bytes(&ediv, sizeof(ediv));
+ get_random_bytes(ident.rand, sizeof(ident.rand));
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO, sizeof(enc), &enc);
+
+ ident.ediv = cpu_to_le16(ediv);
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT, sizeof(ident), &ident);
+
+ *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
+ }
+
+ if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) {
+ struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info addrinfo;
+ struct smp_cmd_ident_info idinfo;
+
+ /* Send a dummy key */
+ get_random_bytes(idinfo.irk, sizeof(idinfo.irk));
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO, sizeof(idinfo), &idinfo);
+
+ /* Just public address */
+ memset(&addrinfo, 0, sizeof(addrinfo));
+ bacpy(&addrinfo.bdaddr, conn->src);
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO, sizeof(addrinfo),
+ &addrinfo);
+
+ *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
+ }
+
+ if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) {
+ struct smp_cmd_sign_info sign;
+
+ /* Send a dummy key */
+ get_random_bytes(sign.csrk, sizeof(sign.csrk));
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign);
+
+ *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
--
1.7.6
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