This adds support for generating and distributing all the keys specified in the third phase of SMP. This will make possible to re-establish secure connections, resolve private addresses and sign commands. For now, the values generated are random. Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- include/net/bluetooth/smp.h | 1 + net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 1 + net/bluetooth/smp.c | 114 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 114 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/smp.h b/include/net/bluetooth/smp.h index 4fb7d19..46c4576 100644 --- a/include/net/bluetooth/smp.h +++ b/include/net/bluetooth/smp.h @@ -118,5 +118,6 @@ struct smp_cmd_security_req { /* SMP Commands */ int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level); int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb); +int smp_distribute_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 force); #endif /* __SMP_H */ diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c index 9ec9c8c..a9553b3 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c @@ -4177,6 +4177,7 @@ static int l2cap_security_cfm(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 status, u8 encrypt) chan->sec_level = hcon->sec_level; del_timer(&conn->security_timer); l2cap_chan_ready(sk); + smp_distribute_keys(conn, 0); } bh_unlock_sock(sk); diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c index a36f870..1863c574 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c @@ -202,8 +202,8 @@ static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, cmd->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability; cmd->oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT; cmd->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE; - cmd->init_key_dist = 0x00; - cmd->resp_key_dist = 0x00; + cmd->init_key_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_ID_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN; + cmd->resp_key_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_ID_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN; cmd->auth_req = authreq; } @@ -471,6 +471,26 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level) return 0; } +static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); + /* FIXME: store the ltk */ + return 0; +} + +static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct smp_cmd_pairing *paircmd = (void *) &conn->prsp[1]; + u8 keydist = paircmd->init_key_dist; + + BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", keydist); + /* FIXME: store ediv and rand */ + + smp_distribute_keys(conn, 1); + + return 0; +} + int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) { __u8 code = skb->data[0]; @@ -512,10 +532,20 @@ int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) break; case SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO: + reason = smp_cmd_encrypt_info(conn, skb); + break; + case SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT: + reason = smp_cmd_master_ident(conn, skb); + break; + case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO: case SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO: case SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO: + /* Just ignored */ + reason = 0; + break; + default: BT_DBG("Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code); @@ -532,3 +562,83 @@ done: kfree_skb(skb); return err; } + +int smp_distribute_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 force) +{ + struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp; + __u8 *keydist; + + BT_DBG("conn %p force %d", conn, force); + + if (IS_ERR(conn->hcon->hdev->tfm)) + return PTR_ERR(conn->hcon->hdev->tfm); + + rsp = (void *) &conn->prsp[1]; + + /* The responder sends its keys first */ + if (!force && conn->hcon->out && (rsp->resp_key_dist & 0x07)) + return 0; + + req = (void *) &conn->preq[1]; + + if (conn->hcon->out) { + keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist; + *keydist &= req->init_key_dist; + } else { + keydist = &rsp->resp_key_dist; + *keydist &= req->resp_key_dist; + } + + + BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", *keydist); + + if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) { + struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc; + struct smp_cmd_master_ident ident; + __le16 ediv; + + get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, sizeof(enc.ltk)); + get_random_bytes(&ediv, sizeof(ediv)); + get_random_bytes(ident.rand, sizeof(ident.rand)); + + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO, sizeof(enc), &enc); + + ident.ediv = cpu_to_le16(ediv); + + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT, sizeof(ident), &ident); + + *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY; + } + + if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) { + struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info addrinfo; + struct smp_cmd_ident_info idinfo; + + /* Send a dummy key */ + get_random_bytes(idinfo.irk, sizeof(idinfo.irk)); + + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO, sizeof(idinfo), &idinfo); + + /* Just public address */ + memset(&addrinfo, 0, sizeof(addrinfo)); + bacpy(&addrinfo.bdaddr, conn->src); + + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO, sizeof(addrinfo), + &addrinfo); + + *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; + } + + if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) { + struct smp_cmd_sign_info sign; + + /* Send a dummy key */ + get_random_bytes(sign.csrk, sizeof(sign.csrk)); + + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign); + + *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN; + } + + return 0; +} -- 1.7.6 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-bluetooth" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html