Due to the race condition between l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen and l2cap_sock_close_cb, l2cap_sock_kill can receive already freed sk, resulting in use-after-free inside l2cap_sock_kill. This patch prevent this by adding a null check in l2cap_sock_kill. Context 1: l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen(); // context switched l2cap_chan_lock(chan); l2cap_sock_kill(sk); // <-- sk is already freed below Context 2: l2cap_chan_timeout(); l2cap_chan_lock(chan); chan->ops->close(chan); l2cap_sock_close_cb() l2cap_sock_kill(sk); // <-- sk is freed here l2cap_chan_unlock(chan); Signed-off-by: Sungwoo Kim <iam@xxxxxxxxxxxx> --- net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c index ca8f07f35..657704059 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c @@ -1245,7 +1245,7 @@ static int l2cap_sock_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, */ static void l2cap_sock_kill(struct sock *sk) { - if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED) || sk->sk_socket) + if (!sk || !sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED) || sk->sk_socket) return; BT_DBG("sk %p state %s", sk, state_to_string(sk->sk_state)); -- 2.25.1